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Foreword 
Human transformation of freshwater ecosystems is rapidly exceeding capacity required to sustain the 
conditions we need to survive and thrive. Water crises are already impacting people around the globe – 
from river basins in California and China, to the cities of São Palo and Bangkok. Under current population 
and growth trends, the 2030 Water Resources Group predicts global water demand will exceed available 
supply by 40 percent by 2030. 
Humans have used, benefited from, and shaped the natural environment for the whole of human history. 
But what we have not done – especially in the course of industrialization and modernization – is find 
effective ways to integrate natural ecosystems into our economic and social systems. In response to 
these challenges, The Rockefeller Foundation’s work focuses on incentive-based solutions that harness 
the importance of ecosystems as an asset for smart development, economic and social progress, and 
long-term resilience. In our work on agriculture and food security, climate change, energy, and fisheries, 
we seek new approaches to environmental care that will create incentives for the wise use of resources, 
and preserve their resilience. And in all of our work we place particular emphasis on the effects of these 
solutions on the poor or otherwise vulnerable members of society, who are most directly dependent on 
ecosystems to meet their basic needs and are mostly likely to bear the consequences of environmental 
degradation. 
Freshwater crises are representative of the kind of misaligned incentives we seek to correct. Freshwater 
allocation and management systems often place little value on the benefits of functioning ecosystems. 
This, in turn, leads to a vicious cycle in which ecosystem degradation and overuse reduce future water 
supplies, making even more people vulnerable to water scarcity. As water crises continue to capture 
public attention – in January, the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2015 named water crises 
the number one economic risk in terms of impact – and decision makers worldwide scramble for answers, 
The Rockefeller Foundation is eager to help support the identification of sound solutions by synthesiz-
ing the knowledge and lessons from past and current water management interventions.
The synthesis report that follows examines several incentive-based instruments for improving freshwa-
ter management for all users, including poor and vulnerable populations and the freshwater ecosystems 
themselves. The report examines the economic, social, and environmental performance of three tools, 
which were selected because: there is growing interest in applying these instruments in a range of 
settings, they are clearly focused on voluntary transactions rather than sanctions or voluntary standards, 
they can be applied to improve water quality or quantity, and there is an existing body of literature about 
their implementation upon which we can build. However, one of the key findings is that these transac-
tions are often not voluntary. The report highlights the importance of finding a fit between a commu-
nity’s water goals and the water management tool(s) it might choose and, perhaps most importantly, it 
characterizes the enabling conditions required for their effective implementation. We hope this synthesis 
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review will serve as an entry point for those exploring opportunities to improve the management of 
freshwater, and will spark the development of more robust solutions to improve our management and 
maintenance of freshwater systems. 
We hope that you will find this report useful and encourage you to explore the accompanying learning 
tool at freshwater.issuelab.org and to share it widely with colleagues.
Dr. Fred Boltz
Managing Director, Ecosystems
The Rockefeller Foundation 
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Executive summary
Water is one of our most precious and valuable resources and is fundamental for maintaining human 
health, economic activity, and critical ecosystem functions. Yet, we can see clear signs of the overexploi-
tation of available freshwater resources and the resultant inability to meet basic human and ecosystem 
needs. Already, some iconic rivers, such as the Colorado in the United States and the Yellow in China, no 
longer reach the sea. Groundwater withdrawals have tripled over the past 50 years, with groundwater ex-
traction exceeding natural recharge in some areas, causing widespread depletion and declining ground-
water levels. More than 660 million people lack access to an improved drinking water source, predomi-
nantly in sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, and some 2.4 billion people lack access to basic sanitation.1 
At the same time, the world’s water quality is becoming increasingly degraded, with water pollution exac-
erbating the challenges posed by water scarcity. Pressure on water resources is intensifying in response 
to challenges such as economic and population growth, and, in turn, is having major impacts on our 
social, economic, and environmental well-being. 
With traditional approaches to managing water having proven insufficient to address these challenges, 
new approaches and policies are needed. Policy makers and water managers are showing increasing 
interest in incentive-based instruments to reduce pressure on water resources. 
In most regions, laws and regulations have been the primary policy tools employed to improve envi-
ronmental outcomes. However, over the past several decades, the environmental policy “toolkit” has 
expanded to include incentive-based instruments that use financial means, directly or indirectly, to 
motivate responsible parties to reallocate water, or reduce the health and environmental risks posed by 
their facilities, processes, or products. 
This report provides a synthesis review of a set of incentive-based instruments that have been employed 
to varying degrees around the world. It is part of an effort by The Rockefeller Foundation to improve 
understanding of both the potential of these instruments and their limitations. The report is divided into 
five sections. Section 1 provides an introduction to the synthesis review. Section 2 describes the research 
methodology. Section 3 provides background on policy instruments and detail on three incentive-based 
instruments – water trading, payment for ecosystem services, and water quality trading – describing the 
application of each, including their environmental, economic, and social performances, and the condi-
tions needed for their implementation. Section 4 highlights the role of the private sector in implementing 
these instruments, and Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions.
Water trading 
Water trading refers to the temporary or permanent transfer of the right to use water in exchange for 
some form of compensation. It is perhaps the best known and most widely used method of reallocating 
water. It has proven, in some cases, to be less expensive, more flexible, and less time-consuming than 
1 An “improved” drinking-water source is one that, by nature of its construction and when properly used, adequately protects the source 
from outside contamination, particularly fecal matter.
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developing new water supplies through, for example, constructing new diversion structures or desali-
nation plants. Similarly, water trading is generally a more accepted method of reallocating water than 
state appropriation or revoking of existing water rights. Today, examples of successful water trading 
in Australia and other locations – combined with classic economic theory which suggests that market 
mechanisms can optimize resource allocation – have heightened interest in this instrument in both 
academic literature and popular media.
Water trading occurs within sectors, from agriculture-to-agriculture and urban-to-urban, across sectors 
and, less frequently, from either of these to the environment. Water trading exists, to varying degrees, 
in countries around the world, though the most active water trading markets are in Australia and the 
western United States. In Australia, the total value of water trading in fiscal year 2012–13 exceeded 
$1.4 billion, with much of that activity concentrated within the Murray-Darling Basin. While the total 
volume of water traded via long-term trades within the Murray-Darling Basin decreased slightly in fiscal 
year 2012–2013, the volume of water traded via short-term trades increased by 44 percent from the 
previous year, from almost 3.5 to 5.0 million acre-feet (MAF), or about 50 percent of the total surface 
water use in the basin.2 In the western United States, where the scale of water trading is considerably 
lower, there were more than 4,000 water trades between 1987 and 2008. In 2011, the most recent year 
for which data are available, more than 1.4 MAF of water were traded in California, representing about 
4  percent of the total water use that year. Of that amount, 42  percent of the water traded went to 
municipal and industrial users, 37 percent to agricultural users, 17 percent was used for environmental 
purposes, and the remainder was for mixed uses.
The actual results of water trading worldwide have been decidedly mixed, due to two key challenges: ex-
ternalities and transaction costs. In Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin, the federal government overcame 
some of those challenges by investing more than $3 billion to purchase water for the environment, pro-
tecting ecological resources and directly addressing one of the major challenges to water trading. This 
has facilitated trading in the basin and reduced transaction costs by shifting them to national taxpayers. 
Over the last 30 years, the federal government also implemented significant institutional changes that 
facilitated trading and reduced transaction costs. Short-term water trading within irrigation districts in 
the United States, such as within the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, occurs smoothly 
and quickly because intra-district trades undergo very limited oversight, and because the third-party 
impacts of such trades tend to be small or negligible.
However, these examples of successful water trading regimes are countered by critical arguments and 
examples of less-successful trades from various parts of the world. Many authors challenge the applica-
bility and efficacy of water trading, contending that externalities and the unique characteristics of water 
itself pose significant obstacles to trading water. Many of these externalities arise from the physical 
properties of water: it is heavy, unwieldy, and easily contaminated; varies seasonally and from year to 
year; and is readily lost through evaporation, seepage, or runoff. Further, externalities may be borne by 
disparate parties, such as the environment or future generations, challenging efforts to compensate 
those injured by trading. Questions of externalities, commodification, and the special nature of water 
2 An acre-foot, the conventional unit of water measurement in the western United States, is equivalent to 325,851 gallons or 1,233.48 m3. 
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itself highlight the challenges faced when seeking to implement or expand water trading. Critics also 
highlight the many examples of “buy-and-dry” water trades, where water-rich agricultural areas sell their 
water rights, often to wealthier cities, only to find that rural communities as a whole suffer when agricul-
tural production declines. Critics have pointed to examples around the world where wealthy communi-
ties or interests have purchased and withdrawn water from less powerful, poor rural areas.
The environmental performance of water trading has been highly variable, depending on the type of 
trade and site-specific conditions. Water trading has been used as a mechanism to obtain water for 
ecological purposes, to augment streamflow, and to address water quality concerns (such as tempera-
ture) in threatened reaches. The benefits of voluntary, incentive-based water acquisition include ease 
of transaction and greater community support, especially relative to regulatory takings,3 though in most 
areas, such activity still represents a tiny fraction of total water use in any given area. In California, in the 
last three decades, environmental water purchases averaged 152,000 acre-feet per year, accounting for 
about 14 percent of trading activity and less than 0.5 percent of total water use in the state. Conversely, 
water trades for other purposes can inadvertently harm the environment. They can, for example, change 
the timing, quantity, and quality of return flows, adversely affecting riparian and wetland habitats and the 
species that depend upon them.
Water trading has rarely been employed to address equity challenges. Indeed, water trading can exacer-
bate social and economic inequalities, worsening gender and geographic differences. Unequal access to 
water markets due to unequal access to information or credit can distort outcomes and reduce market 
efficiency. On the other hand, water trading that promotes water-use efficiency rather than fallowing of 
agricultural land can improve socio-economic outcomes for both the area of origin and the destination. 
Water trading’s social impacts vary based on several factors, including the relative economic health of 
the area of origin and the purchasing area, whether or not the water leaves the area of origin, the process 
used to trade the water, the relative economic and political power of the parties, gender differences 
regarding access to and control of water, the amount of trading activity in the area, and the legitimacy of 
the water rights being traded. Impacts often vary within the same community, as those with water rights 
or allocations to trade receive compensation, while third parties – such as irrigation equipment suppliers 
or farmworkers – may suffer a loss of revenue or income as a result of trading.
Institutional arrangements are among the most important factors that determine the ultimate success or 
failure of water trading. Successful water trading requires secure and flexible water rights that recognize 
and protect users and others from externalities. Such institutional arrangements also need to be flexible 
enough to adapt to changing physical conditions as well as changing social norms, such as the growing 
interest in meeting environmental needs and protecting water quality. Some factors, such as access to 
timely information about water available to trade, can enable water trading but may not be required. 
Other factors, such as legal and transferable rights to use water, may be necessary for water trading to 
occur. Still other factors, such as “no injury” regulations and “area of origin” protection, limit water trading 
or can function as barriers or obstacles to trading.
3 A “regulatory taking” occurs when a government regulation limits or infringes upon a private property right to such an extent that it 
deprives the owner of some or all of the value of that property” (Fischel, 1995).
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In a limited number of areas with the necessary legal and technical conditions and with sufficient public 
investment, water trading has offered a timely, relatively inexpensive, and flexible mechanism to real-
locate water between users, or from water users back to the environment. Building a successful water 
market requires decades of determined effort to measure water flows and use, report transactions 
publicly, conduct regional water planning, and construct and maintain infrastructure to convey water. In 
Australia’s case, it also required more than $3 billion of public funding to acquire water for environmental 
purposes, which also called for creating and, in turn, maintaining an environmental baseline above which 
trading activity could occur. Such significant institutional changes require broad public support and a 
considerable amount of time to implement. Although water trading can be used to reallocate water ef-
fectively, successful implementation requires a clear understanding of existing conditions and a deter-
mined, long-term effort to make the necessary changes and minimize externalities.
Payment for ecosystem services
Payment for ecosystem services is an incentive-based instrument that seeks to monetize the external, 
non-market values of environmental services – such as removal of pollutants and regulation of precipita-
tion events – that can then be used as financial incentives for local actors to provide such services. In 
practical terms, they involve a series of payments to a land or resource manager in exchange for a guar-
anteed flow of environmental services. Payments are made to the environmental service provider by the 
beneficiary of those services, e.g. an individual, a community, a company, or a government. In essence, it 
is based on a beneficiary-pays principle, as opposed to a polluter-pays principle. 
Payments for ecosystems services (PESs) that focus on watershed services, commonly referred to 
as “payments for watershed services” (PWSs), can take a variety of forms. They may be intended to 
prevent the degradation of a watershed or to restore a previously degraded one. They may be small, local 
schemes covering several hundred hectares or large, national schemes covering millions of hectares. 
Programs may be financed directly by the beneficiary or by third parties acting on behalf of the benefi-
ciary, e.g. governments or institutions, or some combination thereof. They may involve cash or in-kind 
payments to be paid all at once or periodically.
New York City provides a well-known example. In the late 1990s, New York City was faced with the 
prospect of building a $4–$6 billion filtration plant with an additional $250 million in annual operating 
costs to meet new federal drinking water standards. An initial analysis suggested that preserving the 
upstream rural Catskill watershed would be far less expensive. The city and local farmers came together 
to develop a plan that could meet both groups’ interests. A key element of the plan was the Whole Farm 
Program, a voluntary effort fully funded by New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection 
whereby farmers would work with technical advisors to custom design pollution control measures to 
meet an environmental objective while also improving the viability of their farming businesses. By 2006, 
the city had spent or committed between $1.4 billion and $1.5 billion in watershed protection projects, 
averaging $167 million in expenditures per year – far less than building a water filtration plant. Participa-
tion remains high, with 96 percent of large farms in the watershed participating in the program.
Payments for watershed services are gaining prominence and have been applied in a wide range of 
settings. Some of the earliest programs were established in Central America but today, such programs 
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can be found in countries around the world. The United States’ Conservation Reserve Program pays 
farmers to take land out of production in order to protect soil and water resources and wildlife habitat. In 
northeastern France, Vittel-Nestle Waters paid farmers and provided technical support (and some labor) 
to alter local dairy farming practices in order to reduce nitrate pollution of groundwater – the source of 
Vittel’s bottled water. 
The largest PWS programs are in China. China’s Sloping Land Conversion Programme, piloted in 1999 
and fully implemented in 2002, requires farmers to set aside erosion-prone farmland within critical areas 
of the watershed of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers – the two largest rivers in China. In exchange, farmers 
receive regular cash payments and grain rations. The program promotes forestry and other economic 
endeavors on the land rather than grain production, in order to prevent sediment from washing into 
rivers and clogging dams and shipping channels. 
The environmental performance of PWS is not well understood. Evaluation of these programs is in-
herently difficult because the connections between land use practice and watershed services are not 
always clear, especially as they relate to water quantity, and they are often site-specific. It can also be 
difficult to attribute change to the program rather than to external factors (e.g. changing commodity 
prices), and programs may not reach threshold levels for measureable impact, or that impact may occur 
over a relatively long time period. In addition to these challenges, many programs lack baseline data or 
monitoring systems. In the absence of scientific information, performance is often based on perceptions 
of local populations and those operating the schemes. But even based on these sources, the available 
data suggest that environmental performance of PWS is mixed, with less than 60 percent of programs 
reaching their environmental objective. As the field has matured, it has increased emphasis on monitor-
ing, which will inevitably help improve environmental outcomes. 
Similarly, limited data are available on the social and economic impacts of payments for watershed services. 
Most studies have focused on increased income or capacity building rather than broader social impacts, 
such as changes in power dynamics. While participation in a PWS program can boost the income of small 
farmers, the payments they receive will typically boost their annual incomes only slightly. Several studies 
have also suggested that there are important non-financial (or non-income) benefits, such as increasing 
land-tenure security, creating human and social capital through internal organization, and improving the 
visibility of the community to donors and public entities. Some analysts have argued that because the 
programs are mostly voluntary, continued participation provides some indication that the programs are 
cost effective, i.e. that benefits exceed costs and participants are satisfied with the outcomes. 
While information on broader social outcomes is limited, there is information on the role of these arrange-
ments in alleviating poverty. However, it is important to recognize that payment for watershed services 
was conceptualized as a mechanism to improve the efficiency of natural resource management, not as a 
mechanism to reduce poverty. Several studies have examined the socio-economic status of participants, 
either as buyers or sellers, and have found mixed results, depending to some extent on land and forest 
tenure regimes and socio-economic conditions in the targeted areas. While most programs prioritize 
areas critical for ecosystem services, some have been tailored to meet social objectives through a variety 
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of mechanisms, such as targeting the programs to particular areas or populations, reducing transac-
tion costs, and providing pro-poor premiums and subsidies. While there are often more direct ways of 
reducing poverty than payments for watershed services (e.g. education or health programs), there is 
little evidence of these schemes actually doing any harm. Few studies have examined gender represen-
tation among program participants. 
In general, payments for watershed services are flexible, and the necessary conditions are relatively 
modest. Small, self-organized schemes between private entities are based on general legal require-
ments: a legal system recognizing that agreements must be kept and that civil law must provide the 
contracting parties with legal remedies in case of non-compliance. Expanding these projects to address 
regional or national water problems would require a more developed policy and legal framework along 
with incentives or requirements to participate in PES programs, cultural and political acceptance of 
markets, trust between ecosystem service providers and beneficiaries, and a supply and demand for 
ecosystem services.
Water quality trading
Water quality trading (WQT) is an incentive-based approach for reducing or controlling water pollution. 
Under such a system, polluters are granted a permit to pollute, and these permits can be bought and 
sold among polluters. The central idea is that trading puts a price on pollution, encouraging cost savings, 
efficiency, and innovation. Water quality trading is an adjunct to regulation, not an alternative to it. In fact, 
its success depends on the presence of a strong regulatory body to enforce water quality standards, and 
monitor and enforce discharge limits. 
Water quality markets have drawn inspiration from the success of the Acid Rain Program (ARP) es-
tablished in the United States in the 1990s. The popularity of emissions trading for dealing with water 
pollution in the United States is largely a result of the Clean Water Act of 1972, which made it difficult for 
governments to handle pollution from farms. Water quality markets have been established in the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. There is also interest in China and Europe, although no 
programs are currently in place. To date, most water quality trading markets have been used to control 
pollution from nutrients that cause excessive algal growth and low dissolved oxygen levels in water 
bodies, a process referred to as “eutrophication”. Other water quality trading programs have been set up 
to control salinity, heavy metal, sediment, and temperature or thermal pollution.
The largest WQT market in the United States in terms of transactions, the Connecticut Nitrogen Credit 
Exchange Program, was created in 2002 to reduce nitrogen pollution that came into Long Island Sound 
from the Connecticut River. Under the program, which covers 79 sewage treatment plants in the state 
of Connecticut, a plant can control pollution in excess of its permit requirement and sell excess nitrogen 
allowances to those plants that exceed their allowances. A 2012 review of the program found that in ten 
years, the program had helped reduce nitrogen pollution by over 50 percent while controlling costs. 
One of the best examples of a successful water quality trading market is on Australia’s Hunter River, 
where coal mines and other pollution sources are subject to discharge limits to protect water quality 
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N Txvi
and drinking water sources in downstream cities. Under this system, limited discharge is allowed, but 
permitted dischargers must coordinate their activities so that the total salt concentration in the river 
never goes above a specified limit. Industries can buy and sell salt credits in real time via a trading 
website run by the state government. Several years after it began, the trading program remains popular 
among participants and functions smoothly. Perhaps the biggest marker of the program’s success is 
that, even though new and potentially high-polluting mines have been established, river water quality 
has met standards nearly 100 percent of the time.
Despite the fact that water quality trading markets have existed for three decades in some areas, it is 
difficult to determine whether the approach can be considered an overall success. Many of the domestic 
WQT markets in the United States have not lived up to expectations, seeing few trades or no trades at 
all. This can be explained by a number of factors: high transaction costs, lack of trust, uncertainty about 
the future of the market, or simply unfamiliarity and unwillingness to participate. However, paradoxically, 
despite a lack of trading, the process of creating the market may have contributed to better watershed 
management. Bringing stakeholders together around a common goal of improving water quality has 
helped lower resistance to new, more stringent water quality regulations. 
In other cases, discussion of the use of “market fundamentals” helped convince some political conser-
vatives to implement a form of environmental regulation, paving the way for improved water quality. A 
common argument in favor of environmental markets is that they will be smaller, simpler, and lower cost, 
because they aim to replace regulation with a free market. However, water quality markets require a 
strong and capable regulatory ability to set a cap on pollutants, to monitor pollution, and to verify the le-
gitimacy of water quality credits that are created. Ironically, this often results in the creation of additional 
layers of government to perform these functions. 
WQT markets are valuable where large price asymmetries exist in water pollution control, and where 
certain polluters are beyond the reach of a regulatory agency. This is the case in the United States, where 
states are responsible for preserving water quality but have little authority over agriculture and some 
other nonpoint sources. On one hand, this has decreased the burden on municipal and industrial sources 
of pollution, allowing them to save on the cost of installing expensive treatment technologies. On the 
other hand, it has compelled them to fund projects on farms, often hundreds of miles away. We conclude 
that water quality trading is not a panacea for solving water pollution problems. However, it can be part 
of an effective regulatory approach under certain conditions.
Conclusions
In this report, we analyze the potential for incentive-based instruments to reduce pressure on water 
resources. To date, the primary environmental policy tools to address water challenges have been com-
mand-and-control regulations. However, over the past several decades, the environmental policy “toolkit” 
has expanded to include a host of incentive-based instruments that use financial means, directly or 
indirectly, to motivate responsible parties to reduce the health and environmental risks posed by their 
facilities, processes, or products. 
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While regulations and incentive-based instruments are frequently juxtaposed, they also frequently 
operate alongside one another. With water quality trading, for example, governments mandate caps on 
the allowable pollutant levels and issue tradable permits that allow industry groups to allocate polluting 
activities among themselves, governed by market forces. Similarly, with water trading, governments may 
allocate water and then institute a framework within which water trading can occur. While incentive-
based instruments may work in tandem, they must be integrated within a broader watershed manage-
ment effort. 
Decisions about whether and how to apply a particular instrument depend on the specific objectives, 
circumstances, conditions, and needs of a given area. These decisions should be based on an open 
and transparent process, with meaningful participation from all affected parties. This approach will help 
in crafting a solution that is appropriate for local conditions, and ensure that it is fair and equitable. It 
will also help to reduce opposition and promote acceptance from those who will be implementing and 
affected by the program. It is important to recognize that those with the least power may not have the 
resources to participate, or they may be skeptical of the groups involved. In these cases, there is a need 
for consistent and rigorous outreach and, potentially, for engaging a trusted intermediary.
Finally, monitoring and evaluation are essential to the success of any instrument. In particular, moni-
toring and evaluation help ensure outcomes are achieved and allow for adjustments in response to 
changing social, economic, or environmental conditions. Monitoring should evaluate the “additionality” 
of the program, i.e. whether the program has an effect when compared with some baseline. It should also 
examine any potential impacts on surrounding areas (i.e. leakage) and the permanence of the interven-
tion. However, extensive monitoring requirements would increase transaction costs, potentially threat-
ening the viability of the program. Thus, the need for monitoring and evaluation must be balanced with 
practical considerations of the ability to maintain the viability of the program.
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Water is one of our most precious and valuable 
resources and is fundamental for maintaining human 
health, agricultural production, and economic activ-
ity as well as critical ecosystem functions. Even as the 
planet’s endowment of water is expected to remain 
constant, human appropriation of fresh water, already 
at 50 percent by some measures (Postel et al., 1996), 
is expected to increase further (Leflaive et al., 2012). 
We can already see clear signs of the overexploitation 
of available freshwater resources. For example, some 
iconic rivers, including the Colorado River in the United 
States and the Yellow River in China, no longer reach 
the sea. Groundwater withdrawals have tripled over the 
past 50 years (UN, 2012), and in some areas, ground-
water extraction exceeds natural recharge, causing 
widespread depletion and declining groundwater levels 
(Wada et al., 2010; Famiglietti, 2014). Pressures on water 
resources are likely to worsen in response to contin-
ued economic and population growth, climate change, 
and other challenges. Water pollution exacerbates the 
challenges posed by water scarcity as the world’s water 
quality is increasingly becoming degraded. 
Growing pressures on the availability and quality of 
water resources have major impacts on our social, eco-
nomic, and environmental well-being. The failure to 
provide safe drinking water and adequate sanitation 
services to all people is perhaps the greatest develop-
ment failure of the twentieth century. Improving access 
to water and sanitation has been a key focus of the 
global development agenda since 2000. Water and 
sanitation were goals of the 2000–2015 Millennium 
Development Goals, and now, the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals launched in September 2015, also call for 
insuring access to water and sanitation for all. 
Yet, despite nearly two decades of international atten-
tion and tens of billions of dollars invested, more than 
660 million people still lack access to improved drink-
ing water, predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Oceania, and some 2.4 billion people lack access to 
basic sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2015).4,5 In even 
the wealthiest countries, access to water and sanitation 
4 Improved water sources include household connections, public stand-
pipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater 
collections. Unimproved water sources are unprotected wells, unprotect-
ed springs, vendor-provided water, bottled water (unless water for other 
uses is available from an improved source), and tanker truck-provided 
water.
5 Improved sanitation includes connection to public sewers, connection to 
septic systems, pour-flush latrines, simple pit latrines, and ventilated im-
proved pit latrines. Service or bucket latrines (where excreta is manually 
removed), public latrines and open latrines are not considered improved 
sanitation.
“…more than 660 million people still lack 
access to an improved drinking water 
source…”
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(2002, 2003), is based on integrating several key prin-
ciples, including improving the overall productivity of 
water use, matching water quality to users’ needs, pri-
oritizing basic human and ecosystem water needs, and 
seeking meaningful local and community engagement 
in water management. 
A key element of the soft path for water is shifting from 
a near exclusive supply-side orientation to one that 
seeks to manage water demand. Numerous studies 
have found significant opportunities to reduce water 
demand in all sectors using a variety of conservation 
and efficiency measures (e.g. Gleick et al., 2003; Cohen 
et al., 2013; Heberger et al., 2014). These measures 
can be applied in countries at varying levels of eco-
nomic development, although the types of measures 
employed and implementation strategies may differ 
(Sharma and Vairavamoorthy, 2009). Brooks (2006) 
argued that demand management is more than a set 
of techniques; rather, it is a governance approach 
linked to equity, environmental protection, and public 
engagement goals. Additional information on demand 
management can be found in Annex 1.
New policy tools are also needed. In most places, regu-
lations have been the primary tool employed to improve 
environmental outcomes. However, over the past sev-
eral decades, the environmental policy “toolkit” has 
expanded to include “incentive-based” instruments. 
Incentive-based instruments use financial means, 
directly or indirectly, to motivate responsible parties to 
reallocate water or reduce the health and environmen-
tal risks posed by their facilities, processes, or products. 
These instruments have emerged for several reasons, 
but mainly because they are believed to be more cost 
effective than regulations, as they provide greater flex-
ibility for the individual or firm to meet the environmen-
tal objective in the least costly manner. Incentive-based 
is not universal. A 2011 UN report (de Albuquerque, 
2011) highlighted several areas of the United States, 
including California, where marginalized populations 
(e.g. those living in poverty, communities of color, and 
indigenous groups) lacked the basic rights to water 
and sanitation. Moreover, access to an improved water 
source does not necessarily mean that the water is 
affordable or safe to drink. For example, naturally occur-
ring arsenic pollution in groundwater affects nearly 
140 million people in 70 countries (United Nations, 
2009). 
Freshwater ecosystems are among the most exten-
sively altered systems on earth. Rivers, streams, and 
lakes have been subjected to chemical, physical, and 
biological alteration as a result of large-scale water 
diversions, introduction of invasive species, overhar-
vesting, pollution, and climate change (Carpenter 
et al., 2011). As a result, an estimated 20  to 35  per-
cent of freshwater fish are vulnerable or endangered 
(Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). Likewise, about half 
of the world’s wetlands have been lost since 1900, and 
much of the remaining wetlands are degraded (Zedler 
and Kercher, 2005). Freshwater ecosystem conditions 
are likely to continue to decline unless action is taken 
to address acute threats and better manage freshwa-
ter resources.
Traditional approaches to managing water supply and 
demand are not going to be effective in addressing 
these challenges. Throughout much of the twentieth 
century, the emphasis was on developing massive dams 
and pumping ever increasing amounts of groundwa-
ter to satisfy rising water demands. This approach, as 
noted by Sharma and Vairavamoorthy (2009), “has led 
to over-use of the resources, over-capitalisation, pollu-
tion and other problems of varying severity.” The soft 
path for water has emerged as a promising alternative. 
The term “soft energy path”, coined by Amory Lovins 
(1977) of the Rocky Mountain Institute, described an 
alternative path for energy development that empha-
sized energy efficiency and promoted smaller, decen-
tralized energy systems fueled by renewable sources. 
The soft path for water, as described by Peter H. Gleick 
“…the environmental policy “toolkit” has 
expanded to include “incentive-based” 
instruments…”
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in managing both the quantity and quality of fresh-
water. We have divided this review into five sections. 
This Section 1 introduces the synthesis review. Section 
2 describes the research methodology. Section 3 pro-
vides background on policy instruments and detail on 
three incentive-based instruments that have been used 
in the United States and abroad – water trading, pay-
ment for ecosystem services, and water quality trad-
ing. For each instrument, we describe its application, its 
environmental, economic, and social performance, and 
the conditions needed for its implementation. Section 
4 highlights the role of the private sector in implement-
ing these instruments, and Section 5 provides a sum-
mary and conclusions.
instruments are also thought to lower administrative 
costs and promote innovation by rewarding those who 
exceed their targets (Harrington and Morgenstern, 
2004). Furthermore, Koplow (2004) suggests that 
these instruments can support self-enforcement by 
creating “groups of firms and individuals with vested 
interests in the proper use of resources and in emitting 
only as much pollution as allowed.” 
This report provides a synthesis review of a set of 
incentive-based instruments that have been employed 
in varying degrees around the world to reduce pressure 
on water resources. It is part of an effort to understand 
the full potential, and limitations, of these instruments 
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Research methodology
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The freshwater synthesis review is based on a five-step 
approach to making better use of existing evaluative 
knowledge. This approach, modeled by The Rockefeller 
Foundation to help inform its investment and program-
matic decisions, has already been used in a review of 
success factors in small-scale coastal fisheries man-
agement in developing countries (The Rockefeller 
Foundation, 2013). Throughout the project, the proj-
ect team held bi-weekly calls with The Rockefeller 
Foundation to review progress on the project, discuss 
key findings, and dive into specific case studies that 
could further support learning. The following steps 
were taken.
1. Refine project scope. The first step was to work 
with the Foundation Center and The Rockefeller 
Foundation to refine the scope of work and develop 
research questions. 
2. Undertake literature search and review. The 
second step was to review the peer-reviewed lit-
erature and law reviews on the key topics for the 
research. We supplemented this formal literature 
search with a review of the gray literature, including 
government and other institutional reports, from or-
ganizations working to evaluate or implement these 
instruments. To identify the relevant literature, we 
used Web of Science (formerly Web of Knowledge) 
Internet-based search engines, and institutional 
website search engines. The literature on these in-
centive-based instruments is extensive. For example, 
a Google Scholar search of “water trading” returned 
nearly 1 million results. Given the need to review a 
large amount of information in a relatively short time, 
we prioritized articles published since 2000. We further 
refined our study by limiting our scope to articles and 
reports on the state of practice, rather than the state of 
theory. In total, we reviewed approximately 500 articles 
and reports. 
3. Conduct expert interviews. The third step was to 
obtain the knowledge of experts working to address 
the study’s key questions. It was designed to fill in any 
gaps in the literature. We developed the interview list 
based on the academic and grey literature search and 
from the research team’s experience in the sector. 
4. Compile initial analysis and synthesis. The fourth 
step included an initial analysis and synthesis of the 
knowledge gained from the first three steps, which was 
compiled into a detailed presentation and supporting 
materials, and formally presented to the Foundation 
Center and The Rockefeller Foundation Team in an 
interactive discussion in March 2015. The Rockefeller 
Foundation also reviewed the draft report in July 2015, 
providing additional input on the synthesis.
5. Conduct further analysis and develop final 
knowledge product. The fifth step was to conduct 
further analysis of the published and expert knowledge 
based on the discussions with the Foundation Center, 
The Rockefeller Foundation, and other parties. We 
worked closely with the Foundation Center to develop 
the final knowledge products, including this summary 
report and online components, such as a visualization 
of key findings and a public collection of cited research. 
All of the knowledge products are openly licensed and 
free to be used and repurposed.
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Environmental policy instruments 
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The objective of environmental policy is “to modify, 
slow, or stop resource extraction; to reduce or elimi-
nate emissions of concern; and to shift consumption 
and production patterns towards greater sustainability” 
(Koplow, 2004). In most places, regulations have tradi-
tionally been the primary environmental policy instru-
ment employed to achieve environmental outcomes. 
This approach, often referred to as command-and-
control (CAC), relies on some governmental or similar 
body to establish a standard or target (the “command”) 
that must then be complied with to avoid negative 
sanctions, such as fines or prosecution (the “control”). 
Over the past several decades, the environmental pol-
icy “toolkit” has expanded to include incentive-based 
instruments, also referred to as economic instruments 
or market-based instruments. While definitions vary, we 
use the term “incentive-based instruments” to refer to 
a set of tools that use financial means, directly or indi-
rectly, to motivate responsible parties to reallocate water 
or reduce the health and environmental risks posed by 
their facilities, processes, or products. While CAC and 
incentive-based instruments are often juxtaposed with 
one another, a United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) report (Koplow, 2004) noted that “in reality the 
two often operate alongside each other. Governments 
may, for example, mandate caps on allowable pollu-
tion for a region or country and use market-oriented 
approaches such as tradable permits to allocate the 
allowable emissions in an efficient manner.”
Figure 1 provides a depiction of the range of environ-
mental policy instruments currently applied around the 
world. These include the following.
• Regulations and sanctions – mechanisms that 
rely on guidelines, permits, or licenses, and often 
include a legal or financial penalty for non-compli-
ance. Examples include pollution standards, water 
use quotes, and building standards.
• Price-based instruments – mechanisms that 
impose i) higher costs through fees, charges, or 
taxes on pollution or the use of a natural resource, 
making them more expensive and discouraging 
their production or consumption, or ii) lower costs 
through the use of subsidies for environmentally 
friendly activities or products. Examples include 
abstraction fees, pollution charges, grants, low-in-
terest loans, and favorable tax treatment.
• Market creation – mechanisms that include i) 
tradable permits whereby user or polluter rights are 
assigned according to desirable use levels or his-
torical practices, and compliance can be achieved 
by trade, or ii) deposit refund systems that create 
a market to buy back inefficient or polluting prod-
ucts. Examples include water trading and water 
quality trading.
• Information provision – mechanisms that use 
the provision and disclosure of information on envi-
ronmental performance to incentivize producers to 
reduce their water use or emissions of pollutants, 
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As shown in Figure 1, these instruments exist along a 
continuum, from “very strict command approaches to 
decentralized approaches that rely more on market or 
legal mechanisms” (Huber et al., 1998). As noted, there 
are varying definitions of incentive-based instruments 
and the types of tools that would qualify. All definitions 
identify price-based instruments and market creation 
as incentive-based instruments. Some, however, use a 
broader definition that includes information provision, 
voluntary action, and liability instruments (see, e.g. 
Stavins, 2001; UNEP, 2001; Anderson, 2004). Product 
labeling schemes, such as the United States’ “Energy 
Star” or Thailand’s “Green Label”, allow companies 
meeting environmental standards to place a recog-
nized label on their product, boosting sales by making 
the product more appealing to consumers and provid-
ing a financial incentive to improve environmental per-
formance (Stavins, 2001). These products may also be 
sold at a higher price than less environmentally-friendly 
or to incentivize consumers to select products with 
superior performance. Examples include corporate 
reporting, product labeling (e.g. WaterSense),6 and 
environmental certification schemes. 
• Voluntary action – mechanisms that use volun-
tary agreements between the government and pri-
vate firms and/or commitments made independent 
of government requirement. Examples include the 
UN CEO Water Mandate and the Alliance for Wa-
ter Stewardship’s International Water Stewardship 
Standard.
• Legal instruments – mechanisms for compen-
sating victims when pollution causes human or 
environmental harm, and encouraging compliance 
with existing environmental regulations. Examples 
include criminal penalties, civil liability statutes, and 
performance bonds.
6 WaterSense is an environmental program designed to encourage water 
efficiency in the US, through use of a special label on consumer products.
FIGURE 1. Incentive-based policy instruments
WATER MANAGEMENT EXAMPLES:
Regulations 
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Source: adapted from Huber et al., 1998; UNEP, 2009.
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of this activity ($11.6 billion, or 94 percent) was associ-
ated with payment for watershed services, and 98 per-
cent of that activity was in China. Collective action 
funds – which pool contributions from multiple inves-
tors to support coordinated interventions within a 
watershed – had the second highest transaction value 
at $563 million. We note, however, that the distinction 
between payment for watershed and collective action 
programs is sometimes unclear.9 The market activity of 
instream buybacks – programs that purchase or lease 
water to augment instream flows – was considerably 
less ($97 million), followed by water quality trading 
($22 million), and voluntary compensation ($320,000). 
It is of note that instream buybacks likely represent a 
modest fraction of the market activity of water trading 
programs, although comprehensive data on the latter 
are not readily available.10 While the data suggest a 
rapid expansion in the application of these instruments 
since 2008, Ecosystem Marketplace’s Genevieve 
Bennett (personal communication, 2015) noted that 
much of the increase is actually an outcome of better 
reporting. 
9 Water funds are sometimes categorized as payment for watershed 
services and other times as collective action funds.
10 California, for example, has an active trading market but no centralized 
repository of data on the number and value of transactions.
models. Likewise, voluntary programs may reward 
meeting environmental outcomes with, e.g. public rec-
ognition which, in turn, increases sales. 
The application and market activity of these instruments 
are not well understood. Several organizations track the 
application of some of these incentive-based instru-
ments (IIED, 2015 and Forest Trends, 2015a).7 However, 
there is no comprehensive list of the programs that have 
been implemented globally. Additionally, programs are 
sometimes poorly defined, fall into multiple categories, or 
change over time. Moreover, data on the activity of these 
instruments, including the number and value of transac-
tions, are not collected or made available publicly. 
Despite these challenges, Forest Trends has been track-
ing the activity of five market and market-like instru-
ments for watershed investments for several years.8 It 
estimates that the market activity of watershed invest-
ments was $12.3 billion in 2013 (Table 1). The majority 
7 See, for example, Watershed Markets (watershedmarkets.org), main-
tained by the London-based International Institute for Environment and 
Development, and Watershed Connect (watershedconnect.com), an on-
line platform maintained by the Washington, D.C.-based Forest Trends.
8 Forest Trends is an international “non-profit organization with three 
principal roles: convening market players to advance market transfor-
mations, generating and disseminating critical information to market 
players, and facilitating deals between different critical links in the value 
chains of new forestry.” See forest-trends.org.
TABLE 1. Transactions (in millions of US$) by type, 2008–2013
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Payment for watershed 
services/undefined
 $ 7,950  $ 6,950  $ 7,470  $ 8,000  $ 9,600  $11,600 
Collective action funds n/a n/a n/a n/a $ 137  $ 563 
Voluntary compensation n/a n/a n/a n/a $ 0.230 $ 0.320
Water quality trading  $ 10.7  $ 8.30  $ 8.30  $ 7.70  $ 14.9  $ 22.2 
Instream buybacks  n/a  $    19  $ 390  $ 164  $ 144  $ 97.0 
Total  $ 7,960  $ 6,980  $ 7,870  $ 8,170  $ 9,890  $ 12,300 
Note: Numbers shown are nominal values. All values rounded to three significant figures. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. Based on data provided by Bennett 
(personal communication, 2015) and included in Bennett and Carroll (2014).
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side of a recognized legal or administrative frame-
work (e.g. the sale of groundwater to an adjacent 
irrigator)
• water banks – the institutions or agencies that i) 
broker or otherwise facilitate water trading (Culp et 
al., 2014) or ii) are established for a specific objective, 
such as a trust created to obtain water rights for in-
stream augmentation (Clifford, 2012). Water banks 
offer expertise and information for improving com-
munication between buyers and sellers, and often 
provide a centralized repository or clearinghouse of 
information on current and historical transactions, 
including volumes, pricing, and locations. 
There is an extensive body of literature suggest-
ing that water trading provides a mechanism to 
improve the economic efficiency of water through its 
reallocation from lower to higher value uses (Glennon, 
2005; Dellapenna, 2000; Bjornlund and McKay, 2002). 
The germinal study entitled Water and Choice in the 
Colorado Basin (NRC, 1968) recommended that water 
in the western United States be transferred from irriga-
tion, which generates relatively low returns per unit of 
water, to high-value non-agricultural uses. More recent 
research has continued to emphasize the potential value 
created by water transfers. For example, models used to 
project California’s economic costs under a dry climate 
change projection, (Medellín-Azuara et al., 2008) found 
significantly increased benefits with market-based real-
locations. Newlin et al. (2002) and Jenkins et al. (2004) 
asserted that water trading could dramatically reduce 
Southern California’s water scarcity costs.
Water trading is attractive because it tends to minimize 
the impact on existing rights holders by providing com-
pensation and, in many cases, additional security, for 
existing water rights, while providing opportunities to 
those with new or increasing demands (NRC, 1992).
A large number of experts challenge the applicability 
and efficacy of water trading. Freyfogle (1996) asserted 
that externalities, intrinsic to the very nature of water 
itself, pose such an insurmountable obstacle that water 
trading does not and cannot work. Many of these 
In this review, we evaluate three of the major incentive-
based instruments that have been employed to improve 
water management: water trading, payment for ecosys-
tem services, and water quality trading. These instru-
ments are employed in developed and developing 
countries, and there is growing interest in expanding 
their application. 
3.1 Water trading
Description
Water trading is perhaps the best known and most 
widely used method of reallocating water. In some 
cases, purchasing or leasing water from existing users 
has proven to be less expensive, more flexible, and 
less time-consuming than developing new water sup-
plies, such as constructing new diversion structures 
or desalination plants. Similarly, water trading is gen-
erally a more accepted method for reallocating water 
than state appropriation or condemnation of existing 
water rights. Successful examples of water trading in 
Australia and other locations – combined with classic 
economic theory suggesting that market mechanisms 
can optimize resource allocation – have heightened 
interest in this instrument in both academic literature 
and popular media.
As noted in Box 1, the peer-reviewed and gray litera-
ture employ several terms (e.g. water transfers, water 
markets, and water banks) to refer to a variety of some-
times overlapping instruments and methods for con-
veying and reallocating water. In this paper, we use the 
following terms: 
• water trading – the temporary or permanent 
transfer of the right to use water in exchange for 
some form of compensation 
• informal water trading – the sale of a specified 
volume of water for a limited period of time, which 
does not involve actual contracts or occurs out-
“…water trading provides a mechanism to 
improve the economic efficiency of water…”
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tradeable commodity. Similarly, Zellmer and Harder 
(2007) asserted, “Water is a uniquely essential resource 
with uniquely public attributes,” unlike other resources 
typically treated as property. Questions of externali-
ties, commodification, and the special nature of water 
itself highlight the challenges faced by implementing 
or expanding water trading.
In some cases, water trading is effectively zero-sum, 
simply shifting water use and economic productivity 
from one area or sector to another. In other cases, it can 
externalities arise from the physical properties of water: 
it is heavy, unwieldy, and easily contaminated; it some-
times has dramatic seasonal and year-to-year variability; 
and it can be easily lost through evaporation, seepage, 
or runoff (Salzman, 2006). Further, these externalities 
may be borne by disparate parties, such as the envi-
ronment or future generations, challenging efforts to 
compensate those injured by trading (Freyfogle, 1996). 
Moreover, Salzman (2006) argued that custom, history, 
and religion in many parts of the world treat drinking 
water as a common property resource, rather than a 
BOX 1
A note on terminology
Water transfers. The National Research Council 
(NRC) of the United States National Academies defines 
water transfers as changes in the point of diversion, 
type of use, or location of water use (NRC et al., 1992). 
The term “water transfers” encompasses a broad range 
of market-based and non-market water reallocation 
mechanisms of varying periods, geographic scales, 
and arrangements. Water transfers can range from 
short-term leases or conditional arrangements to the 
permanent transfer (i.e. sale) of a water right. They 
can range in scale from i) change in type of use on 
an existing parcel of land, such as when a water right 
shifts from irrigation to municipal use when agricultural 
land is purchased and converted to housing, to ii) 
inter-basin transfers, such as when a city purchases or 
leases water from a different watershed. 
Water bank. A water bank is a mechanism for 
changing the time or location of water use. Water 
banking, as with water transfers, can refer to market-
based or non-market activities. The term “water bank” 
can refer to an actual institution or to the physical 
storage of water. Water banks as institutions may 
function as i) brokers that connect buyers and sellers 
of water rights or leases, providing an important 
communication function; ii) clearinghouses that 
directly purchase or lease water from willing sellers 
and aggregate supplies for subsequent sale to other 
buyers; iii) facilitators that expedite water transfers 
using existing storage or conveyance facilities (Culp et 
al., 2014); or iv) trusts that hold or otherwise manage 
water rights or entitlements for a specific purpose, 
such as streamflow augmentation (O’Donnell and 
Colby, 2010). When serving as facilitators, water banks 
may perform various administrative and technical 
functions, including the confirmation of water rights 
and screening of potential buyers (Clifford, 2012). 
Water banks may also refer to physical storage, either 
in surface reservoirs or in aquifers, which, in turn, may 
be a component of a larger water transfer or simply 
a mechanism enabling an entitlement holder to store 
water for its own future use, but we do not use this 
definition in this review.
Water market. The term water market refers to a 
range of different market-based practices, typically 
referring to water trading. According to Brown (2006), 
the term water market lacks a precise definition, “but 
once a few voluntary trades of water of relatively 
common physical and legal characteristics occur, it is 
said that a water market exists.” A water market may 
also refer to informal transactions involving the direct 
sale of water that does not involve the lease or sale of 
water rights. Informal water transactions can include 
purchasing bottled water or water from a tanker truck, 
a common practice in many parts of the developing 
world that lack a reliable, piped water supply. While 
a “water contract” can refer to a one-time voluntary 
water exchange between two actors, a water market 
is where many actors come together and make trades; 
a market also includes some formalization of the 
transactions (Brown et al., 2015).
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Application
Water trading exists, to varying degrees, in countries 
around the world. When Grafton et al. (2010) assessed 
water trading in two wealthy countries (Australia and 
the United States), two low- to middle-income countries 
(Chile and South Africa), and one poor, rapidly develop-
ing country (China), they found that differing levels of 
information availability, legal rights structures, institu-
tional constraints, and management goals had resulted 
in very different levels of activity and performance. 
The most active water trading markets occur in Australia 
and the western United States. Within Australia, water 
trading includes both short-term trades (referred to as 
allocation trading) and long-term trades (referred to as 
entitlement trading). The total value of water trading 
in Australia in fiscal year 2012–13 exceeded $1.4 billion 
increase system-wide water efficiency, by providing the 
area of origin with funds for investing in improved effi-
ciency, maintaining local productivity with lower water 
use, and then transferring the conserved water. Water 
can be made available for trading from a variety of 
activities, including fallowing fields, crop shifting, and 
in some cases, a shift from surface water diversions to 
groundwater pumping. Water trades can also be linked 
to water conservation and efficiency efforts, including 
increasing irrigation efficiency and decreasing system 
losses that generate surplus water by, e.g. lining canals 
or constructing operating reservoirs. However, increas-
ing demand for greater efficiencies in irrigation can 
challenge the flexibility of existing institutions (Hundley, 
2001), such as irrigation districts and water courts, 
which often do not recognize a legal property right to 
this “new” water created by conservation or efficiency. 
Additionally, existing institutions often impose signifi-
cant costs on those attempting to dedicate water to non-
traditional uses such as instream flows (Getches, 1985). 
These changes have tested the resilience of water insti-
tutions, which have shown some flexibility in adapting 
to new values and goals but often impose high transac-
tion costs (Colby et al., 1991). 
Water trading can occur within sectors, from agricul-
ture-to-agriculture and urban-to-urban, across these 
sectors, and, less frequently, from either of these to the 
environment (Brewer et al., 2007). Figure 2, from the 
California Department of Water Resources, shows the 
relative proportions of water trading within and between 
different sectors. Although water trading is often consid-
ered a means to move water from agriculture to urban 
uses, nearly three-quarters of the 270,000 acre-feet 
of water traded in California in 2013 occurred between 
agricultural users. Interestingly, nearly 25,000 acre-
feet of water were traded from municipal and industrial 
(M&I) uses to agriculture, which was nearly half of the 
volume of water traded from agriculture to M&I uses. 
FIGURE 2. Non-project water transfers within the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin watersheds in 2013
Note: Ag – agriculture; FW – fish and wildlife; M&I – municipal and industrial; 
AF – acre-foot. 
Source: California Department of Water Resources.
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“The most active water trading markets 
occur in Australia and the western United 
States.”
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reports almost 640,000 acre-feet of water traded in 
California, through 36 trades with a total value of about 
$234 million (all values adjusted to 2014$). More than 
80 percent of the water was leased rather than sold. 
According to the database, 15 of these trades, account-
ing for about 88,000 acre-feet of total volume, occurred 
within one agricultural district. However, the Bren 
School database only records the initial year a water 
trade is reported, and thus does not reflect the volume 
of multiyear trading agreements. That means that a 
review of 2009 trading activity does not reflect previ-
ous multi-year trades that may still have been active in 
2009, so the values reported above understate trading 
activity in 2009.
A comprehensive review of water trading in California 
reports about 1.5 MAF of water were traded in 2009, 
a dry year (Hanak and Stryjewski, 2012). Volumes 
reported for 2011, a wet year and the most recent year 
for which data are available, were about 5 percent lower, 
at 1.4 MAF. In 2011, 42 percent of the water traded went 
to municipal and industrial users, 37 percent to agricul-
tural users, 17 percent for environmental purposes, and 
the remainder to mixed uses. Because of limited data, 
the study does not include trading activity within irri-
gation districts or similar users associations, although 
some estimates suggest that such intra-district activity 
accounted for several hundred thousand acre-feet of 
water, a third of total water supplies within some of the 
larger irrigation districts. Hanak and Stryjewski (2012) 
did not provide total dollar values associated with the 
California water market, though they noted that prices 
of temporary water transfers had increased from an 
average of $30–$40 per acre-foot in one region in the 
mid-1990s to $180 per acre-foot in 2011, while aver-
age prices in another basin rose to an average of $400 
per acre-foot. The authors noted the shifting trend 
from short-term to longer-term leases and permanent 
trades, pumping restrictions in the Bay-Delta, and ris-
ing transaction costs that had slowed market activity in 
the past decade.
California is also home to the largest United States 
water trade to date. The San Diego County Water 
Authority (SDCWA) entered into a 45-year contract 
(NWC, 2013). Trading within the Murray-Darling Basin, 
which has an active and well-documented water mar-
ket first established more than 30 years ago (Grafton 
et al., 2012), accounts for 98  percent of all allocation 
trades and 78 percent of all entitlement trades within 
Australia, by volume. Indeed, the Murray-Darling Basin 
figures prominently in discussions about water trad-
ing, as an example of a thriving incentive-based sys-
tem that successfully transitioned from a non-market 
system (Grafton et al., 2012). In fiscal year 2012–13, the 
total volume of short-term (allocation) trading within 
the Murray-Darling Basin increased 44  percent from 
the previous year, from almost 3.5  million acre-feet 
(MAF) to 5 MAF, or about 50 percent of total surface 
water use in the basin. The total volume of long-term 
trades, however, decreased by about 14 percent over 
that period, to about 0.85 MAF. A national study found 
that these permanent entitlement trades often offset 
the temporary allocation trades, as irrigators planting 
perennial crops, such as grapes or almonds, purchased 
entitlements to meet expected future demand, but then 
sold a portion of the temporary allocations associated 
with these entitlements to generate revenue (Frontier 
Economics and Australia National Water Commission, 
2007). For more information on Australia’s water mar-
ket, see Annex 2.
In the western United States, the scale of water trad-
ing is considerably lower. A database compiled by the 
University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) Bren 
School shows notifications for more than 4,000 water 
trades in 12 states in the western United States from 
the years 1987–2008.11 Brewer et al. (2007) docu-
mented the large variability in the volume, price, and 
duration of water trades in the western United States, 
both within and between sectors. In 2009, the most 
recent year for which data are available, the database 
11 The database summary notes that “The data are drawn from water trans-
actions reported in the monthly trade journal the Water Strategist and its 
predecessor the Water Intelligence Monthly from 1987 through February 
2010.” These data reflect published reports that in some cases do not 
reflect final transfer agreements. For example, the database reports that 
the Imperial Irrigation District-San Diego County Water Authority water 
transfer began in 1997, although the final transfer agreement was not 
actually signed and the transfer did not begin (at different volumes than 
the database reports) until October 2003. The Bren School water transfer 
database is available at bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm.
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T14
in several parts of the country (Thobani, 1997), with 
nearly 3,700 registered water transfer requests in 2006 
alone (CONAGUA, 2012). 
Water markets have also been established in parts of 
Europe, Asia, and Africa. In Spain, informal trades, sales, 
and short-term exchanges of water are common, while 
formal transfers of long-term water rights are generally 
limited to groundwater (Albiac et al., 2006). In Spain’s 
Alicante basin, several irrigation districts auction their 
annual water allocations to district farmers (Albiac et 
al., 2006), creating a strong incentive to improve water-
use efficiency and shift toward higher value crops. 
England has encouraged water trading for more than a 
decade, although only about 60 trades have occurred 
to date (TWSTT, 2014). 
South Africa has more extensive water markets that 
continue to be plagued by conflict and inadequate 
institutional support (Grafton et al., 2010). South 
Africa’s Water Act of 1998 has provided a framework 
for water trading. Historically, agricultural irrigators 
traded water rights within their sector, mediated by 
the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(Farolfi and Perret, 2002). In 2001, mining companies 
seeking to expand operations in northern South Africa 
successfully negotiated a temporary trade of some 
10,000 acre-feet of water (13 million m3) from neigh-
boring farmers – representing more than 70 percent of 
their annual allocation – in exchange for the current 
equivalent of about $1 million. These funds, used to 
help rehabilitate the local irrigation infrastructure, rep-
resented less than 0.1 percent of the mines’ develop-
ment costs, reflecting a significant economic disparity 
between the two interests (Farolfi and Perret, 2002). 
In Asia, India and Pakistan have informal water trad-
ing, in which well-owners may sell some of the water 
they extract to neighboring farms or residents (Easter 
et al., 1999). In a report published by the Nepal Water 
Conservation Foundation and the Institute for Social 
in 2003, with an option for a 30-year extension, with 
the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), one of the largest 
irrigation districts in the country.12 Under the terms of 
the agreement, the SDCWA pays the IID to reduce its 
diversion of Colorado River water, while the Authority 
diverts a like amount farther upstream. After a 15-year 
period intended to create time to address ecological 
and public health impacts resulting from the trade, the 
IID will shift to efficiency-based methods (such as lin-
ing canals and constructing regulating reservoirs) to 
generate the water to be conserved. In essence, the 
Authority is paying the District to improve the effi-
ciency of its operations and receiving the water con-
served. The trade is ramping up to a maximum volume 
of 200,000 acre-feet per year by 2021, representing 
about 25 percent of the region’s total water supply. In 
2014, the price for the water was $594 per acre-foot, 
plus an additional $445 per acre-foot to a different 
agency to convey the water through its facilities. This 
total, which does not include additional payments to 
offset the environmental impacts of the trade, is about 
half what the Authority has contracted to pay for water 
generated by a new desalination plant on the coast. 
In Central and South America, Chile and Mexico 
have active water trading markets. Chile’s Limarí 
Basin enjoys water rights trading and water transfers, 
enabled by three large state-built reservoirs and robust 
local water organizations. The actual number of water 
trades in Chile’s Limarí Basin has averaged about 33 
each year (Romano and Leporati, 2002), although 
water trading has been more limited in the rest of the 
country (Bauer, 1997). Mexico’s National Water Law of 
1992 established a formal water market with tradable 
concessions that formed the basis for active markets 
12 With the exception of “water conservancy districts”, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no strict naming convention for water agencies. The 
ability to create conservancy districts is established by statute, enabling 
state district courts or other authorities to establish conservancy 
districts with the power to impose property taxes to support district 
functions (Howe, 2011). Water authorities tend to serve municipal areas, 
and irrigation districts primarily serve agricultural users. However, the 
San Diego County Water Authority has agricultural customers (fewer 
than before, as they have phased out subsidies for irrigation water), 
while the Imperial Irrigation District sells water to all of the cities within 
its service area, serving more than 170,000 people. Similarly, water 
conservancy districts usually serve agriculture, although some districts 
may also serve municipal customers. 
“Water banks are generally less widespread 
than water trading…”
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In 2003, nine states in the western United States had 
functioning state-operated water banks, although their 
level of activity varied dramatically and several are no 
longer active. From 1995–2003, for example, Texas’ 
water bank only reported one transaction (Clifford, 2012). 
California’s Drought Water Bank functioned for a limited 
period in the early 1990s, providing a mechanism to facil-
itate and expedite water trading between agriculture and 
cities during a multi-year drought, while also ensuring 
minimum instream flows and providing limited ground-
water recharge. The Drought Water Bank purchased, 
held, and sold water, primarily from northern agricultural 
users to southern municipal and industrial users, though 
about half of the more than 800,000 acre-feet pur-
chased in 1991 was dedicated to instream flows (20 per-
cent) and to recharge aquifers (32 percent) (Dinar et al., 
1997). Idaho operates water banks to manage storage 
in reservoirs, and in Oregon, river conservancies oper-
ate as water trusts to purchase or lease water rights to 
supplement instream flows (Clifford, 2012). The Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy District maintains a web-
page that functions as an online bulletin board connect-
ing those seeking to acquire water with those who have 
water to rent, an example of a brokerage-type water 
bank. The very active water trading within the Conser-
vancy District is attributable to the equal volume and 
priority of each share available for trade, the absence 
of any requirement to preserve return flows or protect 
downstream or junior priority users, and the fact that 
trading only requires the approval of the district itself, 
not a water court, as is the case for most other trades 
within Colorado (Howe and Goemans, 2003). 
The Colorado River basin, shown in Figure 3, boasts a 
large number of creative approaches to water bank-
ing. In 1998, the federal government adopted a new 
rule permitting interstate banking agreements within 
the basin. To date, Arizona has diverted and stored 
more than 600,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water 
for southern Nevada, and a southern California water 
agency has diverted and stored more than 161,000 
acre-feet for southern Nevada, representing creative 
methods of skirting state prohibitions of interstate 
water trading. In 2007, the seven basin states adopted 
a new set of rules for managing the river that, among 
and Environmental Transition, Moench et al. (2003) 
described an active but largely unregulated water trad-
ing system in Chennai, India, where private companies 
meet as much as 35 percent of urban water demand 
by delivering raw or purified well water purchased 
from farmers in surrounding areas or extracted from 
the companies’ wells. This private sector engagement 
helps meet a demand for water that the intermittent 
municipal water supply cannot meet, though the price 
is much higher. Moench et al. (2003) reported that the 
price of water for urban customers can be 1,000 times 
higher than the price paid to the peri-urban farmers 
supplying the water. Also in Asia, in a rare international 
water trade, the Bishkek Treaty of 1998 commit-
ted Kyrgyzstan to deliver water via the Syr Darya to 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in exchange for compen-
sation (Ambec et al., 2013). China reportedly has small, 
local water markets (Grafton et al., 2010). In Oman, 
the local falaj irrigation systems purchase short-term 
allocations of water based on units of time rather than 
volume (e.g. a certain duration of water delivery) in a 
village-based auction (Al-Marshudi, 2007).
Water banks are generally less widespread than water 
trading because they require additional expertise, fund-
ing, and governance structures. Water banks appear 
to be most prevalent in the western United States, 
although there are examples in several other coun-
tries. The presence of three reservoirs in Chile’s Limarí 
Basin facilitates the large number of water trades in 
the region (Bauer, 1997), meaning that, in this case, 
the physical storage rather than an institutional bank 
facilitates the water trades. In Australia, brokerage-type 
water banks are active in both the Murray-Darling Basin 
and in northern Victoria, where the banks post informa-
tion about pricing and availability (O’Donnell and Colby, 
2010). Mexico’s National Water Commission reported 
that the 13 state-based water banks in the country bro-
ker thousands of water trades annually (CONAGUA, 
2012). In three basins in Spain, water banks operated 
by local water agencies, known as “exchange centers”, 
have successfully brokered water trades that have 
lessened groundwater overdraft (Garrido and Llamas, 
2009). 
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system as a whole, rather than claiming it for them-
selves. In this instance, the Bureau of Reclamation acts 
as a water bank by obtaining water through a reverse 
auction process, augmenting system storage for the 
benefit of the system as a whole.
Environmental, economic, and social 
performance
The primary goal of water trading is usually to pro-
mote economic efficiency by reallocating water from 
lower to higher value uses. However, in some cases, 
other key developments, permitted entitlement hold-
ers in Arizona, California, and Nevada to invest in vari-
ous water efficiency projects within their own states 
and store a percentage of the conserved water in 
Lake Mead for later use. To date, more than 1.1 million 
acre-feet have been stored in Lake Mead under this 
new program. More recently, four large municipal water 
agencies in the basin, in cooperation with the federal 
Bureau of Reclamation, agreed to invest $11 million in 
fallowing and efficiency improvements, and to dedi-
cate the conserved water to the Colorado River Basin 
FIGURE 3. The Colorado River Basin
Source: Cohen et al., 2013.
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can be an effective means of reallocating water, where 
the appropriate conditions exist.  The application sec-
tion of 3.1 of this report describes the range of countries 
where water trading occurs in general terms. In most of 
these regions, limited data precludes detailed assess-
ment of the number or volume of water trading activi-
ties. In several locations, such as the Murray-Darling 
Basin and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy 
District, water trades occur frequently, often for small 
volumes, suggesting a robust and active market with 
low transaction costs (Howe and Goemans, 2003). In 
other areas, there tend to be fewer but larger transac-
tions, suggesting higher barriers to trading. 
The largest agriculture-to-urban water trade in the 
United States has been successful for San Diego 
County, which currently receives about 25 percent of 
its water supply from the rural Imperial Valley,13 at a 
unit cost of water that is less than half the contracted 
price of water from a desalination plant that will soon 
be operational on the San Diego coastline. The long-
term water trade appears to be cost effective from San 
Diego’s perspective but, due to significant externalities, 
may not be from the broader society’s perspective. Total 
transaction costs for this water trade have exceeded 
$175 million in attorney fees, plus an additional $171 mil-
lion in mitigation fees to offset public health and envi-
ronmental impacts. In addition, the State of California 
agreed to cover all direct mitigation costs in excess 
of a pre-determined financial cap for the water trade 
parties. The magnitude of these additional mitigation 
costs – primarily for managing dust emissions – will not 
be known for many years but are expected to run into 
the hundreds of millions of dollars (Cohen, 2014). As 
suggested by the Imperial Valley-San Diego example, 
a narrow focus on direct economic performance may 
ignore trading’s broader economic impacts. 
Although there are thousands of peer-reviewed 
articles on the economic potential of water trading, 
robust economic analyses of specific water trades do 
13 Roughly 15 percent of San Diego County’s current water supply comes 
from the water trade with the Imperial Valley, while an additional 10 per-
cent comes from water conserved via the lining of the All-American 
Canal, a project funded primarily by the state of California. 
water trading has been used for environmental or rec-
reational purposes, reflecting the increasing societal 
value ascribed to instream flows. In this section, we 
evaluate the environmental, social, and economic per-
formance of water trading. While much of the literature 
on water trading tends toward theoretical assessments 
or recommendations about trading (Newlin et al., 2002) 
or specific elements of trading, such as property rights 
regimes or institutional capacity (Culp et al., 2014), we 
examine the literature on actual impacts to evaluate 
the state of practice. 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Although there are a large number of articles and stud-
ies modeling the potential economic benefits of water 
trading, the number of detailed economic assessments 
of existing water trades is surprisingly limited. Some 
studies on local impacts suggest positive net economic 
performance, but these studies typically do not describe 
changes in the distribution of impacts, and they rarely 
describe broader economic impacts. Assessing the 
economic performance of water trading is frequently 
as simple as documenting trading activity and quanti-
fying the number, volume, and value of reported water 
trades. A more comprehensive analysis would require 
surveys to estimate the number and volume of addi-
tional water trades that users would like to make, as a 
means to assess the disparity between availability and 
demand. An even more robust analysis would compare 
the ability of different instruments – such as water trad-
ing, demand-side management, and supply augmenta-
tion – to meet specific water demands, and the cost 
of those instruments. While water agencies seeking to 
improve their water supply reliability may perform such 
analyses within their service area, these assessments 
are often not publicly available. 
The large number of trades and the significant volumes 
traded, especially in Australia, indicate that water trading 
“…the number of detailed economic 
assessments of existing water trades is 
surprisingly limited.”
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the trading activity in the district is short term and low 
volume, especially in comparison with trading activ-
ity in the same water basin but outside of the district. 
Municipal and industrial (M&I) users buy district water 
rights to meet expected future demand and then lease 
some of this water back to district irrigators. This ris-
ing M&I demand has increased the price of imported 
water rights (known as allotments) within the district 
(Howe, 2011). Within the relatively prosperous district, 
this has improved economic performance. However, in 
other regions, particularly in economically depressed 
rural areas, selling water out of the area has exacer-
bated economic decline, causing property values to fall 
and the local tax base to shrink (Howe, 2011).
In Australia, water trading has enabled the expan-
sion of the wine industry and other high value crops, 
such as almonds. Over time, the dairy industry in one 
part of the Murray-Darling Basin transitioned from a 
small purchaser of water entitlements to a net seller of 
entitlements, primarily to the expanding wine and nut 
producers in other parts of the basin. These expanding 
industries have also exhibited a shift from the former 
model of shared irrigation infrastructure (such as com-
mon canals) to direct extraction from the river by indi-
vidual irrigators – in other words, from a communal to a 
more flexible individual approach to irrigation (Frontier 
Economics and Australia NWC, 2007).
Water trading within the Murray-Darling Basin grew 
and matured within the context of the devastating 
drought that afflicted the region from 2006 through 
2010. The national water trading assessment noted 
the challenge of disentangling the economic impacts 
of the drought from those of water trading itself, gen-
erally concluding that trading offered irrigators an 
additional revenue stream, plus additional flexibility 
and resilience within the face of a severely limited 
water supply. Without water trading, some sectors, 
such as the dairy industry, would have seen even 
greater losses. Trading also offered a mechanism to 
adjust for historic water apportionments, facilitating 
the voluntary sale of water from less productive to 
more productive lands and uses (Frontier Economics 
and Australia NWC, 2007).
not appear to exist. For example, despite its size and 
importance, there do not appear to be any economic 
analyses of the Imperial Valley-San Diego County 
water trade that assess revenues, agricultural produc-
tion lost due to fallowing, value of transfer payments, 
relative value of the water in San Diego, or employ-
ment impacts. There are, however, general regional or 
district-level assessments of water trading, as well as 
an extensive body of literature on macro-economic 
trends, and expected or modeled benefits of water 
trading. Yet, assessments of “net” economic benefit at 
the state or regional level, expressed in terms of net 
increase in employment or revenue, can mask dispari-
ties between areas of origin and importing areas, and 
even within the areas of origin themselves. 
In one study, the income and employment gains found 
in regions in California that imported water via trades 
exceeded the net losses (total compensation often 
failed to cover foregone crop revenue) in exporting 
areas (Howitt, 1998). In 1991, trading activity gener-
ated an average net income loss in water-exporting 
areas equivalent to about 5 percent of net agricultural 
activity, though this varied within different parts of the 
state. However, agricultural areas importing water saw 
total gains greater than the losses in exporting areas: 
net agricultural water trading activity was positive, as 
water moved from lower-value crops to higher-value 
crops (Howitt, 1998). In another example, an agricul-
tural community in California exporting water to urban 
areas saw a 26  percent decrease in the number of 
farms overall, but this masked a 70 percent loss in the 
number of small farms and the loss of almost half of 
the number of produce firms in the area (Meinzen-Dick 
and Pradhan, 2005).
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 
introduced in Section 3.1, has a very active water mar-
ket in part because of low transaction costs. Much of 
“In Australia, water trading has enabled the 
expansion of the wine industry and other 
high value crops, such as almonds.”
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community support, especially relative to regulatory 
takings. However, water trading can also generate large 
environmental externalities, adversely affecting either 
natural habitats or downstream users, or both (NRC, 
1992). For example, when water for trading is generated 
by efficiency or by fallowing land, the trade may reduce 
the amount of runoff supporting local habitat and may 
diminish instream flows.14 On the other hand, some 
water trades may improve local instream flows by de-
creasing diversions and contaminant loadings. Where 
water is traded to downstream users using the existing 
stream as a conveyance, trading could offer measur-
able environmental benefits. Where water is traded out 
of the basin or alters the timing and magnitude of flows, 
adverse impacts are likely to occur. Unfortunately, there 
do not appear to be published assessments of the rela-
tive impacts of water trading on streamflow.15 In the fol-
lowing, we discuss the environmental performance of 
several examples of water trading.
Water trading is now used in some areas to return water 
to river channels, in order to support listed species or 
threatened habitats, and for general ecosystem restora-
tion (Tarlock, 2014). However in most areas, such activ-
ity still represents only a tiny fraction of total water use in 
any given area.16 For example, the Colorado Water Trust 
(CWT) brokered a lease agreement between two state 
14 In efficiency-based agricultural water trades, the buyer typically pays 
the irrigator to install more efficient irrigation equipment or methods, 
such as hiring additional irrigation management staff, installing pump-
back systems, lining canals, or constructing new regulatory reservoirs. 
The water conserved by these new practices would then be available for 
transfer to the buyer/investor. Efficiency-based trades keep agricultural 
land in production and can increase total employment in the area of 
origin, but they require additional monitoring and measurement to doc-
ument or calculate the volume of water conserved. In fallowing-based 
trades, also known as “buy-and-dry”, the buyer simply pays the irrigator 
not to irrigate and, in exchange, receives the volume of water historically 
used by the parcel. This requires less effort and less time to implement, 
but takes land out of production and typically generates significant 
adverse impacts on rural communities. 
15 For example, the various water trading agreements between Imperi-
al Valley and urban Southern California will have the direct effect of 
reducing the volume of water flowing down the lower Colorado River 
between Parker Dam – the new diversion point – and Imperial Dam, 
about 150 river miles downstream, by more than 300,000 acre-feet per 
year, equivalent to roughly 5 percent of the historic average annual flow 
between these two diversion points.
16 Such instream flows typically require additional legal conditions, such 
as explicit recognition of instream flow rights, improved monitoring and 
measurement, and the acceptance of local entitlement holders.
The active participation of the Australian government 
in water trading increased prices and participation but 
may also have increased total water use within the 
basin. A large survey (n=520) of those selling entitle-
ments or allocations to the Australian environmental 
water program found that sellers believed they received 
a higher price from the government than they would 
have from other private agents, or that the government 
was the only purchaser in the market. The survey also 
found that sellers reportedly used 69 to 77 percent of 
their water allocations prior to trading it to the govern-
ment (Wheeler and Cheesman, 2013). That is, survey 
respondents reported selling portions of their alloca-
tions that they would not have used otherwise. Selling 
unused water allocations is not a reallocation so much 
as an expansion of total water use.
Water trading occurs in a variety of forms. Howe (2011) 
noted that, in practice, many water trades reflect a 
change in type of use rather than a change in loca-
tion. For example, in the Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District, developers have purchased 
farmland and its water rights and then converted the 
land and water to residential or commercial use, often 
generating a significant increase in revenue per unit 
of water while limiting some of the social and environ-
mental externalities that would occur if the water were 
physically moved to a different location.
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
Water trading has been used as a mechanism to obtain 
water for ecological purposes, to augment streamflows, 
and to address water quality concerns (such as tem-
perature) in threatened reaches. The environmental 
performance of water trading is highly variable, de-
pending on the type of trade and site-specific condi-
tions. The benefits of voluntary, incentive-based water 
acquisition include ease of transaction and greater 
“Water trading can also generate large 
environmental externalities, adversely 
affecting either natural habitats or 
downstream users, or both”
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trading activity between 1982 and 2011, but less than 
0.5 percent of total water use in the state (Figure 4). 
In Australia, the federal government has invested more 
than $3 billion to date to purchase entitlements and 
allocations for environmental water, protecting eco-
logical resources to enable and expedite water trading 
between non-governmental users. In 2008–2009, for 
example, the government purchased nearly 880,000 
acre-feet of long-term water entitlements and 1.4 mil-
lion acre-feet of short-term allocations, at a total cost of 
about $2 billion (adjusted to 2014$). The price for this 
water ranged from about $269 to $377 per acre-foot. 
Local interest in this environmental water buyback 
program, known as “Restoring the Balance”, has been 
strong, with the Australian government receiving nearly 
7,600 applications to sell water from 2007 to early 2012. 
Water entitlement sales for the environment account 
agencies, increasing low-season flows in the White River 
by 3,000 acre-feet of water three times over a 10-year 
period to lower the temperature of river flows and, in 
turn, benefit fish (CWT, 2015). Similarly, the Columbia 
Basin Water Transactions Program, active for more than 
a decade, works with partner organizations in four west-
ern states to acquire and dedicate water for instream 
flows within the basin. In 2013, 45 transactions led to the 
acquisition of more than 48,000 acre-feet of water, cost-
ing about $13.9 million and benefiting some 276 miles of 
streams, the fish and wildlife, and the communities that 
depend on them (National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, 
2014). Bonneville Power Administration, in cooperation 
with the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, 
provides some of the funding for the program due, 
in part, to concerns about endangered species. In 
California, environmental water purchases averaged 
152,000 acre-feet, accounting for about 14  percent of 
FIGURE 4. Water purchases for the environment in California, 1982–2011 
Source: Hanak and Stryjewski, 2012.
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resulting in the loss of open water and wetland habitats 
that support several hundred species of birds (Cohen 
and Hyun, 2006).
Yet water trading occurs in regions of water scarcity, 
where water resources in particular have already under-
gone dramatic transformation. Dams, canals, and diver-
sions have already altered the timing and magnitude 
of stream flows throughout many of the regions now 
turning to water trading (Worster, 1985). Determining 
the additional impacts of water trading upon this exist-
ing landscape would be difficult. An alternative basis 
for comparison could be the marginal or cumulative 
environmental impacts of water trading relative to the 
new impacts of additional water development. That is, 
water trading may prove to be less environmentally 
harmful than the construction of new dams and diver-
sion projects, or even the construction of new desalina-
tion plants. 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
Water trading is usually characterized as a market-
based mechanism that reduces economic inefficiencies 
by reallocating water from lower to higher value uses. 
Trading has been used to meet explicit environmen-
tal objectives, but, as described previously, it is rarely 
employed to address equity challenges. Indeed, water 
trading can exacerbate social and economic inequali-
ties, worsening gender and geographic differences. 
In regions with informal water rights and trading that 
are functional at the community level, such as rural 
Nepal, demands from outlying urban areas for larger 
scale trades can overwhelm local water management 
institutions. Trades from these rural areas might not 
reflect the true value of the many informal uses water 
has in the community (such as subsistence fishing or 
milling) or the full range of informal ownership and use 
for roughly 25  percent of total entitlement trading 
activity (Wheeler and Cheesman, 2013). However, 
some irrigators and state governments in Australia 
oppose the instream buyback program, and it was cut 
dramatically when the Labor Party fell from power in 
September 2013 (Bennett and Carroll, 2014). 
However, water trades not explicitly intended for envi-
ronmental purposes can create a host of adverse envi-
ronmental impacts. They can, for example, change the 
timing, quantity, and quality of return flows, adversely 
affecting riparian and wetland habitats and the species 
that depend upon them. Some trades, such as from 
California’s Owens Valley to Los Angeles, adversely 
affect public health by increasing the amount of dust 
emissions from exposed lakebed and fallowed land, 
generating significant externalities (LA DWP, 2013). 
Groundwater substitution, in which a user trades sur-
face water and increases groundwater extraction, can 
lead to over-extraction, and sinking or caving in of land 
surfaces (subsidence), depleting springs and seeps, 
and robbing future generations (Brown et al., 2015).
Water trading can also diminish groundwater recharge 
rates, whether the water is generated via fallowing or 
increased efficiency. In the southern Indian state of 
Tamil Nadu, farmers irrigating with groundwater have 
increased extraction rates and sold the excess to water 
tanker trucks serving urban populations, an example of 
informal water trading. Yet this increased groundwater 
extraction lowered the water table, increasing pump-
ing costs for other irrigators or drying up their wells 
entirely (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2005). 
Efforts to mitigate the environmental impacts of water 
trading have had mixed success. In Spain, a proposal to 
add a small environmental mitigation fee to each unit 
of water traded was insufficient to overcome the strong 
opposition of environmental and social organizations 
(Albiac et al., 2006). In California, state commitments to 
mitigate the environmental and public health impacts 
of the nation’s largest agriculture-to-urban water 
trade have yet to result in any actual mitigation efforts, 
potentially jeopardizing several listed species and likely 
“…water trades not explicitly intended 
for environmental purposes can create… 
adverse environmental impacts.”
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water first began flowing to LA, creating the single 
largest source of dust pollution in the United States. In 
the past decade, after years of litigation, LA has spent 
more than $1.4 billion on dust management efforts and 
has returned some of the water to Owens Lake.17
San Luis Valley, Colorado. As demonstrated by 
efforts to destroy the infrastructure moving water out 
of the Owens Valley, local opposition to trading water 
can be strong. In the late 1980s, the Canadian owner 
of the 97,000-acre Baca Ranch in southern Colorado’s 
San Luis Valley began buying water rights from other 
farms in San Luis Valley, allegedly to irrigate new crops. 
Local residents, who soon discovered that the true pur-
pose of the purchases was to sell the water to Denver 
suburbs, 100 miles to the northeast, feared that their 
valley would experience the devastation felt in Owens 
Valley. Thus, they formed Citizens for San Luis Valley 
Water to fight the water trade, working with the local 
irrigation district to support a special ballot measure 
to raise local taxes to fund litigation against the pro-
posed water sale. The ballot measure prevailed with 
92 percent of the vote. In 1991, the locals prevailed in 
court, stopping the proposed water trade. After Baca 
Ranch was subsequently sold, the new owner also 
attempted to sell the water out of the valley, sponsor-
ing two statewide initiatives seen as efforts to support 
the water trade. In 1998, both initiatives failed, receiving 
less than 5 percent of the vote. With continued pub-
lic pressure, the federal government purchased Baca 
Ranch in 2004 – more than a quarter century after 
the fight began – to prevent water from leaving the 
San Luis Valley. It then parceled the land to the newly 
designated Great Sand Dunes National Park, part to a 
nearby national forest, and 54,000 acres to the new 
Baca National Wildlife Refuge (Reimers, 2013). 
Imperial Valley, California. On the other hand, water 
trading that promotes efficiency rather than fallowing 
of agricultural land can improve socio-economic out-
comes for both the area of origin and the destination. 
For example, an ongoing water trade from the Imperial 
17 For information on the dust emissions at Owens Lake and the current 
dust management program, see the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution 
Control District website. 
rights within the community, meaning residents may be 
deprived of full compensation (Pant el al., 2008). Even 
within the community, the complex web of informal 
water-use arrangements can complicate informal trad-
ing agreements and, in turn, generate a range of eco-
nomic impacts on those using the water who had not 
been consulted or participated in the trading arrange-
ments (Pant et al., 2008). 
Limarí Basin, Chile. Unequal access to water mar-
kets due to unequal access to information or credit can 
distort outcomes and reduce market efficiency. Chile’s 
Limarí Basin has very high water trading activity, sug-
gesting successful economic performance, but Romano 
and Leporati (2002) argued that it suffers from several 
market distortions arising from disparities between the 
resources available to those trading water. Peasants 
fare poorly in trading activity because their water rights 
often are not fully recognized, they are not as well-
organized as those purchasing the water, and they lack 
access to information on pricing (Romano and Leporati, 
2002). Dinar et al. (1997) noted that economic perfor-
mance is affected by disparities in the value of water in 
different sectors and by the ability of those with limited 
means to participate in water trading. 
Southern California. Water generated for trades by 
fallowing land can benefit water rights holders at the 
expense of farmworkers and equipment suppliers, 
potentially devastating rural communities. California’s 
Owens Valley provides one of the early examples of 
the adverse impacts of trading water away from rural 
areas. In the early 1900s, agents secretly representing 
the City of Los Angeles (LA) covertly purchased land in 
the Owens Valley. In 1908, LA began a 5-year construc-
tion project of a 419-mile pipeline to divert water from 
Owens Valley farmland to LA. Although Owens Valley 
irrigators had willingly sold their water through market 
transactions, they had not contemplated the plight of 
the valley as a whole. Over the next several years, agi-
tators from the valley dynamited the pipeline several 
times in a vain attempt to protect their water supplies 
(Hundley, 2001). In addition to the direct economic and 
social impacts on the Owens Valley, the water trade 
had desiccated Owens Lake by 1926, just 13 years after 
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within households where men have left for new indus-
trial jobs enabled by new water supplies. In places 
where rural agriculture, particularly at the household 
level, provides subsistence and food security, reduced 
access to water can impose significant adverse impacts 
(Farolfi and Perret, 2002).
Rural household access to water for domestic uses 
and for subsistence agriculture may have only infor-
mal community-level recognition that does not trans-
late into tradable water rights. Water trading that does 
not recognize these informal or ad hoc water uses can 
adversely affect equity outcomes and prompt ques-
tions of legitimacy (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2005). 
Formal, state-recognized water rights typically require 
the means and ability to register and defend them, 
in turn conferring power on those with formal water 
rights. In South Asia and other parts of the develop-
ing world, informal water-use arrangements that permit 
and enable water use and trading can be disrupted by 
formal rights-based trades and command-and-control 
reallocations (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2005). 
Zwarteveen (1997) noted that, as men in Ecuador, 
Nepal, and Peru have migrated in search of employ-
ment, women have assumed a disproportionately large 
number of agricultural roles, even as formal and infor-
mal water rights continue to be held by the absent men. 
These geographic and gender disparities can generate 
adverse outcomes as water is traded by absentee own-
ers. Conversely, trading within households – even in the 
form of recognition of joint ownership – can encourage 
investment in water resource maintenance and pro-
ductivity at the local level (Zwarteveen, 1997). Similarly, 
water organizations in the developing world, where 
decisions may be made about trading water out of 
the community, tend to have limited female participa-
tion, potentially neglecting compensation for impacts 
that would have been identified if there were stronger 
female roles and participation (Zwarteveen, 1997).
Water trading mechanisms can privilege certain popu-
lations and marginalize others, especially when cultural 
practices differ. For example, New Mexico’s cooperative 
irrigation systems, known as acequias, usually enjoy 
Valley that began in 1989 relies on efficiency-based 
measures rather than fallowing to generate water for 
trade, creating additional employment while keeping 
land in production.18 
Water trading’s social impacts vary based on several 
factors, including the relative economic health of the 
area of origin and the purchasing area, whether or not 
the water leaves the area of origin, the process used to 
trade the water, and the relative economic and politi-
cal power of the parties (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 
2005), gender differences regarding access to and 
control of water (Zwarteveen, 1997), the amount of 
trading activity in the area (Howe, 2011), and the legiti-
macy of the water rights being traded (Meinzen-Dick 
and Pradhan, 2005). Impacts often vary within the 
same community, as those with water rights or alloca-
tions to trade receive compensation, while third parties 
– such as irrigation equipment suppliers or farmwork-
ers – may suffer a loss of revenue or income as a result 
of trading (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2005).
Water trades within the same region typically have 
minimal or no adverse social or equity impacts. Howe 
(2011) noted the large number of small-volume, short-
term water trades within an irrigation district as an 
example of positive economic and equity outcomes. 
Inter-sectoral trades, such as from agricultural to 
manufacturing or mining within the same region, may 
also generate positive economic and equity outcomes, 
as jobs shift from lower income farm employment to 
higher income industrial employment (Meinzen-Dick 
and Pradhan, 2005). However, Zwarteveen (1997) 
noted that even such intra-regional trades can gen-
erate differential impacts based on gender, requiring 
additional agricultural and domestic labor for women 
18 The Imperial Irrigation District’s IID/MWD Water Conservation Program 
Final Construction Report (2000) documented that 24 separate system 
water conservation projects and programs (as opposed to on-farm), 
such as lining irrigation canals and installing new headgates, had been 
implemented through 1999. The capital cost for these totaled $193 
million (2014$), with an additional $8.3 million in annual operations and 
maintenance costs. These improvements yield 108,500 acre-feet of 
conserved water per year, at a cost of $254 per acre-foot. In addition 
to the jobs associated with the initial construction effort, the on-going 
water trade supports about 12–13 full-time positions for managing water 
deliveries, and for annual operations and maintenance.
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trading can increase costs for those who do not sell, 
such as operations and maintenance costs associated 
with water storage and delivery structures. The eco-
nomic and equity impacts of water traded from rural 
areas can accumulate with additional trading activity, 
reaching a tipping point where local demand for agri-
cultural services falls below the level necessary to main-
tain operations, creating a cascading set of business 
failures and depressing the local tax base (Howe, 2011). 
Agricultural areas importing traded water may also suf-
fer from third-party impacts, in the form of increased 
competition, extended wait-times for water deliveries 
via shared infrastructure, and rising water tables that 
may threaten plant roots or require additional drainage 
(Frontier Economics and Australia NWC, 2007). 
The one key exception to water trading that exacer-
bates social and economic inequalities is in South 
Africa. Section 27(1) of South Africa’s 1998 National 
Water Act states: 
“In issuing a general authorisation or licence a re-
sponsible authority must take into account all 
relevant factors, including… 
(b) the need to redress the results of past racial and 
gender discrimination;…
(d) the socio-economic impact – 
(i) of the water use or uses if authorised; or 
(ii) of the failure to authorise the water use or 
uses.” 
While this act explicitly sought to use water trading to 
improve socio-economic conditions,19 South Africa’s 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (now known 
as the Department of Water and Sanitation) refused to 
permit more than 118 applications for water trades from 
2005 through 2008, claiming that the trades failed to 
meet the Section 27(1) standards (Coleman, 2008). 
South Africa’s Supreme Court found in 2012 that: i) one 
proposed trade would create new employment oppor-
tunities for both men and women in a region with high 
unemployment, meeting the standard established by 
19 The National Water Act is available at http://www.acts.co.za/national-wa-
ter-act-1998/. 
very senior water rights. However, they have fared 
poorly when defending their rights or seeking com-
pensation for third-party impacts in state proceedings, 
where language and cultural practices favor fluency in 
English and legal literacy (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 
2005). Romano and Leporati (2002) found similar 
circumstances in Chile, where less-educated rural 
peasants fared poorly in trading water rights to more 
powerful non-agricultural interests. 
Economic disparities also affect water-trading out-
comes. As with the acequias, wealthy, powerful inter-
ests enjoy disproportionate advantages relative to 
many historic water rights holders. In South Africa in 
the late 1990s, mining interests sought to increase 
their production and activity in rural, water-scarce 
regions by purchasing water rights from small irri-
gators, at prices ten times higher than other irriga-
tors were willing to offer. Although the mines offered 
employment and generated greater returns per unit 
of water, they threatened to dewater local subsis-
tence farms and adversely affect a broad swath of 
rural economies beyond the irrigators voluntarily sell-
ing their water (Farolfi and Perret, 2002). A study of 
water trading in Chile’s Limarí Valley found a similar 
impact, where increasing rural poverty was traced to 
water rights sales from peasants to non-agricultural 
interests and the general worsening of water-rights 
distribution (Romano and Leporati, 2002).
As noted in the examples of the Owens and San Luis 
Valleys, those in areas of origin can strongly, sometimes 
violently, oppose the sale of water to outside interests. 
A national study of water trading in Australia found 
that this opposition can extend to local interests that 
trade their water rights to external interests (Frontier 
Economics and Australia NWC, 2007). In addition to 
cultural and social bases for opposing such trades, 
“Water trading mechanisms can  
privilege certain populations and 
marginalize others…”
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Grafton et al. (2010) wrote that “Legal clarity over 
water rights, including what they can be used for and 
the rules of water trade, is a cornerstone of functioning 
water markets.” Diversion or, better yet, consumptive 
use water rights with clear title and quantified alloca-
tions that can be leased or sold can be described as 
marketable property rights, a necessary condition for 
water trading (Grafton et al., 2012). Culp et al. (2014) 
noted that water trading requires legally enforceable 
contracts that clearly and completely define the water 
right to be traded, an exclusive right to the water, and 
the recognized right to trade the water. Government 
plays a clear role in establishing these necessary condi-
tions, documenting and, in some cases, allocating water 
rights themselves, establishing and maintaining the 
legal framework in which trading occurs and, in many 
cases, financing the physical infrastructure to store and 
convey water and allow water trading to occur (Dinar 
et al., 1997). Strong and effective institutions that adju-
dicate and resolve disputes, enforce contracts, and 
monitor trading agreements are a necessary element 
in successful water markets (Zwarteveen, 1997). 
Typically, infrastructure is also required to physically 
convey water from a seller to a buyer, or to store or 
otherwise manage water availability so that an agreed-
upon volume can be conveyed to the buyer at the 
appropriate time. In some cases, creative agreements 
have enabled trades from unconnected or remote 
sources of water, creating what are known as “in-lieu” or 
“paper” trades.21 While these trades can avoid require-
ments for connecting physical infrastructure, they do 
require sophisticated legal arrangements, manage-
ment, and monitoring to ensure that the correct vol-
umes of water move at the approved time.
21 One example of an in-lieu water trade is the agreement between the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and the Coachella 
Valley Water District and the Desert Water Agency. All three have 
contracts with California’s State Water Project (SWP), but because a 
direct connection from SWP’s California Aqueduct to Coachella Valley 
would have cost the equivalent of more than $1.8 billion, the latter two 
agencies agreed to an in-lieu exchange agreement with Metropolitan for 
a “bucket-for-bucket” exchange of SWP water for Colorado River water. 
That is, Metropolitan takes the other agencies’ allotment of SWP water, 
in exchange for giving up an equivalent amount of Colorado River water. 
Source: cvwd.org/news/news178.php.
Section 27, and ii) the Department had acted improp-
erly in failing to grant the requested license to trade 
the water.20 According to a local source, however, the 
responsible authorities in South Africa continue to 
delay and deny licenses for water trades, meaning that 
South Africa’s water market has been restricted for a 
decade (Backeberg, personal communication, 2015). 
Necessary, enabling, and  
limiting conditions
Institutional arrangements determine the ultimate 
success or failure of water trading (Livingston, 1998). 
Successful water trading requires secure and flexible 
water rights that recognize and protect users and others 
from externalities. Such institutional arrangements also 
need to be flexible enough to adapt to changing physical 
conditions as well as changing social norms, such as the 
growing interest in meeting environmental needs and 
protecting water quality (Livingston, 1998). Recognizing 
and understanding these factors can help explain the 
varying successes and even the existence of water trad-
ing in different countries and regions within countries. 
Some factors, such as legal and transferable rights to 
use water, may be necessary for water trading to occur. 
Others, such as access to timely information about water 
available to trade, can enable water trading but may not 
be required for trading to occur. Still other factors, such 
as “no injury” regulations and “area of origin” protections, 
limit water trading or function as barriers or obstacles to 
trading. The following explains the details of the neces-
sary, enabling and limiting conditions.
Necessary conditions include:
• legal, transferable rights to use water
• decoupling of water rights from land rights
• contract adjudication and enforcement 
• means for buyers and sellers to communicate
• physical infrastructure to move water
• mechanisms to monitor and measure water flows 
and use.
20 Makhanya v Goede Wellington Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (230/12) [2012] 
ZASCA 205 (30 November 2012).
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T26
as precluding trading while the higher end of the scale 
can be seen as enabling trading.
Water banks can enable water trading by connecting 
buyers and sellers, posting information on availability 
and transaction history and, in some cases, by physi-
cally storing water to match availability and demands. 
The existence of technically skilled staff and monitor-
ing equipment increases the efficacy of water banks 
and can help resolve disputes. Where water banks do 
not exist or have limited capacity, water contracting 
can enable spot trading (Brown et al., 2015).
The availability of pertinent information can be con-
sidered both a necessary and an enabling condition, 
depending on the extent and type of information avail-
able. The availability of information on quantity, quality, 
location, and timing of water entitlements or alloca-
tions can enable trading by pairing sellers and buy-
ers. Similarly, clear information about transaction costs 
enables trading. Additionally, greater information and 
certainty about future conditions, such as the security 
of a water right given climate changes, can also enable 
water trading (Brown et al., 2015). Clear and timely 
information about prices also facilitates trading and 
decreases search costs (Levine et al., 2007).
Social cohesion can also enable water trading. Trading 
is more likely to occur where informal bonds exist, such 
as between neighbors or within an irrigation district or 
even between irrigators, relative to trading between 
parties with no common history. In some cases, irriga-
tors will accept a lower bid from another irrigator than 
a higher bid from a municipal agency, particularly one 
from outside the basin or region. Water rights hold-
ers may fear that indicating they have water to trade 
could be interpreted to mean that they do not need the 
water, jeopardizing the right or imposing political costs 
(Albiac et al., 2006). 
Water trading can and does occur when necessary con-
ditions are satisfied, but markets are much more robust 
and active when additional enabling conditions are met. 
Enabling conditions include:
• water rights equivalency (as opposed to prioritized 
rights)
• water banks and contracts 
• clear, available information
• social cohesion
• competitive markets with multiple participants of 
roughly equivalent economic power.
One of the major factors contributing to Australia’s 
successful adoption of water trading in the Murray-
Darling Basin was the absence of prioritized water 
rights. This enabled water trading without concern for 
impacts on those holding less senior water rights (see 
Annex 1 for greater detail). By contrast, in the western 
United States and other regions with prioritized water 
rights (also known as prior appropriation or seniority), 
an entitlement holder with a senior water right (deter-
mined by the date the right was first exercised or “per-
fected”) could only sell or lease water after ensuring 
that more junior rights holders receive compensation or 
do not otherwise protest the transaction. This distinc-
tion helps explain the frequency of trades within irriga-
tion districts where district members share a common 
priority right – such as the Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District – and the much lower number 
of transactions between those with different priorities. 
That is, common priority rights or water rights with 
equivalent seniority can be traded more readily than 
rights with different priority dates. 
Dinar and Saleth (2005) proposed a scale from zero 
to seven to describe a range of surface water rights 
conditions that could be used to evaluate the enabling 
conditions for water trading. It spans from a rating of 
zero for no water rights, to a rating of five for appropria-
tive rights; six for proportional sharing systems (such 
as the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District 
and Australia); and seven for water licenses and per-
mits. Under this system, we could categorize no rights 
“Social cohesion can also enable water 
trading. Trading is more likely to occur 
where informal bonds exist…”
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The anti-speculation doctrine requires buyers to 
describe the new location and use of the water, condi-
tioning the trade on these terms and increasing trans-
action costs (Culp et al., 2014). The anti-speculation 
doctrine is intended to prevent hoarding and mar-
ket distortion by those with the economic means to 
acquire large volumes of water (Grafton et al., 2010). In 
some areas, this doctrine is waived for municipal water 
agencies, enabling them to acquire water for unspeci-
fied future needs.
The beneficial use doctrine requires that water rights 
be exercised, encouraging inefficient or unproductive 
uses as rights holders must “use it or lose it.” Some 
jurisdictions have amended beneficial use require-
ments to enable rights holders to sell or lease the water 
they conserve or save by implementing efficiency mea-
sures, water they would otherwise simply lose to junior 
rights holders. Without explicit protection for such 
conservation measures, the beneficial use doctrine 
precludes water efficiency and hinders trading. In some 
areas, laws prohibit users from selling or leasing water 
“salvaged” from conservation or efficiency measures 
(Culp et al., 2014).
Some kinds of water rights, such as non-consumptive, 
appurtenant water rights (common in wetter regions of 
the world) do not lend themselves to water trading.22 
Examples of such non-consumptive rights include 
rights to use or divert water to run mills or generate 
hydroelectric power.
Some markets limit participation to existing contractors 
or entitlement holders (Albiac et al., 2006). A related 
barrier is a limitation on the purpose or use to which 
a buyer may apply water. For example, several states 
only allow state agencies, and not private individuals or 
non-profit organizations, to purchase or lease water for 
environmental purposes. 
22 An appurtenant water right is directly tied to the land itself, typically to 
lands adjacent to streams.
Levine et al. (2007) argued that successful water trad-
ing requires the participation of multiple buyers and 
sellers, with roughly equivalent power. They contended 
that, without these factors, market inefficiencies will 
result. In Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin and within 
several United States irrigation districts, the satisfac-
tion of these criteria has enabled active and successful 
water trading. In their absence, as seen in many agricul-
tural-to-urban trades, a small number of economically 
powerful buyers have distorted markets and created 
significant externalities.
Limiting conditions, which hinder or reduce water 
trading, include:
• no injury rule
• anti-speculation doctrine
• beneficial use doctrine
• property rights/pre-conditions
• high transaction costs
• spatial and temporal differences in supply and de-
mand.
In many arid and semi-arid regions, water scarcity and 
variability dictate that upstream “return flows” – water 
diverted but not consumed that subsequently returns 
to the stream – are used and claimed by downstream 
users. To protect the rights of these downstream users, 
courts or regulators typically require that the quantity 
and timing of these return flows be maintained when 
upstream water is traded. These and similar protections, 
known as “no injury” rules, place the burden of proof that 
the trade will not harm or adversely affect other water 
rights on those wishing to sell or lease water. The “no 
injury” rule is the prevailing law in most of the western 
United States, intended to presumptively protect junior 
water rights holders from harm that may occur due to 
changes in the volume or timing of return flows from 
senior appropriators. It dramatically increases transac-
tion costs, requiring sellers to hire attorneys and hydrol-
ogists to prove no injury, or otherwise compensate all 
junior entitlement holders, and was a strong disincen-
tive to water trading (Culp et al., 2014).
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services (Figure 5). Payments are made to the envi-
ronmental service provider by the beneficiary of those 
services, e.g. an individual, a community, a company, 
or a government. In essence, it is based on a benefi-
ciary-pays principle, as opposed to a polluter-pays 
principle. Environmental services most often included 
in PES arrangements include carbon sequestration in 
biomass or soils; habitat provision for endangered spe-
cies; protection of landscapes; and various hydrological 
functions related to the quality, quantity, or timing of 
freshwater flows from upstream areas to downstream 
users (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010).
PES has no standardized definition. The definition most 
commonly used in the literature was developed by 
Wunder (2005) and is based on five criteria: i) a volun-
tary transaction where ii) a well-defined environmental 
service is iii) purchased by at least one environmental 
service buyer from iv) at least one environmental ser-
vice provider, with v) payment conditional on the ser-
vice provided. In reality, few projects actually meet all 
of these criteria. For example, money may come from 
donors rather than service providers, or participation in 
the program may be mandatory. Wunder (2005) argued, 
and several reviews confirm, that conditionality is the 
hardest criteria to meet because initiatives are often 
loosely monitored and payments are made up front or 
in good faith. Moreover, in some cases, participation 
is not voluntary (e.g. China), and the beneficiaries are 
broadly defined and are not directly contributing to the 
program. Wunder (2005) concluded that while there 
are a considerable number of PES-like arrangements, 
there are likely “very few ‘true PES’ conforming to the 
theoretical concept developed in the literature.”
PES programs focused on watershed services are 
commonly referred to as payment for watershed ser-
vices, or PWS. PWS arrangements, as with all PES 
arrangements, can take a variety of forms. They can 
be intended to prevent the degradation of a watershed 
or to restore a previously degraded watershed. They 
can be small, local schemes covering several hundred 
hectares or large, national schemes covering millions of 
High transactions costs, driven by the various doctrines 
noted above as well as by the need to overcome infor-
mation constraints and related factors, can hinder water 
trading. Similarly, the time required to complete a trans-
action may limit trading, particularly when buyers seek 
to meet a short-term demand such as an additional irri-
gation cycle or to offset a delivery disruption within an 
urban system; relatively fast trades will produce greater 
trading activity than prolonged approval processes.
Finally, geographic and temporal mismatches between 
supply and demand can impose additional barriers to 
water trading, especially in the absence of physical 
infrastructure to bridge these gaps. Where dams and 
conveyances do not exist, those wishing to sell water 
may lack the means to physically deliver the water to a 
potential buyer, or be unable to deliver the water at the 
right time (Bauer, 1997).
3.2  Payment for ecosystem 
services/payment for 
watershed services
Description
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is an incentive-
based instrument that seeks to monetize the external, 
non-market values of environmental services, such 
as removal of pollutants and regulation of precipita-
tion events, into financial incentives for local actors to 
provide such services. In practical terms, PES involves 
a series of payments to a land or resource manager 
in exchange for a guaranteed flow of environmental 
“High transactions costs, driven by the 
various doctrines noted above as well 
as by the need to overcome information 
constraints and related factors, can  
hinder water trading.”
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• Service providers. For the vast majority of lo-
cal and national programs, private landowners are 
the main watershed service providers, followed by 
communal landholders, private reserves, national 
parks and, in a very small number of local schemes, 
occupiers of public land. 
• Payment levels. In national programs, payment 
levels are mostly determined administratively. In 
the local programs, negotiation through an inter-
mediary is more common. Direct negotiations be-
tween supplier and buyer occur in very few cases. 
Funds and transfer of payments are in most cases 
managed by an intermediary, often in a specially 
set up trust fund.
hectares. PWS schemes can be financed directly from 
the beneficiary or from third parties acting on behalf 
of the beneficiary, e.g. governments or institutions, or 
some combination thereof. They can involve cash or 
in-kind payments and be paid all at once or periodi-
cally. In a comprehensive review of 50 ongoing PWS 
programs in developing countries, Porras et al. (2008) 
highlighted the following major trends.
• Scale. Most ongoing programs (82 percent) are lo-
cal, operating at watershed level or smaller. The re-
maining 18 percent are national programs. Some of 
the local programs are linked to national programs 
or international projects.
• Scope. Local programs tend to target one or two 
watershed services (more commonly water qual-
ity than water quantity), while national programs 
tend to target multiple environmental services as 
a means of tapping into multiple funding sources.
FIGURE 5. Schematic of a PES arrangement for watershed services
Watershed services
e.g. water purication, 

ood risk mitigation, 
aquifer recharge, 
erosion minimization
Balances upstream and 
downstream interests
Upstream community
Stewards and providers 
of waterhsed services
Incentives
e.g. cash, assistance,
materials Project
Payments
Downstream water users
Beneciaries of watershed services
Source: Forest Trends, 2012.
“PWS schemes can be financed directly from 
the beneficiary or from third parties…”
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that preserving the upstream rural Catskill watershed 
would be far less expensive. However, New York City 
had a long-history of employing eminent domain to 
solve such issues. When farmers and rural landowners 
voiced immediate concern, the city and local farmers 
came together to develop a plan that could meet both 
groups’ interests. A key element of the plan was the 
Whole Farm Program, a voluntary effort fully funded 
by New York City’s Department of Environmental 
Protection whereby farmers would work with technical 
advisors to custom design point and nonpoint source 
pollution control measures to meet an environmen-
tal objective while also improving the viability of their 
farming business. By 2006, the city had spent or com-
mitted $1.4–$1.5 billion in watershed protection proj-
ects, averaging $167 million in expenditures per year 
(Kenny, 2006). Participation remains high, with 96 per-
cent of large farms in the watershed participating in the 
program (Watershed Agricultural Council, 2011). 
PWS arrangements have also been established in 
developing countries. In Ecuador, for example, the Socio 
Bosque Program (SBP), a national program established 
in 2008, provides financial incentives to individual and 
communal forest landowners to conserve native forest 
and Andean tundra ecosystems. The program, which 
includes environmental protection and poverty alle-
viation objectives, is largely state funded. Since 2012, 
however, additional support has been provided by 
the German Development Bank, NGOs, and General 
Motors Omnibus BB. Program participation is volun-
tary. Participants are provided a monetary incentive 
per hectare of land entered into the program, and in 
exchange, must agree to refrain from logging, changing 
existing land uses, burning, altering hydrological condi-
tions or reducing carbon storage, and commercial or 
sport hunting and fishing for 20 years. By mid-2013, 
1.1 million hectares had been conserved through 2,100 
individual and 150 communal agreements (Raes and 
Mohebalian, 2013).
While PWS programs can be found in a wide range of 
settings and, in some cases, have been operating for 
decades, comprehensive data on their size or scope are 
not available. Ecosystem Marketplace (2013) estimated 
• Funding sources. Funding sources are varied. Na-
tional programs primarily receive government fund-
ing through the allocation of national budgets and 
donor funding, including loans from the World Bank. 
Funding for local programs is more varied but is pri-
marily from: domestic and agricultural water fees; 
donors, including the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), World Bank, and German Cooperation; the 
private sector, including downstream hydroelectric 
companies (in some cases, in the form of a dona-
tion); and local government budgets. 
• Conditionality. Nearly all programs are uncon-
ditional, meaning service providers are paid on a 
per unit area basis for land-management practices 
“believed to have a high probability of resulting in 
provision of the environmental service.” Only one 
payment scheme, Indonesia’s Rewarding Upland 
Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) initia-
tive, is conditional on outcomes, such as the level 
of sediment reduction achieved. 
Application
PWS arrangements are gaining prominence and have 
been applied in a wide range of settings. For example, 
the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), estab-
lished in the 1950s in an effort to reduce erosion on 
agricultural lands, became more conservation oriented 
in the mid-1980s, making it among the oldest and lon-
gest running PES programs in the world. CRP today 
pays farmers to take land out of production in order 
to protect soil and water resources, as well as wildlife 
habitat (Karousakis and Brooke, 2010). In northeastern 
France, Vittel-Nestle Waters paid farmers and provided 
technical support (and some labor) to alter local dairy 
farming practices in order to reduce nitrate pollution 
of groundwater – the source of Vittel’s bottled water 
(Perrot-Maitre 2006).
New York City provides another well-known example. 
In the late 1990s, New York City was faced with the 
prospect of building a $4–$6 billion filtration plant with 
an additional $250 million in annual operating costs 
to meet new federal Safe Drinking Water Act require-
ments – an approach that was “treating symptoms, not 
causes” (Appleton, 2010). An initial analysis suggested 
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• many programs lack baseline data or monitoring 
systems 
• the connections between land-use practice and 
watershed services are not always clear, especially 
as they relate to water quantity, and are often site 
specific 
• it can be difficult to attribute change to the pro-
gram rather than to external factors (e.g. changing 
commodity prices)
• programs may not reach threshold levels for mea-
sureable impact, or that impact may occur over a 
relatively long time period. 
As a result of these challenges, reliance on input-
based indicators (sometimes referred to as behavioral 
change) has been borne out of necessity.
Porras (personal communication, 2015) argued that 
because of these challenges, monitoring should be 
based on input-based, rather than outcome-based, 
indicators, as outcome-based indicators shift too much 
risk to the ecosystem service provider and may raise 
equity concerns. She further noted the need to set 
meaningful expectations. For example, conservation 
projects may be implemented within a landslide-prone 
watershed to reduce the risk of landslides, with the 
understanding that, even with a successful program, 
a landslide would still likely occur, albeit with reduced 
frequency and intensity over the long term. Thus, an 
expectation of no landslides is unrealistic and could 
threaten the viability of the program.
In the absence of data on project outcomes, Porras 
et al. (2008) found that reported impacts are often 
based on “perceptions of local populations and those 
operating the schemes and/or quick measurements of 
what the impacts should be, rather than in-depth sci-
entific evidence drawing from site measurements and 
modelling of relationships.” But even based on these 
sources, the available data suggest that environmental 
performance is mixed. In a review of previous studies 
that the total transaction value of PWS programs and 
water funds in 2012 was $8.0 billion. Activity in 2013 
was considerably higher, with an estimated $11.5 billion 
in transaction value for PWS programs in China alone. 
While these data suggest dramatic growth, Bennett 
(personal communication, 2015) noted that the differ-
ence can largely be explained by better reporting by 
a larger number of projects. Case studies of PWS pro-
grams in developing countries are maintained by the 
London-based International Institute for Environment 
and Development and at Watershed Connect, an online 
platform maintained by Forest Trends (2015a). 
Environmental, economic, and 
social performance
Comprehensive studies on the performance of PWS 
programs are limited, although some studies have 
been conducted on various aspects of these programs. 
Below, we examine the available evidence looking at 
how PWS has performed environmentally, economi-
cally, and socially. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
The environmental performance of PWS is not well 
understood due to a lack of scientific analysis. In an 
analysis of 47 PWS schemes in developing countries, 
Brouwer et al. (2011) found that “less than half of the 
schemes used quantifiable indicators and monitored 
the impact of the schemes on environmental perfor-
mance.” In most cases, the indicators were input-based, 
meaning that they, for example, looked at land area with 
forest cover, rather the actual impacts and outcomes 
of the program. In a review of Costa Rica’s programs, 
Pagiola (2008) found it “unfortunately impossible 
to determine the extent to which the PSA23 program 
has successfully generated environmental services. 
Although the PSA program has established a strong 
system to monitor land user compliance with payment 
contracts, the program remains weak in monitoring its 
effectiveness in generating the desired services.”
There are several challenges to evaluating environ-
mental performance:
23 Pagos por servicios ambientales (payment for environmental services)
“…PWS programs can be found in a wide 
range of settings…”
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applicants for forest protection are prioritized based 
on the total number of points they receive, with more 
points awarded for forests in indigenous territories or 
those protecting water resources. Likewise, applicants 
for reforestation projects are awarded more points if 
they use native species or reforest degraded areas with 
high forestry potential (Porras et al., 2013). The selec-
tion criteria can be tailored to reflect the environmental 
(and even social objectives) of the program and altered 
as priorities or needs change. 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Payment structures are generally uniform and untar-
geted, with flat rates per hectare for all sites (Porras et al., 
2008; Karousakis and Brooke, 2010). Despite the preva-
lence of uniform, untargeted payments, program costs 
and benefits are spatially heterogeneous. Wunschler et 
al. (2006) found that ecosystem service provision varies 
spatially according to the ecosystem benefits, the threat 
of loss, and the cost of service provision. Several stud-
ies have suggested that untargeted, uniform payments 
reduce the cost effectiveness of PES schemes (Dillaha 
et al., 2007; Ferraro, 2008), and given likely constraints 
on program budgets, reduces the project benefits and 
its long-term success (Karousakis and Brooke, 2010). 
Reverse auctions (also referred to as procurement auc-
tions) have been put forth as one option for improving 
the economic efficiency of PWS schemes (Karousakis 
and Brooke, 2010). In an ordinary auction, the buy-
ers compete to obtain a good or service by offering 
increasingly higher prices. With reverse auctions, the 
sellers compete to obtain business from the buyer, 
and prices typically decrease as sellers undercut one 
another. The US Conservation Reserve Program, for 
example, combines reverse auctions with an environ-
mental benefit index to select land for inclusion in the 
program. However, Ferraro (2008) acknowledged that 
and surveys of PWS scheme managers, Brouwer et 
al. (2011) found that “58 percent of the PWS schemes 
were classified as effective in reaching their environ-
mental objectives, while 42 percent were not.” Several 
factors, ranging from the number of intermediaries and 
mode of participation to the selection of service provid-
ers, level of community participation and type of moni-
toring, were found to improve environmental outcomes: 
• schemes with fewer intermediaries were more ef-
fective in meeting environmental objectives
• mandatory participation increased environmental 
effectiveness compared with voluntary schemes
• selecting service providers based on a set of crite-
ria, e.g. location, accessibility of land, or parcel size, 
tended to have a negative impact on environmen-
tal performance
• contracting with the community was more effective 
than contracting with a single ecosystem service 
provider
• programs that monitored progress toward achiev-
ing environmental objectives were more likely to 
reach those objectives.
The study also found that schemes for direct payments 
by downstream hydropower companies to upstream 
land owners to reduce sediment loads were generally 
identified as successful, while other factors – includ-
ing the type of watershed service, age of the scheme, 
or scale of implementation – had no significant effect 
on the outcome. Recognizing this, Brouwer et al. (2011) 
called for international monitoring guidelines to com-
pare programs, identify success factors, and support 
their future design.
Some have suggested that one way to improve envi-
ronmental outcomes is through better selection of 
areas to include within the PWS program, a process 
that could be facilitated by the application of new tech-
nologies (e.g. satellite imagery) and modeling efforts. 
Porras et al. (2013) identified several criteria suggested 
in the literature for targeting efforts, including focus-
ing on areas at high risk of deforestation, large blocks 
of land prone to landslides or other natural disasters, 
and biological corridors. In Costa Rica, for example, 
“…studies have suggested that untargeted, 
uniform payments reduce the cost 
effectiveness of PES schemes…”
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rivers in China. Total investment is $4.3 million per year. 
Farmers in the Yangtze River Basin are paid yuan 417 
per hectare per year ($50), while those in the Yellow 
River Basin are paid yuan 290 ($36) per hectare per 
year. In addition to the regular cash payments, farm-
ers also receive a one-off cash payment and regular 
grain rations (Porras and Neves, 2006a). The program 
is designed to promote forestry and other economic 
endeavors on the land, rather than grain production.
Given that most programs are voluntary, some have 
argued that continued participation provides some indi-
cation that the programs are cost effective, i.e. that the 
benefits exceed the costs. The impact of PWS schemes 
on ecosystem service providers is generally estimated 
by looking at the payment as a fraction of household 
income. Using this metric, results are varied. Kosoy et 
al. (2007) found that the amount received from the 
PWS scheme was less than 2 percent of gross annual 
income for most providers in three cases in Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras; moreover, most watershed 
service providers did not think that the payment was 
fair. However, Wunder (2008) found that payments 
represented 10  to 16  percent of household income in 
schemes in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and 
Vietnam. Even these studies did not examine the trans-
action costs participants incurred in the program or 
the opportunity costs. In light of these findings, several 
studies have suggested that there are also important 
non-financial (or non-income) benefits (Kosoy et al., 
2007; Wunder, 2008). The most commonly cited non-
financial benefits include increasing land-tenure secu-
rity, increasing human and social capital through internal 
organization, and increasing the visibility of the commu-
nity to donors and public entities (Wunder, 2008).
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
Limited data are available on the social outcomes of PES 
programs, as studies have been more narrowly focused 
on “short- or mid-term outcomes such as increased 
income or capacity building since these are much 
easier to identify” than broader social impacts, such as 
changes in power dynamics (Richards, 2013). In one 
notable exception, a review of Mexico’s PES program 
auctions introduce their own set of challenges, espe-
cially in low- and middle-income countries. In these 
countries, PES schemes may have dual objectives, and 
reducing information asymmetries (and thus payments 
for the ecosystem service provider) may not be a pri-
ority. Additionally, administrators of these programs 
might be less likely to differentiate payment due to 
concerns about fairness, and it is unclear whether there 
would be institutional capacity to manage these pro-
grams. Moreover, auctions tend to increase transaction 
costs, which may already be relatively high in low- and 
middle-income countries where buyers of environmen-
tal services are likely to contract with many small, often 
semi-literate, landowners, who often have no legal titles 
and are in dispersed remote rural areas. Finally, differ-
entiation of payment can make it difficult to identify 
corruption and ensure that differentiation is based on 
implementation of transparent rules. Alix-Garcia et al. 
(2009) suggested another option to reverse auctions 
would be “to conduct rigorous contingent valuation 
studies in areas targeted by the program.” 
While uniform payments are still common, there are sev-
eral notable exceptions. Mexico’s National Programme 
for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) pro-
vides higher payments for lands that provide greater 
benefits. For example, primary forest owners receive 
300 pesos per hectare per year (approximately $27). 
Cloud forest owners, by contrast, receive 400 pesos 
per hectare per year ($36) due to the perceived higher 
delivery of hydrological services associated with this 
type of forest which has a role in capturing water from 
fog and clouds during the dry season (Porras and 
Neves, 2006). Payments are made annually, at the end 
of the year, once the absence of land use change has 
been confirmed. 
China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program also pro-
vides targeted payments, although payments are dif-
ferentiated according to the opportunity costs. China’s 
program, which began as a pilot in 1999 and was fully 
implemented in 2002, requires farmers to set aside ero-
sion-prone farmland within critical areas of the water-
sheds of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the two largest 
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broad geographic regions – could be developed to 
improve social outcomes. While some have argued that 
the pursuit of poverty alleviation objectives is likely to 
result in environmental tradeoffs (see, e.g. Huang et al., 
2009), others suggest that this may not always be the 
case (Brouwer, personal communication, 2015).
South Africa’s Working for Water (WfW) program is one 
of the few programs to have poverty alleviation as its 
primary objective. Between its launch in 1995 and 2009, 
WfW cleared more than 1 million hectares of invasive 
alien plants, which improved the timing and volume 
of surface water flows, provided erosion control, and 
increased biodiversity (Ferraro, 2009). The program, 
administered by the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, employs 25,000 to 32,000 people annually, 
targeting low skilled, previously unemployed laborers, 
with a special focus on rural women, youth, and the dis-
abled (Ferraro, 2009). Social development, an integral 
part of the program, includes “skills development, train-
ing, and awareness creation of communities in health 
issues, hygiene, environmental health, inoculation, 
sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy and meno-
pause” (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2015). 
The vast majority of the program budget is provided by 
the central government and the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry’s general budget, with only very 
minor funding from foreign donors, municipalities, and 
the private sector. Ferraro (2009) argued that while the 
program is effectively the government paying for envi-
ronmental services on government-controlled lands 
(and therefore not a true PES program), the program 
administrators are actively seeking voluntary payments 
from private and municipal actors to remove invasive 
plants from within their watersheds. 
Several studies have examined the socio-economic 
status of participants in PES schemes, either as buyers 
or sellers. Porras et al. (2008) found mixed results in 
both national and local schemes, depending, to some 
extent, on land and forest tenure regimes and socio-
economic conditions in the targeted area. In programs 
in Mexico and Nicaragua, for example, the poor were 
relatively well represented (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; 
Pagiola et al., 2005), whereas in Costa Rica, the poor 
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2009) found that in most cases, there 
were no “obvious” changes in the social dynamics within 
a community. However, in two cases, they found a shift 
in the relative power of certain groups, whereby small, 
private forest holders who held land within or adjacent 
to communal lands threatened to cut down their for-
ests if they did not receive some compensation.24 In 
two other cases, the program improved environmental 
awareness and participation in conservation activities.
Information on broader social outcomes is limited. 
However, there is information on the role of PES 
arrangements in alleviating poverty. It is important 
to recognize that PES schemes were conceptualized 
as a mechanism to improve the efficiency of natural 
resource management, not as a mechanism to reduce 
poverty (Pagiola et al., 2005). While most programs 
prioritize areas critical for ecosystem services, some 
have been tailored to meet social objectives through 
a variety of mechanisms, including by targeting the 
programs to particular areas or populations, reducing 
transaction costs, and providing pro-poor premiums 
and subsidies (Wunder, 2005; Porras et al., 2013). In 
Costa Rica, a social development index consisting of 11 
health, participation, economics, and education indica-
tors is one of the criteria that is then integrated with 
environmental criteria to select participants.25 This par-
ticular social development index has been shown to be 
ineffective in targeting payments to low-income popu-
lations because it is biased toward large properties and 
is “too spatially coarse to represent the social impact of 
the programme at household level” (Porras et al., 2013). 
However, it suggests that some sort of criterion – pref-
erably tailored to individual characteristics rather than 
24 In a somewhat unusual situation, this conflict was a result of the fact 
that only a small group had rights to the commons and only those with 
rights received payment.
25 The index is used by Costa Rican government institutions to establish 
priority for social policy and budget allocations. 
“PES schemes were … to improve the 
efficiency of natural resource management, 
not as a mechanism to reduce poverty…”
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were not well represented (Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
Wunder (2008) noted that one must typically own or 
hold land in order to be a seller, thereby excluding the 
“poorest of the poor.” Some schemes have attempted to 
recognize informal access to resources (e.g. Indonesia’s 
RUPES Program), although this has been difficult to 
replicate elsewhere (Porras et al., 2008). A recent 
review of ten PWS schemes in developing countries by 
Bond and Mayers (2010) found only a small number 
of cases where livelihoods had been improved, con-
cluding that “there are significant and positive indirect 
effects of PWS – particularly in building social capita 
in poor communities.” They acknowledged that while 
improving education, health, and nutrition are bet-
ter ways of reducing poverty than PWS, there is little 
evidence of these schemes actually doing any harm. 
Moreover, they suggested that targeting can make 
PWS programs more effective in alleviating poverty. 
Additionally, while it is commonly assumed that up-
stream service providers are poorer than downstream 
users (Wunder, 2008), the reality may be more com-
plicated. For example, George et al. (2009) found that 
downstream and upstream stakeholders were part of 
the same community in two watersheds in Thailand and 
Lao PDR with no clear distinction between upstream 
providers and downstream beneficiaries. In some 
cases, according to Porras et al. (2008), downstream 
users may, in fact, be poorer, raising concerns about 
their ability to pay as well as whether those payments 
are equitable. In cases where user fees were used to 
compensate ecosystem service providers, the authors 
found that the fees were generally found to be accept-
able, with no detectable impact on water use or access 
to water. Additionally, some programs had taken steps 
to ensure that the poorest users were not impacted by 
these fees, e.g. by making payments voluntary or pro-
viding a lifeline supply of water.
Few studies have examined gender representation 
among program participants. In a literature review, Ravn-
borg et al. (2007) found that less than 5 percent of the 
references addressed gender-specific aspects of impacts 
of PES. In a more recent assessment, Richards (2013) 
concurred, finding that “Gender effects have not been 
monitored, and therefore there is no information about 
how women have been affected except some reference 
to their low levels of participation.” Porras et al. (2008) 
cited two studies indicating low participation levels by 
women. However, these studies were more than a decade 
old and may not have reflected current conditions.
Necessary, enabling, and  
limiting conditions
Some factors, such as contract adjudication and 
enforcement, may be necessary for establishing a PWS 
program. Other factors, such as appropriate inventories 
and analyses and government support, can enable but 
may not be required for PES programs to be estab-
lished. Still other factors, such as legal prohibitions, limit 
watershed PES or function as barriers or obstacles. 
Necessary conditions include:
• a legal system recognizing that agreements must 
be kept
• a civil law providing contract parties with legal rem-
edies to enforce contract rights in cases of non-
compliance with contract obligations
• general respect for the rule of law.
In general, PES schemes are flexible and the necessary 
conditions are relatively modest. However, Calvache 
et al. (2012) determined that they must be designed 
within the legal context of a particular area. Greiber 
(2009) provided additional detail on the legal frame-
work for PWS implementation, noting that the frame-
work will differ depending on the type of scheme 
implemented. For example, private schemes, defined 
as self-organized schemes between private entities, 
require the least government intervention and depend 
on only general legal requirements: e.g. a legal system 
recognizing that agreements must be kept, and civil 
law providing contract parties with legal remedies in 
case of non-compliance. However, if only these condi-
tions are in place, Greiber (2009) asserted that these 
“Few studies have examined … gender-
specific aspects of impacts of PES.”
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• methodologies for measuring, monitoring, report-
ing, and verifying progress toward achieving proj-
ect outcomes.
Several studies have developed guides highlighting the 
technical requirements (Hawkins, 2011; Calvache et al., 
2012; Smith et al., 2013). In addition to these require-
ments, methodologies for measuring, monitoring, 
reporting, and verifying progress toward achieving out-
comes are also needed. Monitoring and evaluation are 
fundamental to the success of PES schemes because 
the information they provide gives assurance to the 
buyer that ecosystem services are delivered as prom-
ised and allows for adjustments to the program based 
on better information and changing conditions. Porras 
et al. (2013) made a distinction between monitoring for 
compliance and monitoring for environmental effective-
ness. The former “seeks to ensure that the conditional-
ity inherent in a PWS scheme is put into practice, and 
that the project is implemented effectively.” The latter, 
by contrast, seeks to ensure that the scheme achieves 
its overall objectives and is needed to demonstrate 
additionality, i.e. that changes in watershed ecosystem 
services can be attributed to the program. While com-
pliance and effectiveness monitoring are often linked, “a 
high degree of compliance does not necessarily ensure 
that a scheme is effective, as a poorly designed scheme 
may target the wrong land managers and land that is at 
least risk, meaning that the payments may not generate 
the desired hydro-ecological or conservation benefits.” 
Despite some of the challenges to monitoring (described 
in  the application section of 3.2), Brouwer et al. (2011) 
pointed to the need for international monitoring guide-
lines to identify the relationship between the design of 
the program and its environmental effectiveness because 
understanding these relationships is “paramount to the 
future design of cost-effective PWS schemes.” A recent 
Science article by a large team of scientists and prac-
titioners in the PES field (Naeem et al., 2015) noted 
that “many projects are based on weak scientific foun-
dations, and effectiveness is rarely evaluated with the 
rigor necessary for scaling up and understanding the 
importance of these approaches as policy instruments 
and conservation tools.” In an effort to advance the field, 
programs would “mostly develop at a small scale with 
the objective to solve a specific local water problem,” 
and expanding these projects to address regional or 
national water problems would require a more devel-
oped policy and legal framework. 
By contrast, public schemes are government-driven 
schemes that, by definition, require far greater gov-
ernment involvement, as local, regional, or national 
governments are involved as either watershed service 
providers or buyers, and payment may be done through 
user fees, taxes, or subsidies. However, many of these 
schemes have evolved on an ad hoc basis from initia-
tives of NGOs and overseas development corporations 
and, as a result, they typically lack comprehensive or 
coherent legislation. Greiber (2009) also noted that 
these conditions limit “the real potential of PES as 
an innovative instrument that might be applied more 
often, more efficiently, and at a larger scale to combat 
prevailing water problems.” He argued that a specific 
legal and policy framework would stimulate PES devel-
opment by creating greater legal certainty and helping 
to promote good governance practices. 
While necessary conditions establish the minimum 
requirements for the implementation of a PES program, 
there is a set of enabling conditions that promotes the 
success and long-term viability of these programs. 
While some of the enabling conditions are technical in 
nature, others are legal, institutional, social, and political. 
Technical enabling conditions include:
• an inventory of the value of hydrological services, 
including assessments of baseline conditions, and 
of how these values may change in response to 
land use alterations, infrastructure development, 
and climate
• an analysis of program costs, including implemen-
tation, opportunity, and transaction costs 
• a registry of names, transactions, project data, 
credit issuance, or other information related to PES 
activities 
• technical support from the government, civil soci-
ety, or the private sector through trainings, infor-
mation, or direct technical assistance 
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TABLE 2. Natural-science principles and guidelines for PES programs
Principle: Dynamics
Objective: Ensure project capacity to adapt to dynamic 
natural and anthropogenic processes.
Principle: Monitoring
Objective: Track factors necessary for management, 
trade, forecasting, and assessment.
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES:
identify key services for each service type beyond 
target services
identify spatiotemporal scales of targeted services
identify data needs, resources, and gaps
identify stressors and their spatiotemporal variability
identify and forecast trends in endogenous and 
exogenous threats
identify services’ production and functions and 
sensitivities
determine trade-offs and synergies among services
determine how functional diversity influences resilience.
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES:
quantify deliverables associated with target services
identify spatiotemporal scales in advance of 
implementation
use established methods/protocols and best practices 
for monitoring
estimate uncertainties
monitoring should inform decision-making
monitoring should detect potential changes in 
baseline conditions
monitor non-target services that influence  
target services.
Principle: Baseline
Objective: Document and initial conditions
Principle: Metrics
Objective: Robust, efficient, and versatile methods  
for procuring data.
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES:
measure influences of interventions on  
services
measure status and trends of non-target  
services
ensure that measurements are feasible  
given resources
assess initial state of exogenous and endogenous 
threats to services
measure factors important for forecasting  
service trends.
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES:
must be relevant, reliable, and appropriate in scale
should comply with voluntary standards, certification, 
and regulations
should reflect spatiotemporal scales as identified  
in dynamics
optimize balance between precision and simplicity 
assess progress (in conjunction with baseline  
and monitoring)
should measure both absolute changes and changes  
in trends
preferentially selected to allow comparisons across 
service types
assess how services influence each other.
Principle: Multiple services
Objective: Recognize trade-offs and synergies  
among services
Principle:  Ecological sustainability
Objective: Insure project durability and sustainability
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES:
assess how intervention influences the other services
avoid “double counting”
assess impacts of intervention on non-target services.
SCIENTIFIC GUIDELINES:
estimate short-term and long-term project or program 
performance.
Note: The scientific guidelines shown in bold font are intended to indicate “essential” guidelines that must be followed for a successful intervention.  
Guidelines shown in regular font are considered “desirable”. 
Source: Naeem et al., 2015. 
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of ecosystem services, while Colombia went even fur-
ther by requiring departments and municipalities to 
invest at least 1  percent of annual revenues toward 
either PES to landowners or direct land acquisition in 
source water areas (Bennett et al., 2014). Enabling leg-
islation can occur at various levels (e.g. local, provincial, 
or national) and take a variety of forms. However, the 
appropriate level and form will depend on the prevail-
ing governance system in a particular area.
A variety of social and political conditions increases 
the likelihood of the successful implementation of PES 
schemes. For example, cultural and political acceptance 
of markets in general, and of commercializing rights to 
land use and land management practices, creates an 
enabling environment. Dillaha et al. (2007) noted that 
PES activity is generally strong in Latin America, but 
that development tends to lag in areas with strong 
indigenous cultures (such as the Bolivian highlands) or 
closed economies (such as Venezuela). It is important 
to note that in areas where the natural environment has 
historically been used for free, “actually paying for envi-
ronmental services in response to mounting resource 
scarcity represents a major change in attitude, which 
necessarily will take time” (Dillaha et al., 2007).
Trust is also a key element for an effective PES pro-
gram, as it helps to ensure that there are willing buy-
ers and sellers, and reduces transaction costs. Dillaha 
et al. (2007) noted that service providers might fear 
that PES is a first-step toward appropriation of their 
resources, while service users “might suspect that they 
are or will be the victims of ‘environmental blackmail’.” 
Based on several cases in Asia, Neef and Thomas 
(2009) argued that “Lack of trust between poten-
tial buyers and providers of environmental services is 
probably one of the most constraining factors in set-
ting up viable PES schemes.” One way to facilitate the 
trust-building process is through stakeholder engage-
ment, especially during the initial stages of the project. 
Likewise, transparency and access to information are 
also essential. Intermediaries, such as NGOs, can some-
times play a role in building and maintaining trust while 
also providing technical, legal, and financial support. As 
the authors put forth a set of natural science principles 
and guidelines for PES efforts that they felt were appli-
cable to local-, regional-, and national-level programs in 
developed and developing countries (Table 2). A set of 
scientific guidelines for four of the principles – dynamics, 
monitoring, baseline, and metrics – were deemed “essen-
tial” for a successful intervention, whereas the remainder 
were deemed “desirable”. While specific to PES arrange-
ments, they argued that the principles and guidelines 
could be applicable to market-based conservation 
instruments more broadly. In a review of 118 active PES 
projects, however, the authors found that 60 percent did 
not adhere to the four essential principles, highlighting 
considerable room for improvement in the development 
and implementation of PES projects.
In addition to the more technical aspects of PES, there 
are a number of enabling legal, institutional, social, and 
political conditions that also improve the effectiveness 
of PES. 
Enabling legal, institutional, social, and political 
conditions include:
• a policy and legal framework for PES 
• incentives and/or requirements to participate in 
PES programs
• cultural and political acceptance of markets
• trust between ecosystem service providers and 
beneficiaries
• a supply and demand for ecosystem services.
Governments, for example, can pass laws or institute 
policies that enable the development of PES pro-
grams. In Costa Rica, participants of PES programs 
are exempt from paying property taxes (Porras et al., 
2013). Likewise, the Peruvian government unanimously 
passed a law providing a legal framework for voluntary 
PES programs between land stewards and beneficiaries 
“Governments, for example, can pass 
laws or institute policies that enable the 
development of PES programs.”
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whether these rights also include “the right to receive 
income from the ecosystem services provided by the 
transferred natural resource.” Likewise, in Asia, most 
forested and agricultural land is state-owned. Thus, 
individuals and communities have weak land rights, 
making it difficult for them to sign a contract and pro-
vide a legal guarantee of future land management 
practices (Huang et al., 2009).  
3.3 Water quality trading
Description
Water quality trading (WQT) is a market-based 
approach for reducing or controlling water pollution. It 
allows permitted dischargers in a watershed to trade 
water quality credits, or pollution allowances, in order to 
meet water quality standards. Markets in water quality 
differ from conventional markets in that they are not 
based on an actual physical commodity. Rather, they 
are based on trading a license or a permit to pollute. 
The primary goal of water quality trading is to reduce 
the costs of water pollution control, often following the 
imposition of a cap on pollutant emissions by regula-
tors. Secondary goals are to reduce compliance costs 
and spur innovative solutions to pollution control. 
Water quality trading is an adjunct to regulation, and 
not an alternative to it. In fact, its success depends on 
the presence of a strong regulatory body to enforce 
water quality standards, and monitor and enforce dis-
charge limits.
Water quality markets draw inspiration from the suc-
cess of the Acid Rain Program (ARP) in the United 
States in the 1990s. At the time, most environmental 
groups and government agency staff favored a “com-
mand-and-control” approach to pollution control that 
Bond and Mayers (2010) acknowledged, trust “is hard 
to build and easy to lose.”
Finally, there must be a supply of, and demand for, eco-
system services. On the supply side, payments must be 
big enough relative to other opportunities to create a 
real incentive for change. On the demand side, benefi-
ciaries must have the ability to pay. For example, Huang 
et al. (2009) posited that by increasing incomes, rapid 
economic growth in Asia could increase demand for 
watershed services because there is greater willing-
ness and ability to pay for amenities such as clean 
water and recreation. At the same time, rapid economic 
growth could increase demand for goods and services 
produced on the land, thereby increasing the oppor-
tunity cost of the land. In a regional review of PWS 
programs in sub-Saharan Africa, Ferraro (2009) sug-
gested that demand for watershed services is relatively 
low, as there are relatively few formal water systems, 
and even those with formal systems may lack reliable 
access – which means there are few people who could 
be easily charged a water fee to pay for watershed ser-
vices. Moreover, high poverty rates suggest that many 
would not be able to afford higher water costs.
There is also a set of conditions that can hinder or limit 
the development of PES schemes. 
Limiting conditions can include:
• any legal provision prohibiting watershed PES con-
tracts 
• poorly defined property rights. 
Greiber (2009) noted that “clearly defined property 
rights enable parties to enter into PES contracts and 
ensure the sustainability of PES schemes.” Several 
challenges associated with property rights arise when 
implementing PES schemes. For example, ecosystem 
services are a relatively new concept and may not be 
recognized by the existing legal framework. In Peru, 
the state is the owner of natural resources and holds 
the property rights over ecosystem services. While the 
state can transfer certain property rights over natural 
resources to individuals, it has not yet been determined 
“Water quality markets draw inspiration from 
the success of the Acid Rain Program in the 
US in the 1990s.” 
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levels in water bodies, a process referred to as “eutro-
phication”. Other water quality trading programs have 
been set up to control salinity, heavy metal, sediment, 
and temperature or thermal pollution (Morgan and 
Wolverton, 2005). These programs are typically based 
around specific watersheds or receiving waters, such 
as the Chesapeake Bay or Wisconsin’s Fox River. WQT 
markets are different from other emissions trading 
schemes, in that trading is used between sources in 
the same area of impact, e.g. a watershed that drains 
to a particular water body, such as a lake, estuary, or 
river. The geography of trading contrasts starkly with 
other well-known cap-and-trade-style environmental 
markets, such as national and international markets 
for carbon offsets, where emission reductions can take 
place even in remote parts of the world. 
Trading within water quality markets can take several 
different forms. The most common arrangement in 
the United States is a bilateral market, where buyers 
negotiate trades directly with potential sellers, discuss-
ing their quantity and price. Often, a regulator will get 
involved by, for example, approving the terms of the 
agreement, or facilitating monitoring to ensure that 
actual discharge reductions take place. This arrange-
ment makes transactions slow and costly, and has 
been partially blamed for the moribund trading activ-
ity in most US WQT markets (Woodward et al., 2002). 
In clearinghouse-style markets, a middleman such as 
a brokerage firm facilitates trades by connecting will-
ing buyers and sellers, as has been done in the Tar-
Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Trading Program in North 
Carolina. On the opposite extreme, exchanges are a 
form of trading where allowances are turned into stan-
dardized commodities and are freely traded. For exam-
ple, in the United States, SO2 allowances are traded 
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The Hunter 
River Salinity Trading Scheme in Australia may also 
be considered an example of an exchange, although 
in this case, the government is responsible for trades 
(NSWDEC, 2003).
Water quality markets can be classified in a number of 
ways. One useful way to categorize markets is based on 
would have required all power plants to install scrub-
bers on their smokestacks to remove sulfur diox-
ide (SO2). Lawmakers instead opted for a bold policy 
experiment, setting a cap on total SO2 emissions, and 
allowing polluters to buy and sell pollution allowances. 
Under this system, emissions from individual sources 
could rise or fall, as long as the total annual emissions 
stayed the same. The central idea was that allowing 
trading puts a price on pollution, and, in turn, encour-
ages cost savings, efficiency, and innovation. 
In most WQT markets, a cap is put on water pollutants. 
In the United States, the cap is usually set by state gov-
ernments, which are responsible for regulating water 
quality in rivers, lakes, and estuaries. The cap should 
be based on a scientific analysis of how much pollutant 
a water body can assimilate without being excessively 
degraded, which is referred to as a total maximum daily 
load (TMDL). Government regulators issue pollution 
allowances, often referred to as “credits”, to existing 
polluters. For example, a credit may allow a facility to 
discharge one pound of phosphorus to a river. A facility 
manager may choose to install pollution-control tech-
nologies that limit emissions. If a facility’s emissions 
decrease to below its permitted level, this frees up 
additional credits that managers may then sell to other 
polluters. There typically may be two types of buyers 
that create a demand for credits: i) new entrants to the 
market, such as a new factory in the watershed, or ii) 
existing polluters that may wish to or need to increase 
their emissions, e.g. a factory that wishes to increase 
output, or a sewage plant serving a growing commu-
nity. Trading allows the industry greater freedom to 
operate as it sees fit. A low-performing facility may 
continue to pollute more heavily, but it will be required 
to purchase credits, making the cost of doing business 
more expensive. High-performers that can reduce their 
pollution levels create valuable pollution credits that 
they can sell, and this creates an incentive to invest in 
pollution controls, at least according to theory. 
To date, most water quality trading markets have been 
used to control pollution from nutrients that cause 
excessive algal growth and low dissolved oxygen 
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right to discharge pollutants. Markets are also thought 
to foster innovation – where “innovative, entrepreneur-
ial companies can profit from low-cost reductions in 
emissions. Slower, less innovative firms can benefit as 
well by having the opportunity to purchase needed 
emission allowances for less than it would cost them 
to comply internally” (Anderson, 2004). Moreover, cap-
and-trade programs may provide greater certainty in 
the outcome. With a fixed or declining cap, policy mak-
ers can be more certain of the environmental improve-
ment that will be achieved, compared with alternative 
approaches such as best management practices or a 
pollution tax. 
Application
A survey conducted by Bennett and Carroll (2014) 
for Forest Trends found that activity for WQT mar-
kets is still relatively small, although it has shown large 
increases in the past several years. In 2013, the trading 
value of WQT markets was about $22.2 million. Much 
of that activity was concentrated in the United States, 
where WQT markets had a trading value of $11.1 mil-
lion in 2013, with a cumulative total of $95 million since 
2000. While there are currently over 30 water quality 
markets in place in the United States, some have seen 
no trading or only a few trades, even two decades after 
their establishment. Among the reasons cited for the 
lack of trading activity are high transaction costs, lack 
of trust, uncertainty about the future of the market, or 
simply unfamiliarity and unwillingness to participate in 
the market (Shortle and Horan, 2008). While some of 
the longest-running markets are getting smaller, new 
programs in Oregon, Virginia, and Maryland have kept 
overall transaction values high. Indeed, in 2013, United 
States market activity was at its highest level ever 
recorded, although Bennet and Carroll (2014) posited 
that this likely represented recovery from the eco-
nomic downturn rather than new growth. It is of note 
that New Zealand’s Lake Taupo Trading Program, a 
relatively new program, has rapidly become the largest 
in the world, with at least $10.2 million in transactions 
in 2013. However, the future of that market is uncertain 
because “that market’s biggest buyer, the Lake Taupo 
Protection Trust, announced in June 2013 it would 
the regulatory system that drives the demand for trad-
ing and whether it includes a cap on total emissions 
(Anderson, 2004). This includes both cap-and-trade 
systems and credit systems.
Cap-and-trade systems put a limit on the total 
amount of allowed releases of pollution. They seek 
a specific environmental result (a cap), and trading 
allowances to release pollution are simply an option to 
minimize the cost of achieving the emission reductions 
specified in the regulatory cap. In the cap-and-trade 
approach, allowances for future emissions are sold or 
granted to existing sources. 
Credit systems, on the other hand, do not establish 
any fixed ceiling on total emissions. Total emissions can 
increase if new sources of pollution enter the market, or 
if existing sources increase their outputs. In uncapped 
systems, tradable credits are earned for controlling pol-
lution beyond what is specified in one’s permit.
The literature is full of descriptions of the potential 
benefits of water quality trading compared with the 
more conventional “command-and-control” approach, 
where regulators allocate the right to pollute by impos-
ing limits on individual polluters (Shortle and Horan, 
2005). In particular, WQT markets are thought to be a 
less-costly, more-efficient alternative. When the total 
amount of pollutant emissions in a region is capped, 
the right to pollute becomes a scarce commodity and, 
as many economists assert, markets are the most effi-
cient way of allocating a scarce commodity.26 WQT 
programs allow polluters to interact in the marketplace 
and decide among themselves how to allocate the 
26 While economic theory says that trading will lead to the most efficient 
allocation of a resource, it says little about distributional effects, i.e. who 
pays and who benefits, or other market “externalities”. 
“WQT programs allow polluters to interact 
in the marketplace and decide among 
themselves how to allocate the right to 
discharge pollutants.”
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in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush 
administrations, “and were once strongly condemned 
by liberals and environmentalists” (Schmalensee and 
Stavins, 2012). The key element for overcoming con-
servative politicians’ resistance to the policy was to 
replace regulation with a free market; the market would 
operate on its own with no intervention by the govern-
ment, a step that would “radically disempower the reg-
ulators” (Conniff, 2009). However, this has not been the 
reality with most environmental markets, which have 
been designed with additional layers of government 
that oversee the market, monitor and enforce emis-
sions limits, and facilitate and verify trades. By contrast, 
there are alternative pollution control policies that are 
simpler and require less government involvement, such 
as mandating the use of pollution-limiting technology 
or taxing pollution. There is some irony here, prompting 
one scholar to observe, “a putative form of rationaliza-
tion or deregulation is in fact a case of ‘reregulation’” 
(Mariola 2009).
As an example of how WQT markets work, consider 
the example of the Chesapeake Bay. To reduce nutri-
ent discharge into the bay, regulators had the option 
of requiring wastewater plants to install expensive and 
technologically advanced treatment systems. Nitrogen 
removal costs for these systems are typically about 
$200 per pound per year (Jones et al., 2010). However, 
farms in the watershed are an even larger source of 
nitrogen, and removal costs are much lower, at $1 to $5 
per pound per year. As a result, permitted dischargers 
have negotiated the ability to fulfill their permit require-
ments by funding pollution control projects on farms 
in the watershed, such as planting winter cover crops, 
planting vegetation around streams (called riparian 
buffers), or installing permeable filter strips around 
animal feedlots. These agricultural “best management 
practices” reduce soil erosion and sediment runoff 
from farms, reducing the amount of nutrients washed 
into local waterways. Because they use soil and veg-
etation to filter water and sediment, they are gener-
ally low-tech and relatively inexpensive to install and 
maintain. The Chesapeake Bay WQT program was set 
up specifically to encourage these kinds of exchanges. 
withdraw from future trading, having made arrange-
ments to achieve its remaining nitrogen reduction 
goals by purchasing and managing land in the catch-
ment” (Bennett et al., 2014). 
The popularity of emissions trading for dealing with 
water pollution in the United States is largely a result 
of the Clean Water Act of 1972. The specifics of how 
the law was written and implemented have made it dif-
ficult for governments to handle pollution from farms. 
In particular, the law made it illegal for “point source” 
dischargers, such as factories or wastewater treatment 
plants, to release pollutants into waterways without a 
permit, but did not attempt to regulate pollution from 
“nonpoint sources”, such as agriculture or urban run-
off, since these were considered minor sources of pol-
lution and believed to be difficult to regulate. In many 
watersheds, however, farms and feedlots are the larg-
est source of pollutants. These nonpoint sources are 
exempt from most water pollution regulations, and 
there appears to be insufficient will to remedy this. 
Forty years after passage of the landmark law, some 
40 percent of America’s surface water fails to meet its 
water quality goals (Faeth, 2000). Further, a set of stud-
ies in the 1990s showed that reducing nutrient pollution 
from agriculture could be 65 times more cost effective 
than imposing further controls on municipal or indus-
trial sources. As a result, water quality regulators in the 
United States use WQT markets primarily as a tool to 
encourage point dischargers to fund nonpoint source 
pollution controls, largely because regulators lack the 
authority to deal with these sources of pollution. 
One factor contributing to the popularity of emis-
sions trading is its appeal to conservative politicians 
due to their invocation of the “power of the market” 
(Conniff, 2009). The original cap-and-trade programs 
were policy innovations developed by conservatives 
“40 percent of America’s surface water fails 
to meet its water quality goals.”
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(Olszowa et al., 1998). Further, on-farm nutrient con-
trols will do little to control other toxins that are present 
in coal ash, such as arsenic, lead, mercury, and heavy 
metals. However, the program is notable as it is the 
first program in the United States that has allowed the 
purchase of pollution control credits across state lines 
(Fox, 2014). 
In addition to the many markets in the United States, 
there are also examples of WQT markets in other 
regions, especially in Oceania: 
• Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading Program (New Zea-
land)
• South Creek Bubble Licensing Scheme (Australia)
• Murray-Darling Basin Salinity Credits Scheme 
(Australia)
• South Nation River Watershed Trading Program 
(Canada)
• Chao Lake Nutrient Trading Program (China, under 
consideration)
Several European countries have shown interest in 
WQT. A literature review by Wind (2012) summarized 
14 studies of the concept within the European Union. 
Despite this interest, no markets have been created to 
date, and it appears that EU directives limit the ability 
of states to set up markets. 
Perhaps the best example of a successful operating 
WQT market is on Australia’s Hunter River, where coal 
mines and other sources are subject to discharge lim-
its to protect water quality and drinking water sources 
in downstream cities. Saline soils are present through-
out Australia, and during coal mining, salty water col-
lects in mine pits and shafts and has to be pumped 
out to allow mining operations to continue (NSWDEC, 
2003). The Hunter River Basin had a history of conflict 
among users, with mining activities making the water 
unsuitable for irrigation, and new mine proposals facing 
extremely high costs. The state government, following 
years of study and collaboration with stakeholders, set 
a cap on salinity levels in the river, and put a system of 
tradable discharge credits in place. 
Trading allows regulated polluters to meet their per-
mitted discharge requirement at a much lower cost 
than with technology. Further, it helps to finance pollu-
tion reduction from the agricultural sector, which gen-
erates about 44 percent of the nutrients entering the 
bay. A recent assessment concluded that controlling 
discharges from agriculture is necessary to restore the 
bay (Steinzor et al., 2012).
A second noteworthy example of a domestic WQT 
market is the relatively new Ohio River Basin Water 
Quality Trading Project developed by the Electric 
Power Research Institute, the research arm of the 
United States electric power industry. Coal-fired power 
plants in the Ohio River Basin are a major source of 
nitrogen pollution in rivers, due to their using water 
in scrubbers for air pollution control and to sluice the 
coal ash out of reactors (US EPA, 2009). The ash and 
water slurry most often goes into storage and treat-
ment ponds that provide only a minimal level of treat-
ment and where spills and illicit discharges have been 
common (Zucchino, 2015). Under the pilot program, 
power plants and other interested parties can pay for 
nonpoint source pollution reductions on farms, another 
major source of pollution in the watershed. Because 
on-farm improvements are much less expensive than 
installing wastewater treatment facilities, power plants 
stand to save $500,000 to $800,000 per year (EPRI, 
2010). 
The first projects are creating nutrient reduction credits 
through “activities like planting cover crops and creat-
ing treatment wetlands for animal wastes” (Ecosystem 
Marketplace, 2015). The program is notable for its thor-
oughness in documenting projects, posting a descrip-
tion and photos of every project on the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) website, and using a stan-
dard methodology for calculating the reduced pollution 
in farm runoff. The program is credited with reducing 
pollution by 100,000 pounds of nutrients between 2013 
and 2015 (Barrett 2015). While commendable, this proj-
ect is a small pilot, and pollutant reductions are small 
compared with the estimates of over 3 million pounds 
of nitrogen entering the watershed’s rivers every day 
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at how WQT markets have performed environmentally, 
economically, and socially. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
While there are no comprehensive analyses of the envi-
ronmental performance of WQT programs in general, 
there are several examples of successful programs. 
In the application section of 3.3, we cited Australia’s 
Hunter River as one example. Indeed, since formation 
of the program, river water quality has met standards 
nearly 100 percent of the time, protecting water sup-
plies to downstream irrigators and cities. This hap-
pened despite the establishment of new, potentially 
highly polluting mines in the watershed. The Alpine 
Cheese Company Nutrient Trading Program in Ohio is 
another notable success. As a part of this program, the 
company helped fund pollution reduction projects on 
local farms, paying 25 farmers to install 91 conserva-
tion measures that resulted in a 3,000-pound-per-year 
phosphorus reduction (US EPA, 2010).
A United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(US EPA) 2010 evaluation of the program found that 
it exceeded its nutrient reduction goals, and estimated 
that “conservation measures would reduce up to three 
times more nutrients than if equal funds were used for 
wastewater treatment upgrades.” It is noteworthy that 
the project has also been praised by the local chapter 
of the Sierra Club, which has strongly opposed the cre-
ation of larger WQT schemes in other areas that could 
allow industry to continue implementing poor practices 
by purchasing offsets (Marida, 2010). 
Likewise, the Connecticut Nitrogen Credit Exchange 
Program – currently the largest in the United States 
– was created in 2002 to reduce nitrogen pollution to 
Long Island Sound from the Connecticut River. Under 
the program, which covers 79 sewage treatment plants 
in the state of Connecticut, a plant can control pollu-
tion in excess of its permit requirement and sell excess 
nitrogen allowances to those plants that exceed their 
allowances. A 2012 review of the program suggested 
that the program had helped the state meet its environ-
mental goals while lowering overall costs (Stacey et al., 
2012). The program helped reduce nitrogen loading by 
Under this system, no discharges of salty water are 
allowed when the river is in low flow. When the river 
is in high flow and its capacity to dilute salty inflows 
is greater, limited discharge is allowed, controlled by 
a system of salt credits. Permitted dischargers coor-
dinate their activities so that the total salt concen-
tration in the river never goes above a specified limit. 
Industries can buy and sell salt credits in real time via 
a trading website run by the state government. Several 
years after the program began, the trading program is 
popular among participants and functioning smoothly. 
The state government has set up real-time monitor-
ing to make sure the river water quality meets stan-
dards, and to monitor for permit violations. Perhaps the 
biggest marker of the program’s success is that new, 
potentially highly polluting mines have been estab-
lished, but river water quality has met standards nearly 
100 percent of the time.
Environmental, economic, and  
social performance
Despite the fact that water quality trading markets 
have existed for three decades in some areas, it is 
difficult to state whether they can be considered an 
overall success. In making such an evaluation, we must 
determine whether desired pollution reductions were 
achieved and water quality targets attained. We must 
also examine how the result compared with what would 
have occurred under another form of management: 
were the pollution reductions greater, did they occur 
more quickly, or at a lower cost? 
Moreover, there is a great deal of literature about water 
quality trading and market-based solutions to water 
pollution but few real-world evaluations of existing 
WQT markets. Much of the literature about markets is 
theoretical and oriented toward “making the case” for 
WQT, e.g. describing how a market can or should be set 
up. Below, we examine the available evidence looking 
“…there is a great deal of literature … but  
few real-world evaluations of existing  
WQT markets.”
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In an assessment of three mature WQT programs in 
the United States, one scholar concluded that there 
had been very little benefit as a direct result of trades. 
However, the programs had an unexpected benefit: they 
brought together watershed stakeholders and increased 
“the institutional capacity for watershed management” 
(Wallace, 2007). Stakeholders coming together around 
a common goal of improving water quality also helped 
lower resistance to new, more stringent water quality 
regulations. Wallace concluded that the markets them-
selves were not important mechanisms for reducing 
pollution. Rather, their presence contributed to “unin-
tended contributions to increased pollution regulation 
and management on a watershed scale.” So, on the one 
hand, these markets could be considered failures by 
some observers because many of them had seen no 
trading even decades after their creation. 
The lack of trades can be explained by a number of fac-
tors: high transaction costs, lack of trust, uncertainty 
about the future of the market, or simply unfamiliarity 
and unwillingness to participate in the market. On the 
other hand, even where little or no trading occurred, 
water quality and governance had improved in the 
three watersheds evaluated by Wallace (2007). It is not 
always possible to disentangle how much of a role the 
market played in bringing about these improvements. 
On the one hand, financial transactions have not played 
a large role, tempting us to conclude that the markets 
were relatively unimportant. However, if discussion of 
the use of “market fundamentals” helped overcome 
resistance to environmental regulation and paved the 
way toward decreased pollution, then we may conclude 
that markets were a key feature in improving water 
quality, albeit indirectly.
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
It is difficult to assess the economic performance of 
WQT markets and how their economic performance 
compares with alternative forms of pollution control. 
To date, the size and impact of water quality markets is 
relatively small. There is some information in the litera-
ture on the number of trades that have occurred, and 
the prices paid for water quality credits. In the applica-
tion section of 3.3, we cited a Forest Trends study that 
over 50 percent over 10 years, and was on track to meet 
water quality goals by 2014. As a result, the area of Long 
Island Sound suffering from hypoxia (low dissolved oxy-
gen which is fatal to wildlife) had steadily declined.
Despite these examples, most water quality trading 
programs in the United States are either too small or 
have seen too little trading to make a meaningful dif-
ference on water quality. For example, a 2012 evalua-
tion of Ohio’s Great Miami Nutrient Trading Program 
called it “one of the most successful programs to date” 
(Newburn and Woodward, 2012). In 2009, the trading 
program attracted $1.3 million in trades and helped fund 
100 projects that reduced nutrient pollution by 800,000 
pounds per year. Proposed projects submitted by farm-
ers in the watershed covered a variety of agricultural 
“best management practices” designed to prevent sedi-
ment and nutrients from entering waterways. Evaluators 
concluded that the program “has been successful in 
developing both supply and ensuring funding for agri-
cultural pollution abatement projects compared to 
other WQT programs” (Newburn and Woodward, 2012). 
Despite this, they found that the program had not likely 
had a significant effect on regional water quality due to 
the “relatively minor role that the trading program has 
had on nutrient management in the watershed to date.” 
To date, the projects have simply been too small and 
too few to have a major impact. The Great Miami River 
watershed drains 748 square miles, the majority of 
which is cultivated, so a much larger investment would 
be needed to meaningfully improve water quality in the 
basin. This example highlights the caution needed when 
interpreting large numbers cited by market proponents. 
While 800,000 pounds sounds like a lot (and is indeed 
a worthwhile accomplishment), it pales in comparison 
with the estimated 1 trillion pounds of nitrogen enter-
ing the Ohio River watershed each year (Olszowa et al., 
1998). Like most WQT markets in the United States, the 
Greater Miami Basin program did not emerge from a cap 
on pollutants. Rather, it was created as a way to allow 
regulated point-source dischargers, such as factories 
and sewage plants, to lower their costs by paying for 
pollution controls on farms rather than installing expen-
sive pollution control measures at their own facilities.
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improving the environment and supporting the local 
economy, and also experienced other indirect benefits 
from the project, “by fencing cows out of streams, bac-
teria levels in milk were decreased, giving the farmers 
a premium price for milk and reducing costs for Alpine 
[Cheese Company]” (Marida, 2010).
As described previously, the Connecticut Nitrogen 
Credit Exchange Program is currently one of the larg-
est WQT programs in operation. An evaluation of the 
program in 2012 suggested that the program has 
helped the state meet its environmental goal of reduc-
ing nitrogen loading to Long Island Sound while lower-
ing overall costs. The state estimated that, in the first 
10 years of the program, trading had lowered costs by 
$300 to $400 million below what individual facilities 
would have had to pay for equivalent pollution reduc-
tions (Stacey et al., 2012). 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
There is little research on the social impacts of WQT, 
and much of what we describe in this section is based 
on anecdotal evidence. Critics of environmental mar-
kets have raised questions about their fairness and 
justice. A specific concern relates to how regulators 
distribute pollution permits at the outset of market cre-
ation. Under a market system, pollution permits become 
valuable commodities to be bought and sold. In many 
cases, as in SO2 trading in the United States, the gov-
ernment grants allowances to industries for free, based 
on their historic emissions. Critics point out that such 
“grandfathering” of permits rewards those polluters 
most responsible for environmental problems in the 
first place. It may also unfairly burden more recent mar-
ket entrants, because they have no history of polluting 
and no “free” permits, yet would be required to purchase 
credits to offset 100 percent of their emissions. There 
are, however, different ways of issuing credits that help 
mitigate these concerns. For example, rather than giv-
ing away credits, they could be sold to polluters in an 
auction, as has been proposed in carbon markets. 
Critics have also raised concerns about the fairness of 
water quality markets to potential sellers of water qual-
ity credits. Consider a farmer who installed pollution 
estimated the value of the United States water quality 
trading market as $11.1 million in 2013, in terms of the total 
value of payments. To put these numbers in perspec-
tive, state and local governments in the United States 
spent $70 billion on sanitation and sewerage in 2008 
(US Census Bureau, 2012). Despite these investments, 
many argue that the United States should be spending 
much more to control water pollution. Researchers at 
Kansas State found that nutrient pollution from nitro-
gen and phosphorus cost the United States $2.2 bil-
lion in 2008, due to losses in recreational water usage, 
waterfront real estate, spending on recovery of threat-
ened and endangered species, and increased treatment 
for drinking water (Dodds et al., 2008).
While limited data are available, advocates for WQT 
markets cite the lower overall cost of improving water 
quality as their main advantage, as compared with more 
conventional means of water pollution control. There 
is local evidence for this, especially in smaller markets. 
Take the case of the Alpine Cheese Company, in Ohio’s 
Sugar Creek watershed. The plant was faced with 
expensive wastewater treatment upgrades to satisfy 
Clean Water Act permit requirements (US EPA, 2010). 
These upgrades would likely have cost over $1 million 
to install, plus ongoing costs for operation and mainte-
nance. Instead, the company collaborated with others to 
reduce pollution through projects at farms in the water-
shed that have a much lower cost per pound of phos-
phorus prevented from entering streams, and which 
are expected to last 15 to 20 years (Moore, 2012). The 
company worked with universities, regulators, and local 
agricultural extension services, providing $800,000 
over five years for planning, technical assistance, and 
outreach. In addition, these measures allowed the plant 
to expand, creating 12 new jobs. Further, the project 
provided funding to chronically cash-strapped local 
soil and water conservation districts and to the local 
agricultural economy. Local dairy farmers took pride in 
“…advocates for WQT markets cite the lower 
overall cost of improving water quality as 
their main advantage…”
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T 47
communal ownership makes it slower and more diffi-
cult to develop land. In a sense, those most responsible 
for past pollution have been rewarded with large (and 
valuable) pollution permits, while the Maori community 
will face higher costs to develop their lands economi-
cally. In response to these concerns, regulators altered 
the market design by relaxing the cap somewhat “to 
ease the restrictive nature of historical allocation on 
Tuwharetoa [Maori] and other forest owners” (Duhon 
et al., 2011). 
In the New Zealand case study, program managers 
realized the importance of dealing with issues of race 
and historical justice in order to make the program suc-
cessful. In the United States, some program managers 
have also sought to address issues related to age and 
gender. For example, the Ohio River Basin Water Quality 
Trading Project directs money from the electric power 
industry to farmers to support on-farm improvements 
to reduce runoff and pollution. A concern was raised 
early on that the early adopters would be all younger, 
male farmers (Jessica Fox, EPRI, personal communica-
tion, 2015) because they would be more open to new 
ideas. Also, there are fewer woman-owned farms in the 
region compared with those owned by men. As a result, 
the managers of this program have made a particular 
effort to involve women farmers and older farmers.
Some critics have suggested that WQT programs could 
perpetuate or worsen environmental justice problems. 
The environmental justice movement in the United 
States has focused on the fact that pollution often 
occurs in areas where many poor and minority people 
live or work, and that disadvantaged communities bear 
an unfair burden of exposure to pollution. There is a 
possibility that trading could allow pollution “hot spots” 
to continue, with accompanying environmental jus-
tice concerns. For example, a polluter could purchase 
credits instead of making onsite pollution reductions. 
controls before a WQT program was established. Unlike 
his (polluting) neighbors, he would not be eligible for 
financing under the program. Thus, the program would 
reward “notorious polluters” rather than the good stew-
ards, “because the good steward had already reduced 
pollution” (Ruppert, 2004). Despite these criticisms, 
there are several examples of WQT markets that have 
been considered successful, and earned support from 
industry, famers, regulators, and environmentalists. 
As was discussed previously, the Alpine Cheese 
Company Trading Program in Ohio was a very small 
market that involved the purchase of credits from 25 
farmers by a local cheese company. Many of the farm-
ers already did business with Alpine Cheese, selling 
milk from their dairy herds, and have a strong inter-
est in maintaining a strong agricultural economy. One 
observer wrote that, “socially, community has been 
built with the farmers taking pride in working together, 
their more sustainable farming practices and in seeing 
the success of the factory” (Marida, 2010). One sees a 
similar outcome in an evaluation of the Hunter River 
Salinity Trading Scheme in Australia. Where there was 
once “significant conflict between primary producers 
and mining operators,” today, “agriculture, mining and 
electricity generation operate side by side, sharing the 
use of the river” (NSWDEC, 2003). Here, a history of 
conflict has been replaced by cooperation. This did not 
happen overnight, and required many years of pains-
taking consultation and negotiation.
In New Zealand, concerns have been raised about how 
the Lake Taupo Nutrient Trading Scheme affects differ-
ent types of landowners, particularly indigenous Maori 
people. In this area, dairy farms and grazing were cre-
ating polluted runoff, negatively impacting a freshwa-
ter lake important for fishing and tourism. Regulators 
instituted a cap on nitrogen pollution seeking to main-
tain water quality at year 2000 levels. Larger corpo-
rate landowners were given more pollution credits 
based on their historical use of the land, while Maori 
landowners had not yet fully developed their lands 
(MOTU, 2009). There are historical and cultural rea-
sons why Maoris have been slower to develop their 
lands: they did not own some lands until recently, and 
“Some critics have suggested that WQT 
programs could perpetuate or worsen 
environmental justice problems.”
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States, the Clean Water Act established the concept of 
“designated use” for waterways (i.e. swimmable, boat-
able, or fishable), with water quality standards then 
developed based on the designated use. The process 
of developing a standard requires understanding the 
basic physical, environmental, and human elements of 
the watershed. Generally, scientists or engineers collect 
data and use computer models to determine the natu-
ral and human pollution sources (i.e. diffuse nonpoint 
sources and point discharges). They also use models 
to determine how much of a pollutant a water body can 
assimilate while restoring or maintaining beneficial uses. 
The second necessary condition is that polluters have 
the ability to create water quality improvements, or 
reduce pollutant discharge through technology or 
management. Further, the regulator must be able to 
verify that these pollution reductions are real and likely 
to last. Verification of credits can be cumbersome and 
time consuming, which can inhibit trading. Regulators 
may require field visits or photos to show that on-
farm improvements have been properly installed and 
maintained. In the case of the Alpine Cheese Trading 
Program, soil conservation agents ensure that pollu-
tion control measures installed on farms meet “strin-
gent engineering specifications” (Mariola, 2009). 
Implementation requires up to eight visits to a farm 
from project start to finish, and a full-time agent is 
required to coordinate a program involving one credit 
buyer and 25 farmers. In some cases, however, the role 
of verification falls to a trusted intermediary, as in the 
case of the South Nation River Program in Canada, 
where a conservation nonprofit hires local farmers to 
conduct field inspections (O’Grady, 2011). More often 
however, inspections and record-keeping are con-
ducted by state or local governments. According to 
the US EPA, “mechanisms for determining and ensur-
ing compliance may include a combination of record 
This was the subject of a 2013 lawsuit by Food & Water 
Watch against the Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Trading 
Program, which was later dismissed by a federal judge 
(Hauter, 2013). 
Trading programs are most effective when they cover 
pollutants with “far-field” impacts, meaning their effects 
are felt over a large area or over a long time period. 
Indeed, a thriving market under a cap could allow pollu-
tion hot spots to continue unchecked, and thus would 
be inappropriate for regulating pollutants which have 
acute local impacts. “This is the reason no one has seri-
ously contemplated a market for toxics,” according to 
Cy Jones, a World Resources Institute (WRI) senior 
fellow (personal communication, 2015). This issue is 
less important when trading operates within discrete 
basins. The larger the basin in which trading is allowed, 
the more chance there is to exacerbate hotspots. For 
this reason, some programs have rules restricting trad-
ing to smaller sub-watersheds, as has been done in the 
Ohio River program described above. 
Necessary, enabling, and  
limiting conditions
In this section, we discuss the minimum conditions that 
are necessary for the creation and successful opera-
tion of a water quality market, followed by a discussion 
of conditions that can enable WQT markets. These 
enabling factors will increase the market’s likelihood of 
succeeding but may not be required for it to be estab-
lished. Finally, we discuss factors which may limit WQT 
markets by acting as barriers or obstacles. 
Necessary conditions for a successful water quality 
trading program include the following  three circum-
stances. The first is the presence of a regulator and 
its ability to set a cap on pollutants, monitor pollution, 
and verify the legitimacy of water quality credits that 
are created. Thus, the regulator must have the scien-
tific and technical capacity to set water quality goals, 
and monitor water quality to ensure that those goals 
are being met. To do so first requires a set of “desired 
future conditions” for a particular waterbody. This may 
be set by law, custom, or local preferences. In the United 
“It is one thing to set up a water quality 
market; it is another for active trading to 
take place.”
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Enabling conditions required for creation of a water 
quality trading program go beyond these basics. First, 
the government regulator must have the authority 
to set discharge limits to protect waterways. Second, 
the regulator needs the power to issue and enforce 
water pollution discharge permits. Enforcement, with 
the threat of meaningful fines or criminal penalties, is 
especially important. As Abraham Lincoln famously 
noted, “laws without enforcement are just good advice.” 
Finally, there must be a legal framework by which trad-
ing can take place. 
It is one thing to set up a water quality market; it is 
another for active trading to take place. As we have 
shown, many United States markets have been largely 
moribund. The following presents what we consider 
enabling conditions – meaning governments can set 
up a market without them, but there may be little or 
no trading. It would be tempting to classify an idle mar-
ket as a failure, but as we have also seen, some United 
States markets have seen little trading, but they have 
been accompanied by an improvement in watershed 
stewardship and improvements to the environment. 
There must be a demand for water quality credits. 
Demand is the first and foremost enabling condition for 
trades to take place. Generally, such demand is created 
by a strong regulatory or non-regulatory driver.27 In the 
case of the Alpine Cheese Nutrient Trading Program 
described above, factory owners wished to expand pro-
duction, but were unable to do so because of a restric-
tive discharge permit. Violating the permit could have 
resulted in fines or criminal charges. The factory own-
ers faced otherwise undesirable options: they could 
27 An example of a non-regulatory driver could be where industrial 
emitters decide among themselves to voluntarily limit pollution to gain 
goodwill or in an attempt to pre-empt regulation. This is the case in 
the Ohio River study discussed above, where electric power companies 
have funded projects to reduce pollution from farms in their watersheds. 
These activities are not compulsory, so why would a for-profit corpora-
tion do it? Their motivation, as put forth by the program’s manager in 
Congressional testimony is “to meet corporate sustainability goals and 
their voluntary participation may also be considered by the state permit-
ting agencies when determining the need for flexible permit compliance 
options in the future” (Fox 2014). In other words, she was saying that 
companies hope that their activities today will buy them goodwill with 
regulators and that future regulation will be less burdensome as a result. 
keeping, monitoring, reporting and inspections” (US 
EPA, 2003). There are other aspects of regulatory 
oversight necessary to ensure accountability on behalf 
of both buyers and sellers of credits. This oversight 
includes many aspects of a trading program:
• establishing trading eligibility
• tracking of trades
• verification of credit generation
• compliance and enforcement
• monitoring of results
• program assessment.
It is especially difficult and usually impractical to mea-
sure nonpoint source pollution reductions, for example, 
from projects designed to reduce polluted runoff from 
farms. The pollution source is usually spread out, and 
there is no obvious place to measure the discharge (as 
there would be at the outfall of a factory). Nonpoint 
source pollution also tends to be “episodic”, occur-
ring when rainfall flushes pollutants into waterways, 
further thwarting measurement efforts. Regulators 
have adopted several approaches to deal with these 
issues. Nonpoint source pollution reductions are most 
often estimated based on prior studies or modeling. 
To address the uncertainty associated with these esti-
mates, regulators may place a higher burden for pol-
lution reductions on nonpoint sources. Indeed, some 
markets have been designed with “trading ratios” 
where nonpoint source reductions trade against point 
sources at a ratio of 2:1 or 3:1. 
The third necessary condition is an appropriate legal 
framework enabling trading. Some of the legal require-
ments for water quality trading are similar to those for 
other market-based instruments. Broadly, programs 
require a legal environment that will uphold the rights 
of buyers and sellers. Some basics, as outlined by 
Greiber (2009), include:
• a legal system that recognizes agreements must 
be kept
• a civil law providing contract parties with legal rem-
edies to enforce contract rights in cases of non-
compliance with contract obligations
• general respect for the rule of law.
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(2013), economists from MIT and Harvard who studied 
the program, concluded that, by all accounts, it was a 
major success: following its launch in 1995, the market 
performed “exceptionally well along all relevant dimen-
sions” and helped the United States reach emissions 
goals in 2006. 
However, the market’s collapse should be a cautionary 
tale: “When the government creates a market, it can 
also destroy it, possibly fostering a legacy of increased 
regulatory uncertainty and reduced investor confi-
dence in future cap-and-trade regimes, and hence 
reduced credibility of pollution markets more broadly” 
(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).
Trust among market participants is a key element of 
any WQT program. In the United States, most water 
quality markets involve point sources purchasing pol-
lution reduction credits from farms, or less frequently, 
from forests or other nonpoint sources. Controlling 
nonpoint source pollution from agriculture faces 
unique obstacles. Farmers often distrust regulators, 
and worry that participation in a trading program may 
open the door to future regulation. Some pilot pro-
grams in the United States have worked through local 
soil and water conservation districts, or made use of 
agricultural extension services, because the farmers 
know and trust these agents. In fact, Mariola (2009) 
found the most important factor for program success 
was “the use of a local, trusted, embedded intermediary 
as the link between programs and farmers emerges as 
the most important explanatory variable for program 
success.” 
Canadian WQT managers have come to similar conclu-
sions. In the South Nation River watershed, wastewater 
dischargers face a cap on phosphorus discharge, and 
new wastewater systems are purchasing phosphorus 
relocate the factory, install expensive onsite wastewater 
treatment, or stop production altogether. In Australia’s 
Hunter River, salty discharge from mines was affecting 
the drinking water supplies for downstream cities, and 
an inflexible basin cap would have meant that existing 
mines could not expand and new industries could not 
develop. In other cases, industries are interested in mit-
igating their own pollution to create goodwill or to help 
lessen the burden of future regulation. This is the case 
for power companies in the Ohio River Basin. At pres-
ent, large power companies such as Duke Energy, the 
largest electric power holding company in the United 
States with some 7.3 million customers, and American 
Electric Power, which has over 5 million customers, pur-
chase credits “to meet corporate sustainability goals 
and their voluntary participation may also be consid-
ered by the state permitting agencies when determin-
ing the need for flexible permit compliance options in 
the future” (Fox, 2014). 
In addition to demand, there must be willingness 
to engage in trade among buyers and sellers. One 
observer cited the most frequent roadblock to estab-
lishing a WQT program as the “simple absence of 
willing buyers and sellers” (O’Grady, 2011). In WQT 
markets, demand for the commodity (pollution credits) 
“is artificially created by regulatory decree and which 
cannot be seen or felt or even measured with preci-
sion” (Mariola, 2009). Because the market is entirely 
dependent on a regulatory driver, it can be fragile and 
susceptible to interference by politicians or the courts. 
For example, the United States Acid Rain Program 
(ARP), the nation’s first national cap-and-trade pro-
gram, suffered a series of legal challenges beginning 
in 2008, culminating in new rules in 2011 that severely 
limited trading between states. As a result, the market, 
which relied heavily on interstate trading, collapsed. In 
2012, the market value of a credit to emit a ton of sulfur 
dioxide was less than $1. Previously, these same credits 
had sold for $100 to $200 for most of the last decade 
and peaked at $1,200 per ton in 2005 (Schmalensee 
and Stavins, 2013). The ARP’s collapse is worth paus-
ing to consider, as it was the model for all subsequent 
environmental markets. Schmalensee and Stavins 
“In addition to demand, there must be 
willingness to engage in trade among 
buyers and sellers.”
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The ability to trade water quality credits across regional 
borders may be an important enabling condition, 
depending on the geography of the watershed. Many 
important watersheds extend across multiple states, or 
across international boundaries. When trades can only 
take place within a single state or country, it reduces 
the potential for trading and for water quality improve-
ments (Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead, 2013). In 2012, 
the pilot Ohio River Basin Trading Program became 
the first program in the United States to allow trad-
ing across state borders, with an agreement signed by 
the states of Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana (Fox, 2014). 
Lessons learned from the Acid Rain Program sug-
gest that legislation may be necessary for interstate 
programs: “the series of regulations, court rulings, and 
regulatory responses ... affirmed that EPA cannot set up 
an interstate trading system under the Clean Air Act in 
the absence of specific legislation” (Schmalensee and 
Stavins, 2013).
Limiting conditions for water quality trading may be 
created by existing laws, policies, and institutions in 
some regions. Greiber (2009) described a number of 
possible concerns related to the legal and institutional 
frameworks for environmental markets. Unrelated laws 
may contradict the aims of a market by, for example, 
providing perverse incentives to polluting industries or 
restricting innovative ways of funding environmental 
projects. Land tenure is a key concern in some coun-
tries, as farmers without tenure may have little incen-
tive to participate in programs if they do not own land 
and their futures are more uncertain. 
credits from rural landowners, mainly farmers. Initially, 
the agricultural community had reservations about the 
program. One of the main concerns raised by farmers 
during the design of the South Nation program was their 
future liability. 
Organizers confronted this concern during a series of 
public meetings and then added a key phrase to their 
final document that addressed the farmers’ concerns 
and allowed trading to begin (O’Grady, 2011) – the 
phrase was: “Landowners are not bound, legally or 
otherwise, to attain the predicted phosphorus offset 
through the establishment of a BMP [best manage-
ment practice, another term for an on-farm pollution 
control measure] on their property.” Further, control of 
the program was granted to South Nation Conservation, 
a community-based watershed organization that was 
trusted by farmers. In addition, the program is run by a 
multi-stakeholder committee, “and all project field visits 
are done by farmers and not paid professionals.” As a 
result, the program has been able to overcome much of 
the early resistance. An independent evaluation showed 
that most farmers had a high opinion of the program 
and have recommend the program to other farmers in 
their community (O’Grady, 2011).
“When trades can only take place within 
a single state or country, it reduces the 
potential for … water quality improvements.”
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Role of the private sector 
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The private sector participates to some degree in all 
of the instruments described in the previous section. 
For example, in Michigan’s Paw Paw River Watershed, 
Coca-Cola North America and other stakeholders 
recently developed and implemented a performance-
based PWS program to compensate farmers for imple-
menting practices that reduce soil loss and enhance 
groundwater recharge (Forest Trends, 2015b). The pri-
vate sector also participates as a buyer or seller in water 
quality trading programs to comply with water quality 
regulations, or buys or sells water rights through water 
trading programs. In addition to these incentive-based 
instruments, the private sector may participate in a 
range of voluntary initiatives to, for example, restore or 
protect a watershed or provide water service to local 
communities. Moreover, they may employ incentives 
within their direct operations or supply chains to pro-
mote water stewardship. In this section, we describe 
some of the drivers for private sector engagement in 
water stewardship, provide examples of their participa-
tion in incentive-based programs, and provide an initial 
estimate of their investment in these programs.  
4.1 Corporate water stewardship
To produce goods and services, most companies rely 
on a consistent supply of adequate quality source 
water and permission to discharge wastewater. As 
population growth and economic development push 
the limits of renewable freshwater supplies and busi-
ness-as-usual resource management strategies, and as 
rapid urbanization, water pollution, groundwater deple-
tion, and climate change introduce new water-related 
risks, companies face increasing urgency to respond.
Companies typically come to understand their relation-
ship to water in terms of their water footprint and their 
water-related business risk. A water footprint assess-
ment – which estimates the volume of water consumed 
and polluted in the production of a material or a prod-
uct, or in the operation of an entire business, industry, 
or nation – can help managers more fully understand 
the nature and extent of a company’s dependence 
and impact on water resources. It is also appealing as 
a basis for setting targets to reduce water use related 
to, for example, manufacturing processes or production 
of agricultural raw materials. While a water footprint 
assessment can inform a risk assessment, a volumetric 
footprint measurement omits the local context neces-
sary to characterize the risks related to water use, and 
obscures the difference in impact between using water 
“Companies … understand their relationship 
to water in terms of their water footprint and 
their water-related business risk.”
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Effective water resource management systems and 
regulatory frameworks, the performance of which can 
be enhanced by incentive-based instruments, benefit 
companies in a number of ways.
• As water users, companies benefit from a more reli-
able and higher quality supply of water. 
• As polluters, businesses benefit from opportunities 
to manage the cost of compliance over time, and to 
seek innovative approaches to improve the quality 
and reduce the volume of wastewater. 
• As ratepayers and taxpayers, companies benefit by 
avoiding the cost of adding new or expanding ex-
isting supply.
Efforts to reduce water-related business risks typically 
occur at three scales: within direct operations, in supply 
chain agricultural or manufacturing operations that are 
not within a company’s direct control, or outside the 
fenceline of both owned and supply chain properties, 
where water-related risks are driven more by sociopo-
litical, hydrological, or ecological conditions than by the 
actions of the company or its suppliers.
from a source that’s plentiful and using the same vol-
ume of water from a source that’s overexploited or not 
readily replenished.28
Water-related business risks generally fall into three 
broad and interrelated categories:
• physical risks include scarcity, degraded source 
water quality, and flooding 
• regulatory risks relate to inconsistent, ineffective, 
or poorly enforced public policy, particularly when 
a change in regulation or enforcement could dis-
rupt production or lead to an unexpected cost of 
compliance 
• reputational risks are faced by companies that 
overexploit or are perceived to overexploit water 
resources – including inefficient use, water pollu-
tion, excessive withdrawal, competition with other 
users, or other negligent water-related activities.
All three categories of risk include financial impacts 
from increased operating costs, fines or unplanned 
capital expenditures, supply chain disruptions, damage 
to the value of a brand, or lost access to markets.
Increasingly, businesses are taking steps to identify, 
characterize, and mitigate these risks. For example, the 
Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas, a web-based tool produced 
by the World Resources Institute, identifies which and 
how many locations in a company’s operations or sup-
ply chain face water-related risk in 12 dimensions, as 
shown in Figure 7. The Water Risk Filter, an online 
tool launched by the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and the German Investment and Development 
Corporation (DEG), assigns each water-using location 
a score that incorporates both location-specific and 
company-specific risks, based on criteria such as the 
average water intensity or typical level of water pol-
lution generated by suppliers to a particular industry 
sector (WWF and DEG, 2014). 
28 Water “neutrality” or “offsets” are related concepts, similar to carbon 
neutrality or carbon offsets. They imply that a company can compen-
sate for the negative impacts of its water footprint. However, there is no 
standard for measuring negative impacts or defining which types and 
how much of any given activity is sufficient compensation (Hoekstra et 
al., 2011). 
Baseline water 
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FIGURE 7. Water risk indicators 
Source: Gassert et al., 2013. 
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Another recent development is the idea of engag-
ing outside the fenceline. Leading companies under-
stand that collective action with other stakeholders at 
the watershed scale may be required to address root 
causes of resource scarcity, accessibility, or source 
water quality, which can increase costs or disrupt 
operations. The Beverage Industry Environmental 
Roundtable (BIER), a coalition of business leaders in 
an industry that faces substantial water-related repu-
tational risk, has acknowledged that in some locations, 
watershed-level interventions may in fact be more 
effective at mitigating water-related risk than facility-
level water-use efficiency or other activities (BIER, 
2015). To assist companies in prioritizing their efforts, 
BIER has proposed developing a decision support tool 
that could give more priority to intervention outside 
the fenceline than to internal efficiency or water quality 
improvements. 
4.2 Private sector engagement with 
incentive-based instruments
Private sector participation in incentive-based instru-
ments, such as PWS and water quality trading, has been 
relatively modest but is growing. Bennett and Carroll 
(2014) found that in 2013, the private sector invested 
US$41 million in watershed services that supported 
“watershed restoration or protection that delivers ben-
efits to society.” While this represents more than twice 
the estimated private sector investment of $19 million 
to $26 million in 2011, it is still a very small portion of the 
overall $12.3 billion invested collectively in watersheds 
by governments, business, and individual donors in 
2013. Most private sector watershed investment activ-
ity (about 95  percent) took place in North America, 
Europe, and Africa (Bennett and Carroll, 2014).
• Direct operations. Companies that recognize wa-
ter-related business risks often begin working volun-
tarily with direct operations – owned and operated 
offices, distribution or retail facilities, manufacturing 
facilities, farms or other means of production – to 
mitigate those risks. In direct operations, companies 
can plan and manage implementation internally and 
realize cost savings related to obtaining, pumping, 
heating, or treating smaller volumes of water when 
operational efficiencies are achieved.
• Supply chains. From agricultural raw materials to 
water- and chemical-intensive manufacturing pro-
cesses, most companies face challenges managing 
water-related business risks in their supply chains, 
including those with advanced water stewardship 
practices in their direct operations. In many cases, 
complex business models and limited traceability 
are significant obstacles to quantifying corporate 
water footprints and identifying water-related busi-
ness risks that exist in global supply chains.
• Outside the fenceline. Facilities that maintain 
industry average or better water efficiency and 
wastewater quality may not be immune to all wa-
ter-related risks. The term “outside the fenceline” 
refers to conditions and activities outside the phys-
ical footprint of a production site. Water-related risk 
is said to originate outside the fenceline in regions 
where, for example, source water is scarce or pol-
luted, projected demand exceeds renewable sup-
ply, regulations are inconsistent or nonexistent, or 
lack of access to water and sanitation damages 
public health. While internal process or policy 
changes are easier to implement, they would not 
necessarily mitigate these risks. 
The private sector increasingly recognizes the need 
to evaluate site-level water use in the context of its 
local watershed characteristics, in order to inform and 
prioritize efficiency targets for different locations. For 
example, companies can manage risk more effectively 
by giving higher priority to efficiency improvements for 
water-intensive locations in drought-prone locations 
than for similar facilities where water resources are 
more plentiful. 
“Most private sector watershed investment 
activity … took place in North America, 
Europe, and Africa.” 
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provide opportunities for projects within the corpo-
rate replenish initiative to directly mitigate risks in the 
global supply chain. Other projects’ impacts, such as 
those related to access to water and sanitation or ones 
where Coca-Cola contributed to a collective action 
together with other companies, are estimated differ-
ently (Rozza et al., 2013).
Disincentives for private sector investments. 
There are also disincentives for private sector invest-
ments in public goods, including watershed services. 
The benefits must be shared with others that did not 
contribute to the investment, and the benefits could 
be exhausted by other actors that did not participate 
in the collective action or investment (Meißner, 2013). 
However, when the consequences of inaction are sig-
nificant, there is a compelling case in favor of policy 
engagement, collective action, and investment in 
water-related initiatives outside the fenceline, includ-
ing preservation of resources or delivery of ecosystem 
services via incentive-based instruments.
Among the barriers that prevent the private sector 
from participating more fully in watershed investments 
are three critical core competencies needed to achieve 
measureable outcomes with specific benefits for at-risk 
locations, which most companies do not possess:
• scientific and environmental engineering expertise 
to identify, design, and implement watershed-level 
solutions
• a nuanced understanding of the local environment 
and culture in the watershed where they seek to 
have a positive environmental outcome
• experience with partnerships involving diverse 
stakeholders outside the fenceline.
Therefore, in cases where companies identify risk and 
choose to take action at the watershed level, particu-
larly if they choose to do so in more than one location 
across diverse global operations or an extended supply 
chain, it is helpful and sometimes necessary to involve 
an intermediary. Stanton et al. (2010) defined an inter-
mediary as “any party other than the buyer or seller who 
Incentives for private sector investments. Industry 
sectors with the highest levels of investment in water-
shed services (IWS) were energy utilities, water utilities, 
and the food and beverage industry, with investments 
of US$9.3 million, $8.9 million, and $8.8 million, respec-
tively. The primary reported motivation for spending 
on watershed services was regulatory compliance, 
followed by water availability risks, water quality risks, 
corporate social responsibility and reputational risk, 
and biodiversity protection (Bennett and Carroll, 2014). 
The food and beverage sector, which accounted for 
nearly one-quarter of the total corporate investment in 
watersheds, is unlike other sectors in that it is driven 
primarily by water availability and water risks, rather 
than regulatory compliance. Bennett and Carroll (2014) 
found that 88 percent of buyers in the food and bever-
age industry acted voluntarily, compared with the pri-
vate sector average of 31 percent.
For example, in 2012–2013, the Coca-Cola Company 
and its global bottling partners were involved in 20 
projects around the world, buying at least $2.2 mil-
lion in watershed services (Bennett and Carroll, 2014). 
Separately, the company publishes annual reports 
detailing its involvement in hundreds of other projects 
(LimnoTech, 2013). Indeed, the Coca-Cola Company 
is among a handful of private companies with a public 
commitment to “replenish” the water it uses.29 However, 
as Coca-Cola acknowledges, the impacts of water use 
are specific and local, making it impossible for a multi-
national corporation to offset water use at the enter-
prise level. Rozza et al. (2013) described a detailed 
methodology for quantifying the value of Coca-Cola’s 
replenish projects, including source water protection, 
water reuse for conservation or productive uses, and 
community-level sustainability projects. The company 
also requires its bottling plants to complete source 
water vulnerability assessments and to engage in the 
development of source water protection plans, which 
29 Specifically, Coca-Cola is “Collaborating to replenish the water we use”, 
pledging that by 2020, it will “safely return to communities and nature 
an amount of water equal to what we use in our finished beverages and 
their production.”
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are driving increased adoption of water risk assess-
ment across the business community. For example, in 
its annual survey of leaders and decision makers about 
perceptions of global risks, the World Economic Forum 
(WEF, 2015) found that water crises have the greatest 
potential for impact and are the eighth most likely to 
occur, as shown in Figure 8. Moreover, WEF has consid-
ered water among the top three global risks since 2012 
(WEF, 2012; 2013; 2014).
CDP, formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project, 
operates a water program that surveys companies 
helps facilitate some aspect of the transaction or imple-
mentation of the overall program. This role is commonly 
played by NGOs, consultants, or academic institutions.” 
Indeed, Coca-Cola has had to coordinate large-scale 
bilateral partnerships with more than one intermediary 
in order to achieve progress toward its global replen-
ish objective, including The Nature Conservancy, WWF, 
and the  United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). Table 3 illustrates increasing complexity and 
differences in motivation that companies face as they 
move from addressing efficiency in direct operations to 
engaging in collective action intended to create more 
sustainable operating conditions in watersheds where 
they do business. 
Future investments by the private sector are uncertain. 
However, consumer preference for more sustainable 
products and investor concern about unmitigated risk 
TABLE 3. Private sector activities, scale, drivers
ACTIVITIES, COMPLEXITY, INCLUSIVITY
Operational efficiency 
Wastewater quality
Owned facilities
Codes of conduct
Social/environmental indices 
Voluntary sustainability standards
Industry sector/association
Policy engagement
Collective action
Diverse stakeholders
SCALE
Site-specific
Small business
Supply chain
Small to medium enterprise
Landscape
Multinational
TIME/VALUE
Near-term, return on investment Medium-term, possible value capture Long-term, sustainability
DRIVERS
Financial self-interest
Regulatory compliance
Externalities
License to operate
Reputation
Access to markets
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS
Strong governance and enforcement Inconsistent local regulation and 
enforcement
Weak governance
Negative externalities of other actors
“…there is increasing awareness of water-
specific issues and of best practices in 
corporate water stewardship…”
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Figure 1: The Global Risks Landscape 2015
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Concurrently, there is increasing awareness of water-
specific issues and of best practices in corporate water 
stewardship, so there will likely be demand for mecha-
nisms that can deliver quantifiable outcomes to ben-
efit specific corporate assets or at-risk strategic supply 
chain locations. Increased understanding of water-
related risks and opportunities could similarly drive an 
increase in private sector engagement in incentive-
based instruments for watershed services.
in order to reveal water-related risk in institutional 
investment portfolios. CDP’s 2014 Global Water Report 
revealed that, of nearly 1,100 responding companies, 
74  percent had evaluated how water quantity and 
quality could affect their growth strategy. However, of 
these, only 38  percent assessed water-related risk in 
both owned operations and their supply chain, and only 
25 percent conducted detailed water risk assessments 
at the watershed level (CDP, 2014).
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Growing pressure on the availability and quality of 
water resources is having a major impact on our social, 
economic, and environmental well-being. These pres-
sures are likely to worsen in response to continued 
population and economic growth, climate change, and 
other challenges. As water pollution exacerbates the 
challenges posed by water scarcity, and the world’s 
water quality becomes increasingly degraded, new 
approaches and strategies are needed.
One key area of interest is the potential for incen-
tive-based instruments to reduce pressure on water 
resources. To date, the primary environmental pol-
icy tool to address water challenges has been com-
mand-and-control regulations. Over the past several 
decades, however, the environmental policy “toolkit” 
has expanded to include a host of incentive-based 
instruments that use financial means, directly or indi-
rectly, to motivate responsible parties to reduce the 
health and environmental risks posed by their facili-
ties, processes, or products. While regulations and 
incentive-based instruments are often juxtaposed, “in 
reality the two often operate alongside each other” 
(UNEP, 2004). With water quality trading, for example, 
governments mandate caps on the allowable pollut-
ant levels and issue tradable permits that allow those 
in the industry to allocate polluting activities among 
themselves, incentivized by market forces. Similarly, 
with water trading, governments may allocate water 
and then institute a framework by which water trad-
ing can occur. While incentive-based instruments 
may work in tandem, they must be integrated within 
a broader watershed management effort. In a recent 
review of PWS programs, Bond and Mayers (2010) 
cautioned that:
“PWS is a tool that will fail, or become irrelevant, if it 
is not integrated with wider regulatory approaches, 
broader watershed management efforts, and explicit 
attention to governance influences that shape 
what is possible. Policy makers need to consider 
the opportunities to ensure that future policy and 
legislation allow for a mix of both incentives and 
regulations to ensure the effective management of 
land and water resources.”
The choice of whether and which instrument to apply 
depends on the specific circumstances, conditions, and 
needs of a given area. It is important to avoid “the law 
of the instrument”, i.e. the tendency to gravitate toward 
a particular tool and then look for applications of that 
tool. UNEP (2004) found that: 
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for consistent and rigorous outreach and, potentially, a 
need for engaging a trusted intermediary.
Finally, monitoring and evaluation are essential to the 
success of any instrument. In particular, they help 
ensure outcomes are achieved and allow for adjust-
ments in response to changing social, economic, or 
environmental conditions. Monitoring should evaluate 
the additionality of the program, i.e. whether the pro-
gram has an effect when compared with baseline con-
ditions. It should also examine any potential impacts on 
surrounding areas (e.g. leakage) and the permanence 
of the intervention. However, it is important to recog-
nize that extensive monitoring requirements would 
increase transaction costs. Thus, the need for moni-
toring and evaluation must be balanced with practical 
considerations about the ability to maintain the viability 
of the program.  
“Prior to designing and applying any policy instrument 
for environmental protection, the policy context must 
be understood, including the existing institutional, 
legal and economic conditions in which these tools 
are meant to function. Choosing an effective policy 
package that will both address the environmental 
problem policy makers are faced with and fit in with the 
institutional capabilities and existing policy framework 
remains one of the most difficult challenges.”
This process should be open and transparent, with 
meaningful participation from all affected parties. This 
will enable crafting a solution that not only is appropri-
ate for local conditions, it will help reduce opposition 
and promote buy-in from those who will be imple-
menting and affected by the program. It is important 
to recognize that those with the least power may not 
have the resources to participate or be skeptical of the 
groups involved. In these cases, there will be a need 
ANNEX 1 
Demand management
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A key way to reduce pressure on limited water supplies 
is through demand management, commonly referred 
to as water conservation and efficiency. In many cases, 
reducing demand is equivalent to augmenting or real-
locating water supply. Demand management is typi-
cally less expensive and faster to implement than water 
supply augmentation, and often results in reduced 
energy demand and water and wastewater treatment 
costs. For example, a recent study in Westminster, 
Colorado, found that water conservation and efficiency 
since 1980 had reduced water use in the city, reduc-
ing tap fees by 80  percent and reducing customers’ 
bills by 91  percent relative to what they would have 
been without these efforts (Feinglas, Gray, and Mayer 
2013). In major cities, such as San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, total water use has decreased since the late 
1970s despite population and economic growth. At a 
larger scale, a recent United States federal study found 
that water conservation and efficiency efforts have 
reduced annual demand for water from the Colorado 
River basin by more than 1.7 million acre-feet, a tremen-
dous savings in an over-allocated basin (US Bureau of 
Reclamation 2015). In the United States, we have made 
considerable progress in managing the nation’s water, 
with total water use less than it was in 1970, despite 
continued population and economic growth. Indeed, 
every sector, from agriculture to thermoelectric power 
generation, shows reductions in water use. Likewise, 
in Australia, a severe drought in the middle of the last 
decade prompted an intensive effort to reduce water 
demand. In response, total urban demand, including 
losses and non-residential consumption, fell from about 
130 gallons per capita daily (gpcd) in 2005 to about 80 
gpcd in 2010 (Queensland Water Commission, 2010). 
There are many tools available to reduce water demand 
– some of which rely on an incentive-based approach, 
e.g. pricing and rebates, while others are based on a 
more traditional command-and-control approach. 
Numerous studies have shown that significant conser-
vation and efficiency opportunities exist in urban and 
agricultural areas (see, e.g. Gleick et al., 2003; Heberger, 
Cooley, and Gleick 2014). Below, we provide additional 
detail on the major demand management tools, includ-
ing pricing, direct financial incentives, regulations, and 
education and outreach. 
Water pricing. Well-designed tariff structures can 
meet multiple policy objectives, including supporting 
the financial stability of the utility, the affordability of 
water for low-income customers, the efficient alloca-
tion of water and other resources, and environmental 
sustainability. Most water utilities use some form of 
volumetric tariffs to achieve these objectives. There 
are several types of volumetric tariffs in use around the 
world: 
• uniform tariffs in which the volumetric tariff ($/m3) 
is constant regardless of the quantity used; 
• inclining block tariffs in which the volumetric tariff 
increases as the quantity used increases; and
• declining block tariffs in which the volumetric tariff 
decreases as the quantity used increases. 
Uniform tariffs are the most common tariff structure 
in OECD and in developing countries (OECD 2009). 
Inclining block rates are becoming increasingly com-
mon (OECD 2009), as there is recognition that when 
designed properly, this approach can provide a strong 
financial incentive to conserve while ensuring that 
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Instead of providing rebates to cover a portion of the 
cost, some utilities have opted to institute direct-install 
programs that cover the entire cost of the device and 
the installation costs. In the mid-1990s, for example, the 
New York City Department of Environmental Protection 
launched a massive toilet rebate program to replace 
one-third of all water-wasting toilets in New York City 
with low-flow models. For this effort, property owners 
contracted directly with private licensed plumbers for 
the installation of the toilet, and after completion of 
the work, the City provided the property owner with a 
$240 rebate for the first toilet and $150 for the second 
toilet. Where possible, the plumber would also install 
low-flow showerheads and faucet aerators. The pro-
gram was a huge success. Between 1994 and 1997, 1.3 
million low-flow toilets were installed, saving 70 - 90 
million gallons per day. Customers saw their water and 
wastewater bills drop 20 percent to 40 percent (EPA 
2002). Additionally, the City was able to defer the need 
to develop new supply sources and expand wastewater 
treatment capacity, saving the community even more 
money.
Regulations. In addition to financial incentives, reg-
ulations are key demand management strategies. 
Regulations can take a variety of forms, ranging from 
a prescriptive approach focused on a particular appli-
ance to a performance-based approach for outdoor 
water use. For example, the International Plumbing 
Code, which is widely used in the United States and 
forms the basis for plumbing codes in several other 
countries, specifies maximum flow rates for kitchen 
and lavatory faucets. Likewise, communities in the Las 
Vegas area have restricted lawn installation in new 
developments. California has also passed an ordinance 
to reduce outdoor water use, although the state opted 
for a performance-based approach. Landscape irriga-
tion typically accounts for more than half of residen-
tial demand in the state, and in an effort to promote 
outdoor efficiency, the state adopted the Model Water 
Efficient Landscape Ordinance (MWELO). MWELO 
lower-income consumers are able to meet their basic 
water needs at a reduced cost. A 2003 survey of cities 
in the southwest United States found that per-capita 
water use is typically lower in cities with dramatically 
increasing block tariffs, such as Tucson and El Paso 
(WRA 2003).
Although less frequently employed, pricing has also 
been shown to be effective in reducing agricultural 
water use. For example, the Broadview Water District, 
a small district in California’s San Joaquin Valley, imple-
mented increasing block rates in 1988 to reduce the 
volume of contaminated drainage water flowing into 
the San Joaquin River. The rate was set at $16 per 
acre-foot ($0.013 per m3) for the first 90  percent of 
average water use during the 1986 to 1988 period and 
$40 per acre-foot ($0.032 per m3) for any additional 
water. By 1991, the district’s average water use declined 
by 19 percent due to efficiency improvements and crop 
shifting (MacDougall et al., 1992). 
Direct financial incentives. Rebate programs are 
commonly used to encourage customers to make 
investments in water conservation and efficiency 
improvements. Residents and business owners pur-
chase new devices as the old devices wear out. While 
most new standard devices use less water than older 
models, there are many new high-efficiency devices 
available that use even less water. While efficient 
devices are often cheaper over their lifetimes due to 
lower water, energy, and wastewater bills, users may be 
put off by the higher up-front costs. As a result, water 
utilities may provide their customers with a rebate to 
defray the additional cost of the more efficient device. 
There are several examples of water utilities partner-
ing with local energy utilities to augment those rebates 
because of the energy savings (Cooley and Donnelly 
2013). Additionally, utilities may partner with retailers 
to offer rebates at the point of sale, giving customers 
an immediate incentive to purchase the more efficient 
device. 
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Education and outreach. Education and outreach 
programs can also be effective for promoting water 
conservation and efficiency. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), for example, launched the 
WaterSense labeling program in 2006 to promote 
water-conserving devices that are 20  percent more 
efficient than standard products on the market and 
meet rigorous performance criteria. Social market-
ing has also gained prominence in recent years, with 
some programs tapping into new metering technolo-
gies and web-based platforms. For example, a recent 
study found that home water reports - which provide 
customers information on their current water use and 
comparisons to their past use, use by similar house-
holds, and efficient use - reduce water by 5 percent and 
were especially effective in reaching the highest water 
users (Mitchell and Chesnutt 2013). 
establishes a water budget for new construction and 
rehabilitated landscapes that are at least 2,500 square 
feet and require a building or landscaping permit (the 
size threshold is likely to be reduced to 500 square 
feet in response to the current drought). In addition, 
the ordinance requires mulching for most plantings; 
promotes the use of techniques to increase storm-
water retention and infiltration; and requires new and 
refurbished landscapes to install irrigation systems run 
by weather, soil moisture, or other self-adjusting con-
trollers. Also in California, Governor Schwarzenegger 
signed SBx7-7 in 2009, requiring urban water suppliers 
to reduce per-capita water use by 20 percent by 2020. 
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The MDB includes parts of four states (Queensland, 
New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia) and the 
Australian Capital Territory. The MDB supplies water to 
about three million people, including the national capi-
tal (Canberra) and Adelaide, outside of the basin near 
the river’s mouth. According to the MDBA, the basin 
contains some 70 percent of the nation’s irrigated acre-
age, producing a third of the country’s food supply. The 
MDBA reports the gross value of irrigated agriculture in 
the basin in 2012-13 at approximately $6.8 Billion. The 
MDB generates almost all of Australia’s rice and cotton 
and 75 percent of its grapes, as well as roughly half of 
the nation’s hay, fruit, livestock, and dairy production.
The construction of dams and canals and the diver-
sion and depletion of MDB rivers has endangered the 
survival of at least 35 bird species and 16 mammal spe-
cies within the basin. Many fish species, including the 
Murray cod, are also threatened. Wetlands have dried 
up or reached critically low levels, exacerbated by the 
Millennium drought, prompting public concern.
MDB and the Colorado  
River Basin
The MDB and the Colorado River Basin share many 
common traits: both are highly variable rivers in arid 
basins, where rapidly-growing urban populations have 
imposed new demands on limited, climate-stressed 
rivers. Basin size and runoff are similar. And, interest-
ingly, the two basins share a common figure: Elwood 
Mead (namesake of Lake Mead), the Wyoming State 
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) figures promi-
nently in discussions about water trading as an example 
of a thriving incentive-based system that successfully 
transitioned from a non-market system (Grafton et al., 
2012). The total value of water trading in Australia in 
fiscal year 2012-13 exceeded $1.4 billion (NWC 2013). 
Water trading in Australia includes both short-term 
trades, known as allocation trading, and long-term 
trades, known as entitlement trading. In fiscal year 
2012-13, the most recent period for which comprehen-
sive data are available, the total volume of short-term 
trading increased 44  percent from the previous year, 
from almost 3.5 million acre-feet to 5 million acre-feet, 
or roughly 50 percent of total surface water use in the 
MDB. This is an extremely active water market.
Background
The MDB covers some 390,000 square miles in south-
eastern Australia, comprising roughly 14 percent of that 
country’s land area. Most of the basin is very arid, with 
86 percent of the basin contributing little or no flow to 
rivers that drain the basin. The Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority (MDBA) estimates that total runoff within the 
basin is less than 26 million acre-feet annually, yield-
ing an estimated long-term annual average 19 MAF 
of total river flow. As shown in Figure A-1, the system 
displays very high seasonal and annual variability. For 
example, flows in the southern Murray basin typically 
are much higher than in the northern Darling basin. 
Pre-development, an estimated 10 million acre-feet ran 
into the ocean; in 2009, during the historic Millennium 
drought, this had decreased to 4 million acre-feet.
ANNEX 2  
Water trading in Australia:
Lessons from the Murray-Darling Basin
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subsequently changing the water rights structure to 
facilitate trading and protect environmental resources.
In Australia, water rights typically refer to either entitle-
ments or allocations.30 The National Water Initiative of 
2004 defines these as:
• Water access entitlement – a perpetual or ongo-
ing entitlement to exclusive access to a share of 
water from a specified consumptive pool as defined 
in the relevant water plan.
• Water allocation – the specific volume of water 
allocated to water access entitlements in a given 
season, defined according to rules established in 
the relevant water plan. (Young, 2010).
Australian water rights are typically defined as the right 
to divert a specific volume, as opposed to a consumptive 
use right that is more typical with prior appropriation 
30 Additional water rights include: Water use license – a non-tradable 
use or condition linked to the place of use; and Delivery right – may be 
required to ensure that an allocation is delivered, typically associated 
with irrigation infrastructure, such as canals and headgates (Grafton and 
Horne 2014).
Irrigation Engineer from 1888-99, went on to serve as 
the Chairman of Victoria (Australia)’s State Rivers & 
Water Supply Commission (1907–15), prior to return-
ing to the US and serving as the Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Reclamation from 1924-36 (McLeod 2014). 
However, Australia avoided Mead’s legacy of prior 
appropriation and hierarchical water rights to embrace 
a very different system that promotes and facilitates 
water trading, as described in the following sections.
History
Australia has promoted and developed water trading 
over a period of more than 30 years (Grafton et al., 
2012), in a process that initially attempted to activate 
markets prior to recognizing that the water rights struc-
ture itself needed to be altered to encourage active 
trading and minimize transaction costs (Young, 2015). 
Table A-1 lists some of the major steps taken to cre-
ate the current water trading structure. These changes 
have occurred over several decades and often reflect 
corrections to previous policies. Young (2010, 2015) 
asserts that Australia implemented water trading from 
the wrong direction, by first promoting trading and 
FIGURE A-1. Historical river flows within the Murray-Darling Basin 
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Source: Australia’s MDBA.
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the land. Transforming these general land-based rights 
to discrete volumes then required determining his-
toric usage patterns and water requirements for crops 
grown on that land. Several MDB states initially allowed 
water trading within individual irrigation districts, using 
shared infrastructure to trade water to different parcels 
within the district. These volumetric rights were subse-
quently “unbundled” from the land, enabling water to 
be traded between different irrigation districts. Despite 
these changes, restrictions on trading between dif-
ferent sub-basins often took years to revoke, due to 
concerns about adverse economic and equity impacts 
that trading could cause in areas of origin (Grafton and 
Horne 2014). 
regimes (Connor and Kaczan, 2013). Diversions can 
be measured (and subsequently traded) more readily 
than consumptive use, which requires measurement 
of both diversions and surface and sub-surface return 
flows. Return flows often lag diversions, sometimes by 
weeks or months in the case of sub-surface returns, 
requiring more complicated measurements and esti-
mates, challenging efforts to evaluate and quantify the 
full impacts (especially environmental impacts) of the 
trade, hindering transactions.
Initially, Australian water rights were linked to a spe-
cific land parcel. In many cases, the water right simply 
entitled the landowner to sufficient water to irrigate 
TABLE A-1. Policy and legislative milestones 
YEAR ACTION DESCRIPTION
1960s Volumetric water licenses
Start of conversion of land-based water entitlements to volumetric 
entitlements
1983 Water trading w/in districts Allowed in New South Wales and South Australia
1987 1st MDB Agreement Established the MDB Commission, to coordinate management
1991 Inter-district water trading Allowed in New South Wales
1994 “Unbundling”
Council of Australian Governments agrees to separate statutory land 
rights from water rights, facilitating trading
1995 Diversion CAP implemented Limits surface water diversions in the MDB; limits water rights
1995 National Competition Policy Requires development of water markets and full-cost pricing
2000 Water Management Act “Unbundles” diversion and use rights
2004 National Water Initiative Promotes cohesive water planning and trading efforts
2004 Living Murray Initiative Authorizes purchase and dedication of 0.4 MAF to the river
2007 Water Act Promotes management of MDB
2008 Water Amendment Act Establishes MDB Authority, replacing the Commission
2008 Water for the Future Commits $3.1 billion to purchase water entitlements for the env.
2012 MD Basin Plan
Caps total MDB surface diversions at 8.8 MAF, coordinates basin 
management including water quality (esp. salinity)
Sources: MDBA, Young, 2010; Grafton and Horne, 2014.
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uses. New South Wales has attempted to limit federal 
purchases of water for the environment to no more than 
3 percent of total entitlements, though this appears to 
contravene trading rules within the Basin Plan, which 
seek to minimize restrictions on trading (Grafton and 
Horne 2014).
State water plans allocate water entitlements into one 
or two “pools,” known as a high security pool and a gen-
eral or low security pool. The high security pool is allo-
cated to those entitlement holders proportional to the 
size of their entitlement. For example, if a system only 
has two entitlement holders and one right is for nine 
units and the other is for one unit, the former would 
receive 90  percent of the pool’s allocation and the 
latter would receive 10  percent. If additional water is 
available for the general pool, that volume is allocated 
to those entitlement holders. Every season, the state 
determines the total volume available for allocation for 
each pool. During drought, the general pool might not 
receive any water at all (Young, 2010).
Water trading activity
Australia’s water trading activity is largely concentrated 
in the MDB, which represents as much as 94 percent of 
all such activity in Australia despite being only one of 
twelve surface water management areas (Figure A-2). 
Trading is very high as measured by the total volume 
of water traded (as much as 5 million acre-feet), the 
percentage of all diversions that are traded (as much 
as 50  percent), the number of farmers trading water 
(roughly half, in 2008-09), and the total number of 
trades (11,000, in 2011-12). The number of short-term 
(allocation) interstate trades also appears to be rising, 
reaching 20 percent of the total number of such trades 
in 2011/12 (Grafton and Horne 2014). Not surprisingly, 
the number of short-term (allocation) trades is much 
higher, in terms of numbers and volumes, than the 
number of entitlement trades. As the federal govern-
ment has exercised its commitment to ensure minimum 
Unlike the doctrine of prior appropriation in the west-
ern United States, water rights in Australia did not 
have priority dates or a seniority system for satisfy-
ing demands: all rights were considered equivalent. 
Additionally, Australian water rights did not have to 
be exercised on an annual or periodic basis to demon-
strate possession (again, unlike the prior appropriation 
system); many rights holders maintained their rights 
for periodic or infrequent use (known as “dozer” rights) 
or never exercised their water rights (known as “sleep-
ers”), perhaps in the expectation that they might be 
needed in the future.
The 1995 imposition of the diversion CAP limiting 
surface water diversions and rights within the MDBA 
explicitly recognized the continuing validity of dozer 
and sleeper rights and incorporated the volumes of 
these rights into the general calculation of the propor-
tional shares of the new water rights regime. However, 
the result of recognizing dozer and sleeper rights within 
the context of water trading was to increase the finan-
cial value of these unexercised rights, leading to new 
diversions and greater strain on water supply, in turn 
reducing water reliability (Grafton and Horne 2014). 
Tony McLeod, General Manager for Water Planning at 
MDBA, explained that the recognition of these dozer 
and sleeper rights was intentional, to reduce resistance 
to the imposition of the CAP and smooth the transition 
to the new system of proportional sharing (McLeod, 
personal communication, 2014).
In response, the Australian government implemented 
several initiatives to purchase existing water entitle-
ments and dedicate these to the environment, both to 
offset reservoir evaporation and other system losses 
(known as maintenance rights) and explicitly to ensure 
minimum instream flow volumes in designated reaches. 
The government has invested more than $3 Billion to 
date to purchase entitlements for environmental water. 
However, the relative priority of this environmental 
water remains contentious, with some states contend-
ing that such rights receive lower priority than human 
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about $54 per acre-foot in the drier 2012/13.31 Similarly, 
trading in drier years tends to see water move from lower 
value uses, such as pasture and forage, to higher value 
wine and vegetable crops. Connor and Kaczan (2013) 
reported that many livestock operations irrigate pasture 
and forage crops in wet years but tend to trade away 
their allocations in drier years, when the price of water 
rises due to scarcity, using the profits to purchase feed 
from other areas. These trends also manifest regionally, 
as water tends to move across state lines from New South 
Wales into South Australia, which has more high-value 
31 These prices are about an order of magnitude lower than prices for 
short-term transfers in California in the 2014 drought year, but are 
comparable to prices paid for short-term rentals in the active Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy district water market.
environmental flows by purchasing entitlements, such 
purchases have risen to 37 percent of the total number 
of entitlement trades in 2011/12. Only about 5 percent 
of farmers traded water entitlements, either to other 
farmers or to cities or to the government for augment-
ing environmental flows, in 2008/09, or about 10 per-
cent of the number that reported trading allocations 
that year (Grafton and Horne 2014). 
As expected, the number of allocation trades appears 
to be inversely correlated with precipitation and runoff, 
rising in drought years and falling when allocations are 
higher due to wetter conditions. Prices similarly vary in 
response to water availability, rising from the equivalent 
of about $22 per acre-foot in 2011/12 to the equivalent of 
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FIGURE A-2. Surface water management areas in Australia
Source: Australia National Water Commission. 
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market activity while protecting environmental values 
by participating directly in the market, purchasing enti-
tlements from willing sellers and dedicating this water 
to preserve threatened ecosystems and river reaches. 
This approach has come at great expense to the gov-
ernment (and taxpayers) but has been justified by the 
reported increase in economic activity and benefits 
arising from trading activity. In a robust assessment 
of water trading in Victoria’s Murray Valley, Frontier 
Economics (2007) found strong local opposition to 
permanently trading water out of local areas, to the 
extent that some irrigators selling entitlements have 
been ostracized, but also found a combination of posi-
tive and negative socio-economic impacts from such 
trades. For example, the authors found that trading 
ameliorated the impacts of the Millennium Drought on 
dairy farmers in the region, who otherwise would have 
fared much worse. Additionally, water trading facili-
tated the expansion of the wine industry in the region.
Several researchers have compiled extensive lists of 
lessons learned. Two of these are reproduced below. 
Young (2010) writes:
Lesson 1: Unless carefully managed, the legacy 
of prior licensing decisions can result in markets 
causing over-allocation problems to emerge in a 
manner that erodes the health of rivers, aquifer and 
the water dependent ecosystems associated with 
them.
Lesson 2: Transaction and administrative costs 
are lower when entitlements are defined using a 
unit share structure and not as an entitlement to a 
volume of water. One of the simplest ways of pre-
venting over-allocation problems from emerging is 
to assign the risks of adverse climate change and/
or the emergence of long dry periods to entitlement 
holders and define entitlements as an entitlement 
to a share of the water defined as being available 
for use.
Lesson 3: Market efficiency is improved by using 
separate structures to define entitlements, manage 
allocations and control the use of water.
crops. In response, New South Wales and Victoria have 
imposed restrictions on the volume of water that may be 
exported from the state (Grafton and Horne 2014).
Enabling conditions
A large number of necessary and enabling conditions 
help explain Australia’s water trading success. Key 
among these is the development of a proportional 
water sharing regime, in which the state, rather than 
administrative or water courts, determines total annual 
water availability, rather than granting rights holders 
an absolute or priority-based right to a fixed volume 
of water. The Australian experience also shows that 
water trading is more active when allocation pools 
encompass a large number of entitlement holders with 
a diverse range of uses (Young, 2010).
Grafton and Horne (2014) found that infrastructure, 
such as dams and canals, can facilitate water trading by 
storing water until needed and providing conveyances 
to deliver where needed. Similarly, access to accurate 
and timely information on water prices and availability 
facilitates water trading. In Australia, brokerage-type 
water banks are active in both the Murray-Darling Basin 
and in northern Victoria, where the banks post informa-
tion about pricing and availability (O’Donnell and Colby 
2010). Underpinning this information exchange is an 
extensive, credible, verifiable registry of entitlements and 
allocations and mechanism to quickly record, measure 
and monitor trades, as well as sufficient sanctions on 
those violating agreements (Connor and Kaczan 2013). 
Lessons learned
Connor and Kaczan highlighted the classic dilemma 
facing those attempting to implement a water trading 
system: the tradeoff between protecting third parties 
with high transaction costs versus promoting trades 
with low transaction costs, with less concern for third 
parties. Australia has adopted the latter approach, 
choosing to minimize transaction costs and promote 
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Lesson 11: Water use and investment will be more 
efficient if all users are exposed to at least the 
full lower bound cost and preferably the upper 
bound cost of supplying water to them. One way of 
achieving this outcome is to transfer ownership of 
the supply system to these users.
Lesson 12: Manage environmental externalities 
using separate instruments so that the costs of 
avoiding them are reflected in the costs of produc-
tion and use in a manner that encourages water 
users to avoid creating them.
Lesson 13: Removal of administrative impediments 
to inter-regional trade and inter-state trade is difficult 
but necessary for the development of efficient water 
markets. Australia has taken the approach of ap-
pointing an independent agency to develop rules 
designed to remove unnecessary barriers to water 
trade. Amongst other things, this has required the 
setting of guidelines that prevent water supply 
companies from setting charges and adopting 
practices that discriminate against people who wish 
to trade water out of a region.
Lesson 14: Markets will be more efficient and the 
volume of trade greater if entitlements are allocated 
to individual users rather than to irrigator controlled 
water supply companies and cooperatives. Whilst 
opposed by water supply companies and coopera-
tives, it is the Australian experience that willingness 
to trade and market depth typically is much greater 
when entitlements are allocated to individuals rather 
than to water supply companies or associations as 
they are called in other countries. The reason for 
this is that when allocations are issued to individu-
als they do not have to obtain the permission of the 
board of a water supply company or association to 
sell water out of a region.
Lesson 15: Equity and fairness principles require 
careful attention to and discipline in the way 
that allocation decisions and policy changes are 
announced.
Lesson 16: Water markets are more effective when 
information about the prices being paid and offered 
is made available to all participants in a timely 
manner. 
Lesson 4: Early attention to the development of 
accurate license registers is critical and a necessary 
precondition to the development of low-cost entitle-
ment trading systems.
Lesson 5: Unless water market and allocation pro-
cedures allow unused water to be carried forward 
from year to year, trading may increase the severity 
of droughts.
Lesson 6: Early installation of meters and conver-
sion from area based licenses to a volumetric man-
agement system is a necessary precursor to the 
development of low cost allocation trading systems. 
Metering and conversion to a volumetric allocation 
system is a necessary precursor to the development 
of efficient water trading systems. In order to facili-
tate the more efficient management of the available 
resource and trading, Australia has spent many 
years converting area-based licenses to volumetric 
licenses and installing meters. Typically, conversion 
involves estimation of the amount of water used 
by crop type and the development of conversion 
factors.
Lesson 7: It is difficult for communities to plan for 
an adverse climate shift and develop water sharing 
plans that deal adequately with a climatic shift to 
a drier regime. More robust planning and water en-
titlement systems are needed.
Lesson 8: The allocation regime for the provision of 
water necessary to maintain minimum flows, provide 
for conveyance and cover evaporative losses need 
to be more secure than that used to allocate water 
for environmental and other purposes.
Lesson 9: Unless all forms of water use are 
accounted for entitlement reliability will be eroded 
by expansion of un-metered uses like plantation 
forestry and farm dam development, increases in ir-
rigation efficiency, etc. and place the integrity of the 
allocation system at risk.
Lesson 10: Unless connected ground and surface 
water systems are managed as a single integrated 
resource, groundwater development will reduce the 
amount of water available that can be allocated to 
surface water users.
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7. Statutory rights offer flexibility but carry risks 
- can be modified without recourse to the courts. 
Developments to unbundle water rights have facili-
tated trade. A potential downside of statutory rights 
is sovereign risk, or the possibility that the value of 
existing water rights can be degraded by changes 
in regulation and discretionary behaviour by state 
governments.
8. Markets can promote environmental outcomes - 
Trading should always be subject to a public interest 
test. Where there are important public interests, 
such as flow volumes at key locations or the need 
to ensure minimum levels of water quality, trade may 
need to be constrained for environmental reasons. 
An example of this approach is the Basin Salinity 
Management Strategy that seeks to reduce salinity: 
actions that reduce salinity are treated as credits 
and actions that increase salinity as debits on state 
salinity registers.
9. Acquiring water for the environment through 
buybacks has proved effective.
10. Prices contain information on scarcity and risk. 
11. Basin-wide and local perspectives have roles to 
play – local input can also prevent or undermine the 
emergence of strong water markets. … Governments 
need to see through short-term and some-times 
parochial interests to facilitate optimal use in the 
longer term.
12. Effective monitoring and control of extractions 
are critical for sustainability – Farmers made 
substantial investments to increase their on-farm 
retention of water that might otherwise have flowed 
to the Basin’s streams and rivers. Similarly, ground-
water extractions increased by about half over the 
period 2000–2001 to 2007–2008 (from about 1 
MAF to 1.4 MAF) as market users sought access to 
other cost effective water supplies.
Lesson 17: Develop brokering industry and avoid 
government involvement in the provision of water 
brokering services.
GRAFTON AND HORNE (2014) WRITE:
1. Crises may facilitate reform - As the focus on the 
crisis fades, so may do the reform zeal. This ‘stop 
and go’ reform process suggests that determination 
is required to make consistent progress, but that a 
crisis can facilitate reform.
2. Water markets support regional resilience - The 
geographical distribution of markets has meant 
these benefits have been concentrated in areas of 
greatest connectivity of the resource (the southern 
Murray-Darling Basin) where there is also the widest 
cross-section of users. An example is the signifi-
cance of selling water by opportunistic commodity 
producers (such as rice growers) to perennial crop 
producers (such as citrus growers).
3. Political and administrative leadership is critical 
- This involves teams with a range of skills, much 
broader than the engineering-based specialists that 
have traditionally managed water resources.
4. Capping extractions promotes effective use and 
sustainability - any cap should be comprehen-
sive and all water sources should be included to 
avoid substitution to uncontrolled or inadequately 
measured sources.
5. Regulated water framework facilitates water 
trading - entitlements delivered via regulated water 
storages account for about 90 percent of the water 
entitlements traded in the Southern MDB.
6. Reliable, accessible and timely market informa-
tion promotes effective decision-making - the 
Australian government is investing over half a billion 
Australian dollars in improved water information and 
regulations.
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Payment for ecosystem services (PES) – an incen-
tive-based instrument that seeks to translate external, 
non-market values of environment services into financial 
incentives for local actors to provide such services. In 
practical terms, PES involves a series of payments to a 
land or resource manager in exchange for a guaranteed 
flow of environmental services.
Payment for watershed services (PWS) – a type of 
PES arrangement that is focused on watershed services.
Water bank – may refer to the physical storage of water, 
typically in a reservoir or an aquifer, to an institution that 
facilitates or brokers a water transfer or serves as an 
information clearinghouse, or to any agency that holds 
water rights in trust for a specified purpose such as 
streamflow augmentation. 
Water market – Often used interchangeably with water 
transfer, a water market can also refer to informal 
transactions involving the sale of water, e.g. from water 
tankers, that do not involve the lease or sale of water 
rights or concessions. 
Water option – a type of conditional water transfer. 
Under dry-year options a buyer will pay the seller an 
annual fee to be able to exercise an option to purchase a 
pre-determined volume of water under a specific set of 
circumstances. 
Water transfer – a change in the point of diversion, 
type of use, or location of water use. May refer to a 
temporary or permanent exchange of water rights (see 
water market), or to a non-market conveyance of water 
from one location to another.
Aquifer – an underground layer of water-bearing 
materials, such as sandstone or gravel or other 
permeable material.
Command-and-control regulation – an environmental 
regulatory policy that is often contrasted with “incentive-
based mechanisms” in the literature. A command and 
control (CAC) regulation can be defined as the direct 
regulation of an industry or activity that states what is 
permitted and what is illegal.
Economic Efficiency – generally, a state or condition 
with optimal resource use, allocation, or productivity. May 
or may not be consistent with equity considerations.
Equity – refers to fairness, justice, impartiality, such as 
in the allocation of resources or treatment of different 
classes of people. May or may not be consistent with 
economic efficiency considerations.
Eutrophication – excessive richness of nutrients in a 
lake or other body of water, frequently due to runoff from 
the land, which causes a dense growth of plant life and 
death of animal life from lack of oxygen.
Incentive-based instrument – a broad set of tools that 
use financial means, directly or indirectly, to motivate re-
sponsible parties to reduce the health and environmental 
risks posed by their facilities, processes, or products.
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution – water pollution 
from diffuse sources such as runoff from urbanized areas 
or farm fields. 
Nutrients – nitrogen or phosphorus-containing water 
pollutants that can cause water quality problems. See 
eutrophication. 
Paper water – the legal right to use a given volume 
of water, contrasted with “wet” or “real” water. In many 
basins, more paper water exists than wet water.
Glossary
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T 75
Bennett, G. & N. Carroll. 2014. “Gaining Depth: State of Wa-
tershed Investment 2014.” Forest Trends, Ecosystem 
Marketplace. Available at forest-trends.org/documents/
files/SOWI2014.pdf.
Beverage Industry Environmental Roundtable (BIER). 2015. 
“Performance in Watershed Context Concept Paper.” Bev-
erage Industry Environmental Roundtable (BIER). http://
www.bieroundtable.com/#!/c16n5.
Bjornlund, H. & J. McKay. 2002. “Aspects of Water Markets 
for Developing Countries: Experiences from Australia, 
Chile, and the US.” Environment and Development Eco-
nomics 7 (04). doi:10.1017/S1355770X02000463.
Bond, I., and J. Mayers. 2010. “Fair Deals for Watershed Ser-
vices: Lessons from a Multi-Country Action-Learning 
Project.” No. 13. Natural Resources Issues. London, UK: 
International Institute for Environment and Development. 
Available at pubs.iied.org/pdfs/13535IIED.pdf.
Brewer, J., R. Glennon, A. Ker & G.D. Libecap. 2007. “Water 
Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual 
Forms.” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Brooks, D.B. 2006. “An Operational Definition of Water De-
mand Management.” Intenational Journal of Water Re-
sources Development 22 (4): 521–28.
Brouwer, R., A. Tesfaye & P. Pauw. 2011. “Meta-Analysis of 
Institutional-Economic Factors Explaining the Environ-
mental Performance of Payments for Watershed Ser-
vices.” Environmental Conservation 38 (04): 380–92. 
doi:10.1017/S0376892911000543.
Brown, C., U. Lall & F.A. Souza Filho. 2015. “Allocating Water 
in a Changing World: Incentive-Based Mechanisms for 
Climate Adaptation.”
Calvache, A., S. Benitez & A. Ramos. 2012. “Fondo de Agua: 
Conservando La Infraestructura Verde. Guia de Diseno, 
Creacio, Y Operacion.” Bogota, Columbia: The Nature 
Conservancy, Fundacion FEMSA, y Banco Interamericano 
de Desarrollo. Available at conservationgateway.org/
Documents/LAWFP-ENG-low-050312_0.pdf.
Carpenter, S.R., E.H. Stanley & M. J. Vander Zanden. 2011. 
“State of the World’s Freshwater Ecosystems: Physical, 
Chemical, and Biological Changes.” Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 36 (1): 75–99. doi:10.1146/
annurev-environ-021810-094524.
CDP. 2014. “From Water Risk to Value Creation, CDP Global 
Water Report 2014.” CDP. Available at cdp.net/CDPRe-
sults/CDP-Global-Water-Report-2014.pdf.
Albiac, J., M. Hanemann, J. Calatrava, J. Uche & J. Tapia. 
2006. “The Rise and Fall of the Ebro Water Transfer.” 
Natural Resources Journal 46: 729–57.
Alix-Garcia, J., A. de Janvry, E. Sadoulet & J. Manuel. 2009. 
“Lessons Learned from Mexico’s Payment for Environ-
mental Services Program.” In Payment for Environmental 
Services in Agricultural Landscapes, edited by Leslie Lip-
per, Takumi Sakuyama, Randy Stringer, and David Zilber-
man, 163–88. Natural Resource Management and Policy 
31. Springer New York. Available at link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-72971-8_8.
Al-Marshudi, A.S. 2007. “The Falaj Irrigation System and 
Water Allocation Markets in Northern Oman.” Agricul-
tural Water Management 91 (1–3): 71–77. doi:10.1016/j.
agwat.2007.04.008.
Ambec, S., A. Dinar & D. McKinney. 2013. “Water Sharing 
Agreements Sustainable to Reduced Flows.” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 66 (3): 
639–55. doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2013.06.003.
Anderson, R.C. 2004. “International Experiences with 
Economic Incentives for Protecting the Environment.” 
EPA-236-R-04-001. Washington, DC: US Environmental 
Protection Agency, National Center for Environmental 
Economics. Available at yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.
nsf/vwAN/EE-0487-01.pdf/$file/EE-0487-01.pdf.
Appleton, A.F. 2010. “How New York City Used an Ecosystem 
Services Strategy Carried out through an Urban-Rural 
Partnership to Preserve the Pristine Quality of Its Drink-
ing Water and Save Billions of Dollars.” New York, NY: A 
Paper for Forest Trends. Available at ecosystemmarket-
place.com/documents/cms_documents/NYC_H2O_Eco-
system_Services.pdf.
Backeberg, G. 2015. “Water Markets in South Africa,” July 24.
Barrett, K. 2015. “A Different Kind of Sale: April Auction Of-
fers Stewardship Credits to Meet Sustainability Goals.” 
Ecosystem Marketplace. February 12. Available at eco-
systemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.
php?page_id=10792&section=news_articles&eod=1.
Bauer, C.J. 1997. “Bringing Water Markets down to Earth: The 
Political Economy of Water Rights in Chile, 1976–1995.” 
World Development 25 (5): 639–56.
Bennett, G., N. Carroll & K. Hamilton. (2012) Charting New 
Waters: State of Watershed Payments 2012. Washington, 
DC: Forest Trends. Available at ecosystemmarketplace.
com/reports/sowp2012.
References
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T76
at ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/18session/A-
HRC-18-33-Add4_en.pdf.
Dellapenna, J. 2000. “The Importance of Getting Names 
Right: The Myth of Markets for Water.” William & Mary 
Environmental Law and Policy Review 25 (2): 317.
Department of Environmental Affairs. 2015. “Social Develop-
ment | Department of Environmental Affairs.” Accessed 
September 10. Available at environment.gov.za/proj-
ectsprogrammes/wfw/socialdevelopment.
Dillaha, T., P. Ferraro, M. Huang, D. Southgate, S. Upadhyaya 
& S. Wunder. 2007. “Payment for Watershed Services 
Regional Syntheses.” USAID. Available at sanrem.cals.
vt.edu/1010/Dillaha2007_PWS_regional_syntheses.pdf.
Dinar, A., M.W. Rosegrant & R. Meinzen-Dick. 1997. “Wa-
ter Allocation Mechanisms: Principles and Examples.” 
Policy Research Working Paper Series 1779. The World 
Bank. Available at econpapers.repec.org/paper/wbkw-
brwps/1779.htm.
Dinar, A. & R.M. Saleth. 2005. “Can Water Institutions Be 
Cured? A Water Institutions Health Index.” Water Supply 
5: 17–40.
Dodds, W.K., W.W. Bouska, J.L. Eitzmann, T.J. Pilger, K.L. Pitts, 
A.J. Riley, J.T. Schloesser & D.J. Thornbrugh. 2008. “Eu-
trophication of US Freshwaters: Analysis of Potential Eco-
nomic Damages.” Environmental Science & Technology 
43 (1): 12–19.
Duhon, M., J. Young & S. Kerr. 2011. “Nitrogen Trading in Lake 
Taupo: An Analysis and Evaluation of an Innovative Water 
Management Strategy.” In New Zealand Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society 2011 Conference. Nelson, 
New Zealand. Available at ageconsearch.umn.edu/bit-
stream/115353/2/Duhon%20Paper.pdf.
Easter, K.W., M.W. Rosegrant & A. Dinar. 1999. “Formal and 
Informal Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and 
Constraints.” The World Bank Research Observer 14 (1): 
99–116.
Ecosystem Marketplace. 2013. “Innovative Markets and 
Market Like Instruments for Ecosystem Services.” Forest 
Trends. Available at ecosystemmarketplace.com/docu-
ments/acrobat/the_matrix.pdf.
———. 2015. “This Week In Water: The Art Of The Nutrient 
Credit Sale.” Watershed Connect. February 27. Available 
at watershedconnect.com/news/this_week_in_water_the_
art_of_the_nutrient_credit_sale_.
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). 2010. “Program on 
Technology Innovation: Ohio River Water Quality Trading 
Pilot Program: Business Case for Power Company Partici-
pation.” Available at epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductA-
bstract.aspx?ProductId=000000000001018861.
Clifford, P. 2012. “Water Banking in Washington State: 2012 
Report to the Legislature.” Report to Legislature 12-11-
055. Washington State Department of Ecology. https://
fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/SummaryPages/1211055.
html.
Cohen, M.J., J. Christian-Smith & J. Berggren. 2013. “Water 
to Supply the Land: Irrigated Agriculture in the Colorado 
River Basin.” Pacific Institute. Available at pacinst.org/
publication/water-to-supply-the-land-irrigated-agricul-
ture-in-the-colorado-river-basin/.
Cohen, M.J. 2014. “Hazard’s Toll: The Costs of Inaction at the 
Salton Sea.” Pacific Institute. Available at pacinst.org/pub-
lication/hazards-toll/.
Cohen, M.J. & K.H. Hyun. 2006. “Hazard: The Future of the 
Salton Sea With No Restoration Plan.” Oakland, Calif.: Pa-
cific Institute. http://pacinst.org/publication/restoration-
project-critical-to-salton-seas-future/.
Colby, B.G., M.A. McGinnis & K.A. Rait. 1991. “Mitigating Envi-
ronmental Externalities through Voluntary and Involun-
tary Water Reallocation: Nevada’s Truckee-Carson River 
Basin.” Natural Resources Journal 31: 757.
Coleman, A. 2008. “Farmers to Sue DWAF for Water Rights 
Transfers.” Farmer’s Weekly, September 12.
Conagua. 2012. “Water Banks in Mexico.” National Water 
Commission. Available at conagua.gob.mx/bancos-
delagua/.
Connor, J.D. & D. Kaczan. 2013. “Principles for Economically 
Efficient and Environmentally Sustainable Water Mar-
kets: The Australian Experience.” In Drought in Arid and 
Semi-Arid Regions, edited by Kurt Schwabe, Jose Albiac, 
Jeffery D. Connor, Rashid M. Hassan, and Liliana Meza 
González, 357–74. Springer Netherlands. Available at 
dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6636-5_20.
Cosgrove, W.S. & F.R. Rijsberman. 2000. “World Water Vision: 
Making Water Everybody’s Business.” World Water Coun-
cil. Available at worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=961. 
Culp, P., R. Glennon & G. Libecap. 2014. “Shopping for Wa-
ter: How the Market Can Mitigate Water Shortages in 
the American West.” 2014-05. Discussion Paper. The 
Brookings Institute. Available at hamiltonproject.org/
files/downloads_and_links/market_mitigate_water_short-
age_in_west_paper_glennon_final.pdf.
Colorado Water Trust (CWT). 2015. Colorado Water Trust Big 
Beaver Creek Reservoir / Big Beaver Creek & White River. 
Available at coloradowatertrust.org/our-work/projects/
lake-avery-big-beaver-creek-white-river/#sthash.I3vg-
PjZL.dpuf.
de Albuquerque, C. 2011. “Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Mission to 
the United States of America.” United Nations. Available 
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T 77
Victorian Murray Valley / Frontier Economics. PANDORA 
Electronic Collection. Canberra, A.C.T: National Water Com-
mission. Available at nla.gov.au/nla.arc-79821.
Garrido, A. & M.R. Llamas. 2009. “Water Management in 
Spain: An Example of Changing Paradigms.” Policy and 
Strategic Behaviour in Water Resource Management 125.
Gassert, F., M. Landis, P. Reig, M. Luck & T. Shiao. 2013. “Aq-
ueduct Metadata Document, Aqueduct Global Maps 2.0.” 
World Resources Institute (WRI). Available at wri.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/aqueduct_metadata_global.pdf.
Genevieve B., N. Carroll, M. Bennett, A. Leonardi & K. Moull. 
2014. “Gaining Depth: State of Watershed Investment 
2014.” Washington, D.C: Forest Trends. Available at.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/SOWI2014.pdf.
George, A., A. Pierret, A. Boonsaner, V. Christian & O. Planchon. 
2009. “Potential and Limitations of Payments for Environ-
mental Services (PES) as a Means to Manage Watershed 
Services in Mainland Southeast Asia.” International Jour-
nal of the Commons 3 (1): 16–40.
Getches, D.H. 1985. “Competing Demands for the Colorado 
River.” University of Colorado Law Review 56: 413.
Gleick, P.H. 2002. “Water Management: Soft Water Paths.” 
Nature 418: 373.
———. 2003. “Global Freshwater Resources: Soft-Path Solu-
tions for the 21st Century.” Science 302 (5650): 1524–28.
Gleick, P.H., D. Haasz, C. Henges-Jeck, V. Srinivasan, G. Wolff, 
K. Kao Cushing & A. Mann. 2003. “Waste Not, Want Not: 
The Potential for Urban Water Conservation in California.” 
Oakland CA: Pacific Institute. Available at pacinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/21/2013/02/waste_not_want_not_
full_report3.pdf.
Glennon, R. 2005. “Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatiza-
tion.” Texas Law Review 83 (7): 1873–1902.
Gómez-Baggethun, E., R. de Groot, P.L. Lomas & C. Montes. 
2010. “The History of Ecosystem Services in Economic 
Theory and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and 
Payment Schemes.” Ecological Economics, Special Sec-
tion - Payments for Environmental Services: Reconciling 
Theory and Practice, 69 (6): 1209–18. doi:10.1016/j.ecole-
con.2009.11.007.
Grafton, R.Q. & J. Horne. 2014. “Water Markets in the Murray-
Darling Basin.” Agricultural Water Management 145 (No-
vember): 61–71. doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2013.12.001.
Grafton, R.Q., C. Landry, G.D. Libecap, S. McGlennon & R. 
O’Brien. 2010. “An Integrated Assessment of Water Mar-
kets: Australia, Chile, China, South Africa and the USA.” 
ICER Working Paper 32-2010. ICER - International Centre 
for Economic Research. Available at ideas.repec.org/p/icr/
wpicer/32-2010.html.
Faeth, P. 2000. Fertile Ground: Nutrient Trading’s Potential 
to Cost-Effectively Improve Water Quality. Washington, 
D.C.: World Resources Institute. Available at wri.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/fertile_ground.pdf.
Famiglietti, J.S. 2014. “The Global Groundwater Crisis.” Na-
ture Climate Change 4: 945–48.
Farolfi, St. & S. Perret. 2002. “Inter-Sectoral Competition for 
Water Allocation in Rural South Africa : Analysing a Case 
Study through a Standard Environmental Economics 
Approach.” Paper without proceedings Working paper: 
2002-23. Department of Agricultural Economics, Exten-
sion and Rural Development: University of Pretoria. http://
agritrop.cirad.fr/511263/.
Feinglas, S., C. Gray & P. Mayer. 2013. “Conservation Helps 
Limit Rate Increases for a Colorado Utility.” Alliance for 
Water Efficiency. Available at financingsustainablewater.
org/resource-search/conservation-helps-limit-rate-
increases-colorado-utility.
Ferraro, P.J. 2008. “Asymmetric Information and Contract 
Design for Payments for Environmental Services.” Eco-
logical Economics, Payments for Environmental Services 
in Developing and Developed Countries, 65 (4): 810–21. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029.
———. 2009. “Regional Review of Payments for Wa-
tershed Services: Sub-Saharan Africa.” Jour-
nal of Sustainable Forestry 28 (3-5): 525–50. 
doi:10.1080/10549810802701234.
Fischel, W.A. 1995. Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and 
Politics. Harvard University Press.
Fisher-Vanden, K. & S. Olmstead. 2013. “Moving Pollution 
Trading from Air to Water: Potential, Problems, and Prog-
nosis.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 147–71.
Forest Trends. 2015a. Watershed Connect. Available at wa-
tershedconnect.com/
Forest Trends. 2015b. “Paw Paw River Watershed.” Program 
Inventory. Paw Paw River Watershed. Available at water-
shedconnect.com/programs/Paw-Paw-River-Watershed.
Fox, J. 2014. “The Role of Trading in Achieving Water Qual-
ity Objectives.” presented at the United States House 
of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Water Resources and 
Environment, Washington, DC, April 17. Available at wqt.
epri.com/pdf/EPRI%20Testimony%20WQT%20Final%20
4-17-14.pdf.
Freyfogle, E.T. 1996. “Water Rights and the Commonwealth.” 
Environmental Law 26: 27.
Frontier Economics, and Australia National Water Commis-
sion. 2007. The Economic and Social Impacts of Water 
Trading [electronic Resource] : Case Studies in the 
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T78
rent Initiatives.” Journal of Sustainable Forestry 28 (3-5): 
551–75. doi:10.1080/10549810902794287.
Huber, R.M., J. Ruitenbeek & R.S. da Motta. 1998. “Market-
Based Instruments for Environmental Policymaking in 
Latin America and the Caribbean - Lessons from Eleven 
Countries.” WDP381. The World Bank. Available at docu-
ments.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/438776/market-
based-instruments-environmental-policymaking-latin-
america-caribbean-lessons-eleven-countries.
Hundley, N., Jr. 2001. The Great Thirst: Californians and 
Water—A History, Revised Edition. 2001 (revised). Un-
versity of California Press. Available at ucpress.edu/book.
php?isbn=9780520224568.
International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED). 2015. Watershed Markets. Available at watershed-
markets.org/
Jenkins, M.W., J.R. Lund, R.E. Howitt, A.J. Draper, S.M. Msangi, 
S.K. Tanaka, R.S. Ritzema & G.F. Marques. 2004. “Optimi-
zation of California’s Water Supply System: Results and 
Insights.” Journal of Water Resources Planning and 
Management 130 (4): 271–80. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)0733-
9496(2004)130:4(271).
Jones, C., E. Branosky, M. Selman & M. Perez. 2010. “How Nu-
trient Trading Could Help Restore the Chesapeake Bay.” 
Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available 
at wri.org/working_papers/how_nutrient_trading_could_
help_restore_the_chesapeake_bay.pdf.
Karousakis, K. & Q. Brooke. 2010. Paying for Biodiversity: 
Enhancing the Cost-Effectiveness of Payments for Eco-
system Services. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Available at oecd-ilibrary.
org/content/book/9789264090279-en.
Kenny, A. 2006. “Ecosystem Marketplace - Ecosystem Ser-
vices in the New York City Watershed.” Ecosystem Mar-
ketplace. Available at ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/
dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=4130&section=home.
Koplow, D. 2004. The Use of Economic Instruments in Envi-
ronmental Policy: Opportunties and Challenges. United 
Nations Environment Programme. Available at unep.ch/
etb/publication/EconInst/econInstruOppChnaFin.pdf.
Kosoy, N., M. Martinez-Tuna, R. Muradian & J. Martinez-Alier. 
2007. “Payments for Environmental Services in Water-
sheds: Insights from a Comparative Study of Three Cases 
in Central America.” Ecological Economics 61 (2–3): 
446–55. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.03.016.
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LA DWP). 
2013. “Owens Lake Master Project.” Los Angeles, CA: 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. Available 
at ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-water/a-w-
losangelesaqueduct/a-w-laa-owenslake. 
Grafton, R.Q., G. Libecap, E. Edwards, R O’Brien & C. Landry. 
2012. “Comparative Assessment of Water Markets: In-
sights from the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia and the 
Western USA.” Water Policy 14: 175–93.
Greiber, T., ed. 2009. Payments for Ecosystem Services: Le-
gal and Institutional Frameworks. IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper, No. 78. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, in 
collaboration with the IUCN Environmental Law Centre, 
Bonn, Germany. Available at cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/
eplp_78_1.pdf.
Hanak, E. & E. Stryjewski. 2012. “California’s Water Market, 
By the Numbers: Update 2012.” Public Policy Institute 
of California. Available at wee.ppic.org/content/pubs/
report/R_1112EHR.pdf.
Harrington, W. & R.D. Morgenstern. 2004. “Economic Incen-
tives Versus Command and Control: What’s the Best Ap-
proach for Solving Environmental Problems?” Resources 
for the Future. Available at rff.org/Publications/Resources/
Documents/152/RFF_Resources_152_ecoincentives.pdf.
Hauter, W. 2013. “D.C. District Court Fails on Pollution Trad-
ing: Clean Water Act Trading Lawsuit Dismissed Due to 
Burden of Proof.” Food and Water Watch. December 16. 
Available at foodandwaterwatch.org/pressreleases/d-c-
district-court-fails-on-pollution-trading-clean-water-act-
trading-lawsuit-dismissed-due-to-burden-of-proof/.
Hawkins, S. 2011. “Laying the Foundation: An Analytical Tool 
for Assessing Legal and Institutional Readiness for PES.” 
Forest Trends. Available at forest-trends.org/documents/
files/doc_3014.pdf.
Heberger, M., H. Cooley & P.H. Gleick. 2014. “Urban Water 
Conservation and Efficiency Potential in California.” Oak-
land, CA: Pacific Institute. Available at pacinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/21/2014/06/ca-water-urban.pdf.
Howe, C.W. 2011. “The Efficient Water Market of the Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy. District: Colorado, USA.” 
IBE Review reports CS22. WP6 IBE EX-POST Case Stud-
ies. EPI Water. Available at feem-project.net/epiwater/
docs/d32-d6-1/CS22_Colorado.pdf.
Howe, C.W. & C. Goemans. 2003. “Water Transfers and Their 
Impacts: Lessons from Three Colorado Water Markets.” 
JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association 39 (5): 1055–65. doi:10.1111/j.1752-1688.2003.
tb03692.x.
Howitt, R.E. 1998. “Spot Prices, Option Prices, and Water 
Markets: An Analysis of Emerging Markets in California.” 
In Markets for Water, edited by K. William Easter, Mark 
W. Rosegrant, and Ariel Dinar, 119–40. Natural Resource 
Management and Policy 15. Springer US.  
Huang, M., S.K. Upadhyaya, R. Jindal & J. Kerr. 2009. “Pay-
ments for Watershed Services in Asia: A Review of Cur-
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T 79
Moench, M., A. Dixit, S. Janakarajan, M.S. Rathore & S. Mudra-
kartha. 2003. The Fluid Mosaic: Water Governance in 
the Context of Variability, Uncertainty and Change: A 
Synthesis Paper. Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, 
Kathmandu, and the Institute for Social and Environmen-
tal Transition, Boulder, Colorado, US.
Moore, R.H. 2012. “Reaching the Potential of Water-Quality 
Trading.” In Water Sustainability in Agriculture, 73–81. 
Ithaca, New York: National Agriculutural Biotechnology 
Council. Available at nabc.cals.cornell.edu/Publications/
Reports/nabc_24/24_2_1_Moore.pdf.
Morgan, C. & A. Wolverton. 2005. “Water Quality Trading in 
the United States.” 05-07. Working Paper. National Cen-
ter for Environmental Economics. Available at yosemite.
epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/be6bc67216ab9f5d85256e460
07b104d/3e026cbb6a9956918525702f005e383c/$FI
LE/2005-07.pdf.
MOTU. 2009. “Lake Rotorua Short Films.” Motu Economic 
and Public Policy Research. Available at motu.org.nz/
research/detail/rotorua_films.
Muñoz-Piña, C., A. Guevara, J.M. Torres & J. Braña. 2008. 
“Paying for the Hydrological Services of Mexico’s Forests: 
Analysis, Negotiations and Results.” Ecological Econom-
ics, Payments for Environmental Services in Developing 
and Developed Countries, 65 (4): 725–36. doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2007.07.031.
Naeem, S., J. C. Ingram, A. Varga, T. Agardy, P. Barten, G. Ben-
nett, E. Bloomgarden, et al., 2015. “Get the Science Right 
When Paying for Nature’s Services.” Science 347 (6227): 
1206–7. doi:10.1126/science.aaa1403.
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. 2014. “FY 2013 Annual 
Report: Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program.” 
Portland, Oregon: National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. 
Available at cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/library/documents/
NLB_CBWTP_Annual13_R8.pdf.
National Research Council. 1968. Water and Choice in the 
Colorado Basin: An Example of Alternatives in Water 
Management: A Report. National Academies.
———. 1992. Water Transfers in the West:: Efficiency, Eq-
uity, and the Environment. National Academies Press.
Neef, A. & D. Thomas. 2009. “Rewarding the Upland Poor for 
Saving the Commons? Evidence from Southeast Asia.” 
International Journal of the Commons 3 (1): 1–15.
Newburn, D.A. & R.T. Woodward. 2012. “An Ex Post Evalu-
ation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading 
Program1.” JAWRA Journal of the American Water 
Resources Association 48 (1): 156–69. doi:10.1111/j.1752-
1688.2011.00601.x.
Raes, L. & P. Mohebalian. 2013. “The Socio Bosque Pro-
gram for Rainforest and Paramo Conservation, Ecuado.” 
Geneva Switzerland: The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity. Available at teebweb.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/The-Socio-Bosque-Programme-for-
rainforest-and-Paramo-Conservation-Ecuador-.pdf.
Leflaive, X., M. Witmer, R. Martin-Hurtado, M. Bakker, T. Kram, 
L. Bouwman, H. Visser, A. Bouwman, H. Hilderink & K. 
Kim. 2012. “Water.” In OECD Environmental Outlook, 
275–332. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. Available at oecd-ilibrary.org/content/
chapter/env_outlook-2012-8-en.
Levine, G., R. Barker & C.C. Huang. 2007. “Water Transfer 
from Agriculture to Urban Uses: Lessons Learned, with 
Policy Considerations.” Paddy and Water Environment 5 
(4): 213–22. doi:10.1007/s10333-007-0092-8.
LimnoTech & The Nature Conservancy. 2013. “Quantifying 
Replenish Benefits in Community Water Partnership 
Projects, Final Report for 2012.” The Coca-Cola Com-
pany. Available at assets.coca-colacompany.com/2f/cb/
e5d2ca1e4c58a38adbe8586d06db/final-quanitification-
report-water-pdf.pdf.
Livingston, M.L. 1998. “Institutional Requisites for Efficient 
Water Markets.” In Markets for Water: Potential and Per-
formance, 19–33. Springer. Available at link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-0-585-32088-5_2.
Lovins, A. 1977. Soft energy paths: Toward a durable peace. 
Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, US.
Marida, P. 2010. “Ohio’s Water Quality Trading Programs - To 
Be Taken Over by Coal?” The Ohio Sierran, A Publica-
tion of the Ohio Chapter of the Sierra Club.
Mariola, M.J. 2009. “Are Markets the Solution to Water Pollu-
tion? A Sociological Investigation of Water Quality Trad-
ing.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State 
University. Available at rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_
num=osu1250015222.
Medellín-Azuara, J., J.J. Harou, M.A. Olivares, K. Madani, 
J.R. Lund, R.E. Howitt, S.K. Tanaka, M.W. Jenkins & T. 
Zhu. 2008. “Adaptability and Adaptations of California’s 
Water Supply System to Dry Climate Warming.” Climatic 
Change 87 (1): 75–90.
Meinzen-Dick, R. & R. Pradhan. 2005. “Recognizing Multiple 
Water Uses in Intersectoral Water Transfers.” In Asian 
Irrigation in Transition: Responding to Challenges, 178–
205. Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand.
Richards, M. 2013. “What Do We Know about Gender and 
Other Social Impacts of IWS Projects?: A Literature Re-
view.” Forest Trends. Available at forest-trends.org/docu-
ments/files/doc_4089.pdf.
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T80
Porras, I., B. Aylward & J. Dengel. 2013. “Monitoring Pay-
ments for Watershed Services Schemes in Developing 
Countries.” London, UK: International Institute for Envi-
ronment and Development. Available at pubs.iied.org/
pdfs/16525IIED.pdf.
Porras, I., D.N. Barton, A. Chacon-Cascante & M. Miranda. 
2013. “Learning from 20 Years of Payments for Ecosys-
tem Services in Costa Rica.” London, UK: International 
Institute for Environment and Development. Available at 
pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16514IIED.pdf.
Porras, I. & N. Neves. 2006a. “China - Sloping Lands Con-
version Programme.” Markets for Watershed Services 
- Country Profile. International Institute for Environment 
and Development. Available at watershedmarkets.org/
documents/China_SLCP_eng.pdf.
———. 2006b. “Mexico - National PSAH Programme.” Mar-
ket for Watershed Services - Country Profile. International 
Institute for Environment and Development. Available 
at watershedmarkets.org/documents/Mexico_National_
PSAH_eng.pdf.
Porras, I.T., M. Grieg-Gran & N. Neves. 2008. All That Glit-
ters: A Review of Payments for Watershed Services in 
Developing Countries. IIED. Available at pubs.iied.org/
pdfs/13542IIED.pdf.
Postel, S.L., G.C. Daily & P.R. Ehrlich. 1996. “Appropriation of 
Renewable Fresh Water.” Science 271 (5250): 785–88.
Queensland Water Commission. 2010. “South East 
Queensland Water Strategy 2010.” 29229. Queensland 
Water Commission. Available at qwc.qld.gov.au.
Ravnborg, H.M., M.G. Damsgaard & K. Raben. 2007. “Pay-
ments for Ecosystem Services - Issues and Pro-Poor 
Opportunities for Development Assistance.” Copenhagen, 
Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies.
Reimers, F. 2013. “Shifting Ground.” Nature Conservancy, 
June.
Rockefeller Foundation. 2013. Key Factors Supporting Small-
Scale Coastal Fisheries Management. 
Romano, D. & M. Leporati. 2002. “The Distributive Impact 
of the Water Market in Chile: A Case Study in Limari 
Province, 1981- 1997.” Quarterly Journal of International 
Agriculture 41 (1): 41–58.
Rozza, J.P., B.D. Richter, W.M. Larson, T. Redder, K. Vigerstol & 
P. Bowen P. 2013. “Corporate Water Stewardship: Achiev-
ing a Sustainable Balance.” Journal of Management and 
Sustainability 3 (4). Available at dx.doi.org/10.5539/jms.
v3n4p41.
Newlin, B.D., M.W. Jenkins, J.R. Lund & R.E. Howitt. 2002. 
“Southern California Water Markets: Potential and Limita-
tions.” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Man-
agement 128 (1): 21–32.
NSWDEC. 2003. Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme: 
Working Together to Protect River Quality and Sustain 
Economic Development. Sydney, Australia: Department 
of Environment and Conservation, New South Wales. 
Available at epa.nsw.gov.au/resources/licensing/hrsts/
hrsts.pdf.
NWC. 2013. Australian National Water Commission Markets 
Report 2012-2013. Canberra. Available at nwc.gov.au/pub-
lications/topic/water-industry/australian-water-markets-
report-2012-13.
O’Donnell, M. & B. Colby. 2010. “Water Banks: A Tool for En-
hancing Water Supply Reliability.” Guidebook. University 
of Arizona. Available at ag.arizona.edu/arec/pubs/faculty-
pubs/ewsr-Banks-final-5-12-10.pdf.
O’Grady, D. 2011. “Sociopolitical Conditions for Success-
ful Water Quality Trading in the South Nation River 
Watershed, Ontario, Canada1.” JAWRA Journal of the 
American Water Resources Association 47 (1): 39–51. 
doi:10.1111/j.1752-1688.2010.00511.x.
Olszowa, D.M., J.P. Heath & P.A. Tennant. 1998. “Evalua-
tion of Nutrient Loads and Sources in the Ohio River 
Basin.” In . Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Com-
mission (ORSANCO). http://acwi.gov/monitoring/
conference/98proceedings/Papers/54-OLSZ.html.
Pagiola, S. 2008. “Payments for Environmental Services in 
Costa Rica.” Ecological Economics, Payments for Envi-
ronmental Services in Developing and Developed Coun-
tries, 65 (4): 712–24. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.033.
Pagiola, S., A. Arcenas & G. Platais. 2005. “Can Payments for 
Environmental Services Help Reduce Poverty? An Explo-
ration of the Issues and the Evidence to Date from Latin 
America.” World Development, Institutional arrange-
ments for rural poverty reduction and resource conserva-
tion, 33 (2): 237–53. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.011.
Pant, D., M. Bhattarai & G. Basnet. 2008. “Implications Of Bulk 
Water Transfer On Local Water Management Institutions: 
A Case Study of the Melamchi Water Supply Project in 
Nepal.” Working Paper 78. Consultative Group on Interna-
tional Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Available at indiae-
nvironmentportal.org.in/files/capriwp78.pdf.
Perrot-Maitre, D. 2006. “The Vittel Payments for Ecosystem 
Services: A ‘Perfect’ PES Case?” London, UK: International 
Institute for Environment and Development. Available 
at katoombagroup.org/~katoomba/documents/tools/
TheVittelpaymentsforecosystemservices.pdf.
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T 81
Thobani, M. 1997. “Formal Water Markets: Why, When, and 
How to Introduce Tradable Water Rights.” World Bank 
Research Observer 12 (2): 161–79.
TWSST, 2014. Transforming water scarcity through trading, 
2012–2015, Final report.
United Nations. 2009. “World Water Development Report 3: 
Water in a Changing World.” Available at webworld.unes-
co.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/tableofcontents.shtml.
———. 2012. “World Water Development Report 4: 
Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk.” Paris, 
France: United Nations. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0021/002156/215644e.pdf.
UNEP. 2009. “Training Resource Manual: The Use of Eco-
nomic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Re-
source Management.” Available at unep.ch/etb/publica-
tions/EI%20manual%202009/Training%20Resource%20
Manual.pdf.
UNEP. 2004. “The Use of Economic Instruments in Environ-
mental Policy: Opportunities and Challenges.” Available 
at unep.ch/etb/publication/EconInst/econInstruOppCh-
naFin.pdf.
US Bureau of Reclamation. 2015. “Moving Forward, Phase 1 
Report.” Bureau of Reclamation, US Department of the In-
terior. Available at usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/
MovingForward/Phase1Report.html.
US Census Bureau. 2012. “The Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, Table 435: State and Local Governments-
-Summary of Finances.” Washington, DC. Available at 
census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0435.pdf.
US EPA. 2001. “The United States Experiences with Eco-
nomic Incentives for Protecting the Environment.” EPA-
240-R-01-001. Available at yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/
eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-13.pdf/$file/EE-0216B-13.pdf.
US EPA. 2003. “Final Water Quality Trading Policy.” January 
13. http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/finalpo-
licy2003.cfm.
———. 2009. “Steam Electric Power Generation Point 
Source Category: Final Detailed Study Report.” United 
States Environmental Protection Agency. Available at 
water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/steam-electric/
upload/Steam-Electric_Detailed-Study-Report_2009.pdf.
———. 2010. “How Water Quality (Nutrient) Trading Enables 
Alpine Cheese Company to Improve Water Quality and 
Increase Economic Development in the Region.” US. 
Available at water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/ms-
basin/oh_03.cfm.
Ruppert, T.K. 2004. “Water Quality Trading and Agricultural 
Nonpoint Source Pollution: An Analysis of the Effective-
ness and Fairness of EPA’s Policy on Water Quality Trad-
ing.” Villanova Environmental Law Journal 15: 1.
Salzman, J. 2006. “Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water.” 
Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 17 (3). Avail-
able at lsr.nellco.org/duke_fs/31.
Schmalensee, R & R.N. Stavins. 2013. “The SO2 Allowance 
Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy 
Experiment.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (1): 
103–22. doi:10.1257/jep.27.1.103.
Sharma, S.K. & K. Vairavamoorthy. 2009. “Urban Water De-
mand Management: Prospects and Challenges for the 
Developing Countries.” Water and Environment Journal 
23 (3): 210–18. doi:10.1111/j.1747-6593.2008.00134.x.
Shortle, J.S. & R.D. Horan. 2005. “Water Quality Trading.” 
Penn State Environmental Law Review 14: 231.
———. 2008. “The Economics of Water Quality Trading.” 
International Review of Environmental and Resource 
Economics 2 (2): 101–33.
Smith, S., P. Rowcroft, M. Everard, L. Couldrick, M. Reed, H. 
Rogers, T. Quick, C. Eves & C. White. 2013. “Payments 
for Ecosystem Services: A Best Practice Guide.” Defra, 
London: Department for Environment, Food, and Rural 
Affairs. Available at gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/200920/pb13932-pes-
bestpractice-20130522.pdf.
Stacey, P.E., T. Haze & I. Raffa. 2012. “Meeting the Nitrogen 
Wasteload Allocation in Connecticut: Connecticut’s Nitro-
gen Credit Exchange After 10 Years of Operation as the 
Nation’s Most Significant Water Quality Trading Program.” 
presented at the 36th annual Meeting of the New Eng-
land Association of Environmental Biologists, Falmouth, 
Massachusetts, March 22. Available at epa.gov/region1/
neaeb2012/pdfs/0930_BR2_PaulStacey.pdf.
Stanton, T., M. Echavarria, K. Hamilton & C. Ott. 2010. “State 
of Watershed Payments: An Emerging Marketplace.” 
Ecosystem Marketplace. Available at watershedconnect.
com/documents/files/state_of_watershed_payments_an_
emerging_marketplace.pdf.
Stavins, R.N. 2001. “Experience with Market-Based Environ-
mental Policy Instruments.” Resources for the Future. 
Available at rff.org/documents/rff-dp-01-58.pdf.
Tarlock, A.D. 2014. “Mexico and the United States Assume a 
Legal Duty to Provide Colorado River Delta Restoration 
Flows: An Important International Environmental and 
Water Law Precedent.” Review of European, Compara-
tive & International Environmental Law 23 (1): 76–87. 
doi:10.1111/reel.12066.
I N C E N T I V E - B A S E D  I N S T R U M E N T S  F O R  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T82
Worster, D. 1985. Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the 
Growth of the American West. Oxford University Press.
Wunder, S. 2005. “Payments for Environmental Services: 
Some Nuts and Bolts.” CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 42. 
Jakarta, Indonesia: Center for Internatioanl Forestry Re-
search. Available at theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/
resources/pdf/2012/payment-ecosystem-services-02.pdf.
———. 2008. “Payments for Environmental Services and 
the Poor: Concepts and Preliminary Evidence.” Environ-
ment and Development Economics 13 (03): 279–97. 
doi:10.1017/S1355770X08004282.
Young, M.D. 2010. “Environmental Effectiveness and Eco-
nomic Efficiency of Water Use in Agriculture: The Experi-
ence of and Lessons from the Australian Water Reform 
Programme.” Background Report. Sustainable Manage-
ment of Water Resources in Agriculture. OECD. Available 
at dx.doi.org/10.1787/786732081512.
Young, M. 2015. “Tricks of the Trade: Learning From Austra-
lia’s Water Reform Experience.” Waterfront 1 (1): 10–12.
Zbinden, S. & D.R. Lee. 2005. “Paying for Environmental Ser-
vices: An Analysis of Participation in Costa Rica’s PSA 
Program.” World Development, Institutional arrange-
ments for rural poverty reduction and resource conserva-
tion, 33 (2): 255–72. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.012.
Zedler, J.B. & S. Kercher. 2005. “WETLAND RESOURCES: 
Status, Trends, Ecosystem Services, and Restorability.” 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources 30 (1): 
39–74. doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.30.050504.144248.
Zellmer, S.B. & J. Harder. 2007. “Unbundling Property in  
Water.” Alabama Law Review 59: 679.
Zucchino, D. 2015. “Duke Energy Fined $102 Million for Pol-
luting Rivers with Coal Ash.” Los Angeles Times, May 14. 
Available at latimes.com/nation/la-na-duke-energy-coal-
ash-20150514-story.html#page=1.
Zwarteveen, M.Z. 1997. “Water: From Basic Need to Com-
modity: A Discussion on Gender and Water Rights in 
the Context of Irrigation.” World Development 25 (8): 
1335–49.
Wada, Y., L.P.H. van Beek, C.M. van Kempen, J.W.T.M. Reck-
man, S. Vasak & M.F.P. Bierkens. 2010. “Global Depletion of 
Groundwater Resources.” Geophysical Research Letters 
37 (20): L20402. doi:10.1029/2010GL044571.
Wallace, K.H. 2007. “Trading Pollution for Water Quality: 
Assessing the Effects of Market-Based Instruments in 
Three Basins.” Master’s Thesis, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Available at 
dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/39938.
Watershed Agricultural Council. 2011. “Strategic Plan: 2011-
2014.” Walton, New York. Available at nycwatershed.org/
pdfs/Strategic_Plan_2011-2014.pdf.
Wheeler, S.A. & J. Cheesman. 2013. “Key Findings from a Sur-
vey of Sellers to the Restoring the Balance Programme.” 
Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics 
and Policy 32 (3): 340–52. doi:10.1111/1759-3441.12038.
Wind, M.H.A. 2012. “Water Emissions Trading in Europe - A 
Literature Overview and Discussion of Opportunities.” 
Eco-consult Environmental Economics. http://www.eco-
consult.nl/images/pdf/WET_in_Europe_v3.pdf.
Woodward, R.T., R.A. Kaiser & A.B. Wicks. 2002. “The Struc-
ture and Practice of Water Quality Trading Markets.” 
Journal of the American Water Resources Association 
38 (4): 967–79. doi:10.1111/j.1752-1688.2002.tb05538.x.
World Economic Forum (WEF). 2012. “Global Risks 2012, 
Seventh Edition.” Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic 
Forum (WEF). Available at weforum.org/docs/WEF_Glo-
balRisks_Report_2012.pdf.
———. 2013. “Global Risks 2013, Eighth Edition.” Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Economic Forum (WEF). Available 
at.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf.
———. 2014. “Global Risks 2014, Ninth Edition.” Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Economic Forum (WEF). Available at 
weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf.
———. 2015. “Global Risks 2015, 10th Edition.” Geneva, Swit-
zerland: World Economic Forum (WEF). Available at wefo-
rum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_2015_Report15.pdf.
World Health Organization and UNICEF. 2015. “Progress on 
Sanitation and Drinking Water - 2015 Update and MDG 
Assessment.” Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Orga-
nization. Available at wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
resources/JMP-Update-report-2015_English.pdf.
O
hi
o 
R
iv
er
, I
nd
ia
na
. P
ho
to
gr
ap
h 
by
 R
av
en
on
he
al
th
.
O
hi
o 
R
iv
er
, I
nd
ia
na
. P
ho
to
gr
ap
h 
by
 R
av
en
on
he
al
th
.
www.rockefellerfoundation.org
Financial support provided by
